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MILITARY CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
THE BIRTH OF A POLICY
CHAPTER I
EXPLANATION OP METHOD
Before 1954 most scholars in the field of interna­
tional relations considered such elements as power, history 
and geo-politics to be the determining factors behind the 
patterns of interactions among nations. Since this objec­
tive approach reified the state and neglected the human ele­
ment Richard Snyder, in 1954, proposed a method of analysing 
international relations from a subjective viewpoint. Instead 
of the State he would place the nation's decision-makers at
the center of his analysis, and explore the circumstances
1which led them to particular decisions. In this manner he
believed he could better determine why nations exhibited
2their distinctive patterns of interaction, "The State's
1James N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of De­
cision-Making Analysis," 194-98 in James C. Charlesworth, ed., 
Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press,
Ï967TT  -------------
2Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,
1963), 60-62, Hereafter the authors are referred to collec­
tively as Snyder.
action (then becam^ the action taken by those who were act-
3ing in the name of the State."
Snyder assumed that decision-makers planned their 
actions in order to gain optimal conditions and in order to
4prevent other nations from interfering with those conditions. 
He believed that an observer could follow the course of those 
actions or decisions through an identification of the four 
basic components of action; situation, actors, goals and 
means.^ It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to ana­
lyze these four components in order to portray the format 
around which the following chapters will be oriented.
Situation and Actors 
The situation is the independent variable which con­
ditions goals and means, and it is defined by the actors or 
decision-makers. Therefore if the analyst intends to deter­
mine why a particular decision occurred he must view the 
situation as the actors viewed it. This involves defining 
the situation in terms of how the actors relate to each other; 
to goals and means; and in terms of how they formulate goals 
and means into strategies of action subject to relevant fac­






Snyder encompasses a set of potentially relevant 
factors in the situation under the rubric of setting, which 
has two major aspects, internal and external. Each of these 
possesses several subdivisions. The internal setting is 
composed of an organizational unit within which the actors 
decide, the structure and character of the society within 
which the unit is placed and the geographic unit in which 
all are placed. The external setting is composed of similar 
factors, with the exception that they are situated in other 
countries; the organizational unit, society and geographic 
position of other areas may influence the actor under analy­
sis. The degree of influence which these factors in the 
setting exert upon the decision-makers and hence upon the 
decision under analysis, constitutes the research problem 
for the analyst.
These factors may directly influence decision-makers 
as in direct communication between governments. On the other 
hand, the influence may be indirect: events in a foreign
society may influence public opinion in the decision-maker's 
country from which he, in turn, receives impulses. Snyder 
adds that the decision-makers themselves may be a source of 
influence on their further decisions, and hence a relevant 
factor in the situation. This occurs through the process
7of feedback.
Since it is difficult to determine which of these
^Ibid., 66-73, 132.
4
factors holds the most relevance for particular decision­
makers, Snyder has interjected three variables around which
the search for relevancy may be oriented: spheres of com-
0
petence, communication and information, and motivation.
The first of these, spheres of competence, deals generally 
with the totality of those activities of the decision-maker 
relative and necessary to the achievement of the organiza-
9tional goal. Among the problems which the analyst faces 
concerning this variable is a determination of the relative 
importance of rules and/or conventions. Conventional pro­
cedure may place the actor in a more important position vis 
a vis the organizational goal than he would obtain accord­
ing to formal rules. Another problem involves the explora­
tion of authority and subordination relationships in order 
to determine the particular actor’s place in the organiza­
tion, Still further questions include categorizing the ac­
tor's functions as general or specific; usually the higher 
the competence the more general the functions and vice-versa. 
Finally, in relation to spheres of competence, Snyder con­
siders what structure of participation the actor exhibits.
It may be representative in character, meaning he is directly 
involved in the decision-making process or it may be an ad­




The answers to these questions concerning the spheres 
of competence are sought within the structure of the decision 
unit: the occupants of those spheres of competence orient­
ing themselves arc**.id a particular decision. The decision 
unit may be composed formally of only cabinet members, for 
example. On the other hand it may include members who are 
not formally associated with the usually accepted spheres of 
competence. Snyder facilitates matters here when he states 
that only personnel connected with the government in some
capacity may be included within the decision unit, for only
11they possess the authority to carry out a decision.
Government officials usually have an advantage in 
the utilization of the second variable for determining rele­
vant factors in the situation, communication and information. 
Since, in most cases, they occupy high spheres of competence 
they are in a good position to influence the leaders by com­
municating to them information on the situation. The higher 
the competence the more channels of communication are usually
available. Therefore it is important to discover who commu-
12nicates information and how.
Spheres of competence, communication and information 





to determining why particular factors in the situation ap­
peared relevant and therefore influenced a particular deci­
sion. However the center of this question is not approached 
until the third variable is considered, motivation. Snyder 
indicates that, in general, motivation is the intervening 
variable between the organism and the situation. Over time 
an organism develops a readiness to respond to given stimuli 
in the situation in a particualr manner. Both the readiness 
to respond or attitude and the action of responding, frame
13of reference, may be analysed through motivational analysis.
These changes in motivation which occur over time 
may be illustrated in concert with Snyder's concept of an 
event, which is a sequence of activities encompassing a par­
ticular decision. Decision-making may now be described as 
action which occurs incrementally. Each sequence of activi­
ties may be isolated and studied individually and in connec­
tion v/ith the others in order to arrive at the reasons behind 
the particular decision. Included in this analysis is the 
fact that goals and means change over time for various rea­
sons such as differing interpretations of the situation by 
members of the decision unit. These avenues of conflict are 
sources of research in order to determine the influence on 
the decision by occupants of various spheres of competence.




that motivation is important, for the analyst must deter­
mine why and how the individual developed a readiness to 
respond to stimuli in his distinctive manner. This consti­
tutes the observance of attitude formation and its influ­
ence on the decision-maker's interpretation of the situa­
tion, Snyder indicates that the illustration of attitudes 
is oriented around two basic types of motives, "because of" 
and "in order to," The former derives from the personal 
history of the actor and is demarcated according to the pro­
cedures of psychoanalysis. However, Snyder states that 
this form of analysis does not accord with the function of 
the political scientist. This frees the observer to con­
centrate upon "in order to" motives which occur in order to 
obtain some objective. This type of motive is derived 
largely from the actor's experience within a particular de­
cision unit and is therefore association with the unit's 
goal,^^
In preparing the individual to respond in certain
ways to stimuli, attitudes establish the background for an
1.6analysis of frame of reference or the form of response.
Frame of reference contains three elements: perception,
valuation and evaluation. The first of these is character­
ized as omitting, supplementing and structuring incoming in­




17with his conceptual map.
The second element, valuation, strikes at the center 
of the concept of political legitimacy. In many instances 
a decision-maker describes his motives for a decision in terms 
of what he perceives that the public or other actors want to 
hear. His descriptions of his actions, then are circumscribed 
by the prevailing norms of his society and the international 
system in general. For example, today nearly every nation and 
leader must clothe his pronouncements with some semblance of 
democratic platitudes. Even though democracy may symbolize 
different values to different societies the word itself, de­
mocracy, is the norm of international society and statesmen 
subordinate it to their peril, both at home and abroad. Val­
uation as an aspect of frame of reference determines the nor­
mative bounds of the sequence of activities encompassing
■iOdecision-making.
Since the actor's decisions are circumscribed by val­
ues, it is necessary that he continue to evaluate the impact 
of his actions upon the setting. This constitutes Snyder's 
third element of frame of reference, evaluation, which is per­
haps best understood in concert with the concept of feedback. 
According to whether the feedback is positive or negative,
the actor will continue or modify his decision and/or choice





Motivational research, then consists of analysing 
attitudes and frames of reference in terms of their effects 
upon the actor's choice of relevant factors in the situa­
tion, To aid the researcher Snyder provides six sources of
20motivational data. The first source considers the general
nature of a country's foreign policy orientation such as the
United States' containment of communism, and its bearing
21upon the characteristics of an actor's motivation.
The second source is concerned with the influence 
upon members of the decision unit of that unit's particular 
goal. The attitudes and frame of reference of an actor's 
fellow decision-makers are reflected within the confines of 
the usually small group concerned vdth a particular goal. 
Each individual seeks a certain degree of reinforcement of 
his perceptions from his colleagues. Perhaps this occurs 
to a large extent unconsciously, but at any rate Snyder 
states that it is important to determine the characteristics
of the group relationship of those connected with particular
1 22 goals.
While the second source of motivational data is ori­
ented around values derived from the group's relationship 
to its external goal, the third source involves the internal 





motivated to action according to the norms generated by the
23internal dynamics of the group relationship,
A fourth source of motivational data involves a de­
lineation of external values outside of the group's goal 
v/hich are internalized within the members of the decision 
unit. Each member possesses a more or less unconscious stan­
dard of values which govern his actions. The analyst may 
discover this standard through observation of the give and 
take of argument over particular goals and means. What is 
relevant to one actor may or may not be to the next, and
many times neither can explain why. It is in part the task
24of the observer to proffer an explanation.
In contrast to the fourth, members of the decision 
unit are able to explain the fifth source of motivational 
data as it involves external values which they consciously 
reflect, Snyder refers here to the influence of pressure 
groups on decision-makers which tend to circumscribe their 
action. As will be shown in this dissertation the military
is an example of a pressure group which motivates decision-
25makers to weigh its interests.
The final source of motivational data which Snyder 
illustrates falls under the general term of personality, 





competence. The former indicates the importance of a member 
of the decision unit's occupation, whether lawyer, account­
ant, militciry man or other upon the way the actor perceives 
the situation and, hence, upon his motivation to action.
Also pertinent in this respect is the amount of continuing
relations v/hich the individual maintains with his profession- 
26al colleagues.
In regard to interpretation of competence Snyder at­
tempts to determine how the decision-maker views his role 
in the decision unit since an actor's self-image in relation 
to his peers delineates his actions in regard to particular 
decisions. Snyder lists six basic personality types each
possessing a specified self-image or interpretation of com-
27petence within the decision unit. The first of these is 
the communicator who interprets his role as coordinator of 
policies and distributor of information. Another type is 
the innovator whom Snyder describes as a rebel against the 
existing normative order. He is the one most likely to be 
a primary source of internally generated demands to redefine 
situations or to focus the energies of the decisional system. 
His conservative counterpart is labeled the traditionalist.
A repository of precedent, the traditionalist's actions tend 
to slow up organizational change and induce rigidity in po­




realist who perceives only what in his opinion are the major 
essentials of situations. He is usually more concerned with 
specifics than with generalities. Opposed to this narrow 
view is the power-seeker who takes a broad view of his sphere 
of competence and inflates its functional aspects. He will 
violate procedural norms with impunity if it serves his spe­
cial purpose. Diametrically opposed to the power-seeker is 
the final personality type, the career servant. This indi­
vidual maintains a carefully correct attitude with respect
to his role limitations and has a strong sense of organize-
28tional mission.
Goals
Upon utilizing the motivational data to determine 
the most important factors in the situation to the decision 
unit the analyst is prepared to observe the actor's process 
of goal selection. The importance of this component of ac­
tion is revealed in Snyder's definition of decision-making;
"a process which results in the selection from a socially 
defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects
of one project intended to bring about the particular future
29state of affairs envisioned by the decision-makers."
He subdivided the component of goal into four ele­
ments. The first being the target or the specific achieve­




standard of living in France under the Mutual Security Pro­
gram, Following the target was a generalized directional 
element which referred to the ultimate state of affairs en­
visioned through the goal, including its relationship to 
other objectives and to total strategy, A third division 
concerned expectations. This indicated projected changes 
which vjould not have obtained without the action, such as 
heightening of the French resistance to internal appeals to 
communism. Finally, the fourth element of goal referred to
the dimension of time; goals were the directional components
30of action and they would change over time.
Means
Finally, having observed the components of action 
of situation, actors and goals the analyst is ready to con­
sider means or policy. In one sense means may be described 
as action in progress which has occurred, is occurring, and 
which is projected. In another sense means constitutes rules 
or guides to action, which include three aspects: The sub­
stance of a response to some future situation, for example, 
to oppose communist invasion anyv/here by American arms; the 
conditions under which a particular response will be made 
as in the Suez Crisis when the United States indicated that 
it would take no action on its own, but, if asked by Great 
Birtain for a view it would oppose complete Egyptian control; 
finally, the third aspect of rules of action is described as
^^Ibid.. 82-84.
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rhe interpretation of future events and circumstances, for 
example any move by the Soviet Unior to reduce atomic stock­
piles will be regarded as an empty gesture, Snyder's com­
ponent of action of means then, describes a policy of action 
along v/ith rules to guide that action v/ith respect to a pro­
blem, contingency or event which has occurred, is occurring
31or is expected to occur.
Snyder terminates his book v/ith a succinct discus­
sion on what is involved in the specific instance of choice.
He states that choice coincides v/ith one's scale of prefer­
ences v/hich are drived from: organizational norms v/hich
the actor follows ; rules, prescribed and conventional, and 
precedents; and the decision-maker's personal biography.
The remainder of this dissertation will discuss John P, 
Kennedy's choice of the means or policy of military civic ac­
tion and counterinsurgency within the framework of Snyder's 
methodology.
The official definitions, doctrines and orientations
of military civic action and counterinsurgency are derived
largely from President Kennedy's directives in his May 25,
1961 message to Congress and in National Security Action Memo-
32 _randum no, 119, xn the former he elaborated upon the pro­
per purposes of military assistance during his administration:
^^Ibid,, 84-85,
32Willard Barber and Neale Ronning, Internal Security 
and Military Power: Counterinsurqencv and Civic Action in
Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966),
153-54,
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this program like economic assistance, needs a new 
emphasis. It cannot be extended without regard to 
the social, political, and military reforms essen­
tial to internal respect and stability. The equip­
ment and training provided must be tailored to le­
gitimate local needs and to our own foreign and 
military policies, not to our supply of military 
stocks or a local leader’s desire for military 
display. And military assistance can, in addition 
to its military purposes, make a contribution to 
economic progress.33
In National Security Action Memorandum no. 119
Kennedy delineated three stiuations wherein military civic
action would be useful:
1. To strengthen military-civil relationships in 
countries combating active internal subversion.
2. Local military forces can contribute to econo­
mic and social development where neither inter­
nal subversion or external attack is imminent.
3. Military civic action projects should not im­
pair the military role of the armed forces in 
countries threatened by external aggression.34
In accordance with these directives the Department 
of the Army Field Manual defined military civic action as 
the "use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on 
projects useful to the local population at all levels in 
such fields as education, training, public works, agricul­
ture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and 
other areas contributing to economic and social development.
33"Special Message Read by the President Before a 
Joint Session of the Congress, May 25, 1961," 28-37 in Amer­
ican Foreign Policy: Current Documents (Washington: His­
torical Office Bureau of Public Affairs, 1962).
^^Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military 
Power, 154.
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which could also serve to improve the standing of the indige-
35nous military forces with the population." The same manual 
described counterinsurgency as "those military, paramilitary, 
political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken 
by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.
These definitions, along with Kennedy's directives, 
imply a basic difference between military civic action as a 
policy in its own right on the one hand, and as a supplement 
to a primary policy of counterinsurgency on the other. In 
the former case military civic action would take as its pri­
mary goal the prevention of communist insurgency, while in
the latter case it would constitute a means toward defeating
37insurgents through military combat. Accordingly, when 
this study refers to a policy of military civic action it 
connotates preventive action by the military; when a policy 
of counterinsurgency is referred to the goal is one of de­
feating insurgents in military combat.
35Department of the Army Field Manual 31-22 "U.S. 
Army Counterinsurgency Forces" (Washington: Headquarters
Department of the Army, November 1963), 4.
^̂ Ibid.
37Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military 
Power, 6-8.
CHAPTER II
KENNEDY'S PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION 
DURING THE PRE-DECISIONAL SEQUENCE
It is one purpose of this dissertation to utilize 
Snyder's decision-making methodology to determine how and 
why John P. Kennedy arrived at the decision to implement 
the policy of military civic action as a means of prevent­
ing communist aggression in the underdeveloped areas of the 
world, particularly in Latin America and Southeast Asia,
It is a further purpose to determine why in Vietnam that 
policy changed to a primary emphasis on defeating insurgents 
through counterinsurgency.
Following Snyder's concept of decision-making as a 
sequence of activities it will be shown that this strategy 
of action evolved incrementally over several years. Ac­
cordingly pre-decisional and decisional activities will be 
isolated for analysis with the immediate aftermath of the 
Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, for reasons which will
■1The length of time involved in the decision under 
analysis serves to differentiate it from Glenn Paige's defi­
nition of a crisis decision, which he derived from his study 
of Snyder's methodology. Paige defined a crisis decision as 
"a response to a high threat to values, either immediate or 
long range, where there is little time for decision under 
conditions of surprise." Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision: 
June 24-30. 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 1958), è76.
17
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become apparent, serving as the dividing line between them.
In accordance with this procedure the present chapter will fo­
cus on Kennedy's changing definition of the situation through 
the pre-decisional sequence while the following chapters con­
centrate largely on the decisional sequence.
The following statement succinctly delineates Kennedy's 
perception of the external setting during the pre-decisional 
sequence:
I sincerely believe what I said in the State of the 
Union Message about our position in the world. Dur­
ing the next four years our country will be strongly 
tested. Anyone who looks at the increasing power of 
the communist block, the belligerency which marks it, 
particularly the Chinese communists, would conclude 
that we are going to be severely tested in the next 
four years.2
From this quote by Kennedy just after he took office 
it is obvious that he perceived the most relevant factor in 
the external setting to be communist agression. He further 
clarified his conception of that threat through an analysis 
of the canmunist strategy: Since the communists had at
least equaled the United States nuclear capacity they were 
free to concentrate upon "Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush- 
fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation and 
subversion, internal revolution, increased prestige or influ­
ence and blackmail of our allies. Through these methods 
they could nibble away the periphery of the free world with
2J. F. Kennedy, Kennedy and the Press, annotated by 
Harold Chass and Allen Lerman (New York: Cromwell Co., 1965),
Feb. a, 1961, 20.
19
3seemingly insignificant conquests." He further stated that 
the United States had allowed the communists to evict it from 
its rightful estate at the head of the world-wide revolution. 
The communists had made the United States "portray the de­
fender or the status quo while they epitomized the vanguard 
force pointing the way to a better w o r l d . T h e i r  strategy, 
then, involved a deft combination of political, military, 
social and economic tactics, all aimed at capturing the hearts 
and minds of men.
Kennedy's conception of the communist threat as a 
battle for the hearts and minds of men received reinforcement 
on January 6, 1961. On that date Nikita Khrushchev made his 
famous "wars of liberation speech" in which he pledged sup-
5port for all revolutionary movements. It was the opinion 
of the Russian Premier that communism constituted the inevi­
table wave of the future. This was so for several reasons. 
First the Socialist countries, backed by the nuclear power 
of the Soviet Union, now could effectively counter any "im­
perialist" drive to initiate a major world war. Furthermore 
the imperialists realized that by engaging in local aggressive
3"The Missle Gap," speech in the Senate, August 14, 
1958, 33-45 in Allen Nevins, ed., The Strategy of Peace 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1960),
^"The Global Challenge," January 1, 1960, 3-8 in Ibid.
^"The Communist Doctrine of Wars of Liberation: Ad­
dress by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) Before a Meeting of Party Organizations 
of the CPSU, Moscow, January 6, 1961," 555-58 in American 
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962.
20
wars that they would run the risk of escalation into a nu­
clear holocaust. Therefore Khrushchev reasoned that the wars 
of the indefinite future would center upon wars of liberation.
The "Oppressed" peoples, realizing that they had the backing 
of the communist block, would increasingly engage in guerrilla 
activities to overthrow oppressive regimes supported by im­
perialist powers. To emphasize his point he cited the exam- 
pies of this phenomena in Algeria, Vietnam and Cuba.
This speech indicated to Kennedy that in his adminis­
tration the main communist threat would be within rather than 
between countries and that it would be based more on psycho-
7logical strategy than on conventional military procedure.
To Kennedy this psychological aspect of Khrushchev's speech 
indicated affinity with the political philosophy of Mao Tse-tung; 
however, similarity in communist strategy was not only exhi­
bited between Russia and China. When Kennedy took office 
there were four major trouble spots in the external setting 
each portraying a variation of the communist strategy of
"wars of liberation," These areas were Vietnam, Laos, the
8Congo and Cuba,
The Communist movement in South Vietnam was particularly
^Ibid,
7Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 87th Congress, 2nd Session 
(April 9, 1962), 76-77,
Q
Kennedy and the Press. 13; Helen Fuller, Year of 
Trial; Kennedy's Crucial Decisions (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 196^), 90,
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threatening to Kennedy when viewed within the perspective 
of the commitments which Dwight Eisenhower had made to Presi­
dent Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954. He felt bound by Eisenhower* s 
pledge to uphold the Geneva Accords by defending South Viet­
nam from aggression and subversion instigated from above the 
17th parallel.^
Apparently Kennedy had realized the psychological- 
political nature of communist subversion in Vietnam since 
at least 1954. Evidence for this is found in a Senate speech 
on April 6 of that year in which he described the enemy as 
being everywhere and nowhere at the same time, and as having 
the support of the populace. Furthermore he stated that in 
spite of French assurances to the American people to the con­
trary they controlled the Indochinese people politically, 
militarily, economically and culturally. Therefore in order 
to gain their support against communist aggression these peo­
ple must receive ”a sufficient degree of independence from 
France to make them feel that the war is being waged in their 
cause and for their benefit.” Even before 1954 he stated 
that communism in Southeast Asia must be met by building 
strong native non-communist sentiment within these areas and 
relying on that as a spear-head of defense rather than upon
9"Exchange of Messages with the President of the Re­
public of Vietnam, December 15, 1961," 505 in American For­
eign Policy; Current Documents. 1962; Theodore C. Sorenson, 
Kennedy (New York; Harper and Row, 1965), 650-51.
22
10the force of the United States arms.
The necessity to strengthen non-communist sentiment 
also was a requirement in Laos as Kennedy stepped into of­
fice. Souvanna Phouma, a neutralist leader whcxn the French 
supported, temporarily resided in Cambodia, while the Com­
munist-dominated Pathet Lao occupied North East Laos and the 
Plain of Jars. The fact that the troops of Phoumi Nosavan, 
who held the support of the United States, were psychologi­
cally unprepared to face the impending invasion of the
Pathet Lao, along with North Vietnamese troops, became evi-
11dent in March when they initiated a scared retreat.
As in Southeast Asia, communists were attempting to 
capitalize upon disorder in the Congo as Kennedy entered of­
fice. The Belgians had left that area to fend for itself, 
perhaps prematurely, and in the process invited chaos as 
Katanga, the most important province of the area, seceded 
from the Union. The real danger to world peace temporarily 
abated when the United Nations intervened to isolate the 
crisis from the major cold war antagonists. However in early
1961 it appeared that the United Nations might be forced to
12retreat. Thus Kennedy weighed the situation.
"War in Indochina," 284-94 in John P. Kennedy;
11Sorenson, Kennedy. 640. 
^^Ibid.. 635-39.
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Cuba constituted the fourth major area where the com­
munists were utilizing a psychological-military approach to 
gain political power. This Caribbean country had witnessed 
a revolution at the hands of Fidel Castro and others in Jan­
uary 1959 and by the time that Kennedy occupied the presi­
dency it was generally agreed that Castro* s was a bona fide 
communist regime. The threat increased when it became clear
that Cubans were receiving training in Russia to become the
13vanguard of a hemisphere-wide communist revolution.
The vaurious facets of the cummunist threat in the 
external setting portrayed in the above four cases became 
even more frightening to the president when he reviewed them 
within the context of the internal setting and the political 
doctrine which he had inherited from che previous administra­
tion in Washington. In Kennedy’s opinion, the Eisenhower 
administration "substituted platitudes and slogans for the
strength and planning on concrete issues which was necessary
14to meet the increasingly complex communist offensive."
The Republican strategy of massive retaliation had limited 
the United States* options to the minimum of meeting each
13Kennedy and the Press. 5; "The Castro Regime in Cuba: Document submitted to the Inter-American Peace Ccxnmit*tee by the U.S. Representative on the Council of the OAS (Morrison), December 6, 1961," 324-26 in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. 1962. Although the documentwassubmitted in December it pointed out that the U.S. had been 
suspicious of the Cuban-communist Alliance since 1959.
14"Speech in the Senate," August 14, 1958, 705-15 in J.F.K.: A Compendium.
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communist foray with either "indignant platitudes or an ato­
mic bomb." The resultant situation presented increasing op­
portunities for wars due to miscalculation, Kennedy stated 
that he had seen three major wars in his lifetime caused by
miscalculation, and he did not want to be responsible for a 
15fourth. Therefore he advocated a change in political doc­
trine to replace that of the old regime.
However, change in political doctrine at the chief 
executive level was not the only one in store. He believed 
that the occupants of other spheres of ccmpetence in the 
executive decision unit also had to experience a change in 
perception. It was his belief that the administrators of 
republican programs were "short-sighted unsympathetic men, 
opposed to the very programs they are administering, await­
ing their return to private industry, and so lacking in com­
passion for our domestic needs as to be incapable of ccxnpas-
"16sion for the desparate needs of the world's peoples."
President Kennedy also perceived a reactionary state 
of mind in Congress. He believed that that more conserva­
tive body would constitute one of his most difficult problems 
as he attempted to cope with the communist offensive in devel­
oping countries. This fear was particularly evidenced in the
17realm of long-term assistance to those areas. Probably he
^̂ Ibid.
16"A Time of Decision," Senate Speech, June 14, 1960, 926-35 in Ibid.
^^Kennedy amd the Press. March 23, 1961, 56.
25
did not expect more from Congress since it was elected by 
another conservative element of the internal-setting, the 
United States public, which he perceived to hold several in­
valid assumptions concerning foreign policy. Among them 
were the following;
American arms and science are superior to any oth­
ers in the world . . .  American efforts for world 
wide disarmament are a selfless sacrifice for 
peace . . .  Our bargaining power at any interna­
tional conference table is always more vast and 
flexible than that of our enemy. . . .  A free and 
peace-loving nation has nothing to fear in a world 
where right and justice inevitably prevail . . .
Americans live far behind the lines, protected by 
time, space, and a host of allies from attack . . .
We shall have time to mobilize our superior econo­
mic resources after a war begins • • • Our advanced 
weapons and continental defense systems, established 
at a tremendous cost and effort, will protect us •
. . Victory ultimately goes to the nation with the 
highest national income, gross national product, 
and standard of living.^8
His opinion of the public was not all gloomy however.
He stated on one occasion that its people constituted Ameri­
ca' s greatest resource. He believed that if an American
were given a cause to believe in that he would find a way
19to achieve its implementation. This statement alerts the 
observer to the basic optimism inherent in Kennedy’s politi­
cal style, the basis for which, according to Arthur Schlesinger, 
may reside in the fact that his political attitudes received 
crystallization during the era of the Marshall Plan. He
18 Senate Speech,” August 14, 1958, 705-715 in 
J.F.K.: Compendium.
19John Kennedy, "The Global Challenge,” January 1, 
1960, 3-8 in Nevins, ed., Strategy of Peace.
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witnessed Europe's use of that policy enable it to gain the 
necessary confidence to rise from the desolation of total 
war to become the third leading industrial area of the world 
in only a decade. It is this unusual experience which pro­
bably conditioned his faith in the possibility of a similar 
response on the peirt of the Americans of the sixties which
would help the developing world meet the flexible conununist 
20strategy. In terms of Snyder's dictim to concentrate on 
"in order to" instead of "because of" motives it may be sur­
mized, then, that Kennedy sought to achieve an objective 
similar to that obtained through the Marshall Plan.
The evidence presented thus far concerning his per­
ception of the situation may be utilized in identifying the 
four elements of Kennedy's goal in the developing world in
accordance with the format advocated by Snyder: trait, gen-
21eralized directional element, expectation and time. The 
trait aspect or specific achievement element comprised the 
instigation of a vigorous state of mind in the people of the 
"free world" conducive to the positive implementation of dem­
ocratic values. Based on this positive commitment to demo­
cratic values, the generalized directional element envisioned 
a world of independent nations. In a world thus constituted 
it was his expection to diminish further communist gains.
20Arthur Schlesinger. A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 789.
21Snyder, Foreign Policy Decision-Making. 82-84,
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The time element was most vital to Kennedy for he believed 
that the survival of the democratic way of life depended upon 
a vigorous pursuit of his goal during the nineteen sixties.
The means which Kennedy would «nploy to achieve that 
goal is evidenced in the debate which raged throughout the 
Eisenhower administration over the proper technique to stop 
communist aggression. As a senator John Kennedy constituted 
an important figure in that debate. He espoused the position 
that the United States was overemphasizing the role of the 
Strategic Air Command at the expense of ground forces, as 
seen in the Lebanon crisis of 1958, "That situation showed 
our lack of ability to fight a limited war with speed, dis­
crimination and with the versatility needed to keep it lim-
22ited and not weaken our ultimate retalitory power." In
this connection he believed that the United States should
reverse the critical cut in its military manpower which it
began in 1954 when it attempted to subordinate military se-
23curity to the budget.
He emphasized his belief in the correctness of the 
strategy of limited war and its emphasis on manpower many 
times before he occupied the presidency, particularly during 
the presidential campaign of 1960, In his debates with 
Richard M. Nixon, among other occasions, he pointed out that
22"Senate Speech," August 14, 1958, 705-15 in J.F.K.; A Compendium.
^^Ibid.
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the United States possessed at best nuclear parity with the
Russians and at worst, and most probable, a "missle gap."
Thus in an age of nuclear stand-off the proper means appeared
to him to rest with scmie form of limited war, if war must 
24occur.
Following Snyder, means constitute both action and
rules of action, with the combination of the two comprised
of three components: substance, conditions and interpreta-
25tion. Utilizing this format the general outline of Kennedy's 
military policy in the underdeveloped ëireas during the pre- 
decisional sequence may now be illustrated. As for substance 
he would meet the ccmonunist military-political offensive in 
the underdeveloped world with a United States sponsored 
counter-offensive. The conditions of this United States re­
sponse would contain an explicit warning to the recipients 
of United States assistance that they must also help them­
selves or the long-run effects would be negative. As for 
the interpretation of future events, he would probably in­
terpret any interference in the United States project as 
communist inspired.
These appeared to be the basic elements of Kennedy's 
military policy in the underdeveloped world during his first 
three months in office. However an event occurred in April
^^Sidney Kraus, ed.. The Great Debates (U.S.A.: IndianaUniversity Press, 1962), 416; Nevins. ed.. Strategy of Peace.
25Snyder, Foreign Policy Decision-Making. 84-85. Also see chapter one.
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of that first year which caused him to instigate, in Snyder*s 
terms, a painful re-evaluation of all four components of ac­
tion: situation, actors, goals and means. This was the abor­
tive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, and it served no­
tice to him that enunciating and implementing a policy were 
two different things.
In terms of the format of this dissertation, the re­
sults of the Bay of Pigs caused the sequence of activities 
concerning counterinsurgency and civic action to move from 
the pre-decisional into the decisional or implementational 
sequence as several newly relevant factors emerged which 
changed Kennedy*s definition of the situation.
Following are some of the incidents which, in confor­
mity with Snyder's terminology, indicated to Kennedy a mix-up 
in the communication of information: He had assumed that the
exiles were prepared to fight the limited guerrilla type of 
warfare which he had sanctioned. However, not only without 
his knowledge but apparently even without the concurrence 
of President Eisenhower, the exiles received instruction in 
conventional warfare rather than in guerrilla tactics. Fur­
thermore, if the invasion had proven unsuccessful, they were 
to have moved through the Zapata swamp to the Escambray Moun­
tains where they would join other rebels in subversive war­
fare against Castro. But occupation by Castro's forces of 
the few passes through the swamp area enabled them to cut 
off the advance of the exiles into the interior of Cuba.
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Also the re-infiltration of Cuban exiles had not been the 
quiet, clandestine affair that Kennedy had expected. Rather 
it turned into an overly publicized invasion by the United 
States which failed when anti-Castro forces inside Cuba did 
not answer the call to arms against Castro. This illustra­
ted the fact that a meeting of minds failed to occur between 
the exiles and the United States government over the degree 
of participation by each in the invasion. Instead of the 
Revolutionary Council of the exiles deciding to risk their 
own lives without United States support as Kennedy expected, 
they assumed that the United States navy would supply them 
with jets and warships, along with a diversionary force.
The administration in Washington learned afterwards that 
Dr, Jose Miro Cardona, the leader of the Revolutionary Coun­
cil, had failed to pass on the message portraying the lack 
of support frcwi the United States, Further confusion per­
meated the ranks of the exiles as seen in the lack of coor­
dination between their various groups which occurred largely 
because of the element of distrust which swept the whole 
movement. Distrust ensued not only because of conflict over 
correct policy, but also over the presence, against Kennedy's 
orders, of many pro-Batista elements in their midst who were 
only slightly less suspect than supporters of Castro,
Following these incidents Kennedy realized that in
26Sorenson, Kennedv. 302-04; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 250-59, ---------
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order to obtain his goal of initiating in the people of the 
underdeveloped areas a state of mind conducive to democracy 
he needed to determine the reason for the communication of 
faulty information on the true state of affairs surrounding 
the Bay of Pigs invasion. This would necessitate, as a first 
step, a serious re-evaluation of the spheres of competence 
from which he received those ccmununiques. It should be re­
called that he had occupied his office for only about three 
months at the time of the debacle which hardly allowed him 
sufficient time to set in motion a smooth working decision 
unit. He was still engaged in the process of discarding 
Eisenhower’s rules and conventions and installing his own. 
Therefore he did not know the strengths and weaknesses of
his advisors vis a vis military security policy at this 
27time. In fact he had not even chosen a personal military 
advisor.^®
Due to this lack of crystallization of decision unit 
and procedure he had to rely largely on the advisors who had 
set in motion, during the Eisenhower administration, the 
complicated series of events pertaining to the invasion.
This meant the enhanced competence of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency at the expense of 
the lower levels of the bureaucracy, including those at the
27Puller, Year of Trial. 52.
pQIbid.. 55.
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29regional level of expertise. To be even more specific, 
in most important matters the Joint Chiefs yielded to the 
CIA. Perhaps the most disastrous example of this occurred 
when the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to challenge the CIA's 
insistence upon the Bay of Pigs as the point of invasion 
even though the former organization privately disagreed with 
the letter's choice. This left the CIA in more or less com­
plete charge of a full scale invasion, in spite of the fact 
that it was militarily equipped to handle no more than a 
small covert affair.
The questionable ability of the CIA to perform such 
a task was concealed by the successful precedent it had set 
in expelling the communist regime from Guatemala in 1954. 
Ironically its success in that venture led to failure in 1961, 
for assistant director Richard Bissell, who had guided the 
Guatemalan operation, became emotionally involved with the 
attempt to maintain his reputation at the Bay of Pigs. In
the process he lost objectivity and ignored clear signs that
31Castro was indeed prepared for the exile forces.
The president also examined the role of the Depart­
ment of State in the Invasion fiasco. Although many members 
in its lower echelons had advised against it, the subordinated
29Ibid.. 59-62; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation; The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. 
Kennedv (Garden City; Doubleday and Co., 1967), 3Ô-34.
30Sorenson, Kennedv. 306.
31Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 30-31.
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spheres of competence from which they communicated their in­
formation diminished its effect, and accordingly Kennedy was
32not motivated to act positively upon it. Also derogating
the role of State was the fact that Dean Rusk, although a
member of that department for years, had barely entered the
Secretary’s office and did not consider himself prepared to
33recommend a policy.
Two other notable occupants of relatively high spheres 
of competence failed to receive consultation with Kennedy: 
Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, and Adlai Stevenson, United States Ath- 
bassador to the United Nations. The president consulted the 
former briefly only after making the decision to intervene, 
while the latter ranained uninformed until the mission was 
actually in progress. In fact, Stevenson anbarrassed not 
only himself but his country in the eyes of the world when 
he announced to the United Nations after the attack had be­
gun that the United States had nothing to do with it.^*
Stevenson had important company in his disillusion­
ment, however. For Kennedy soon realized that he had made a 
mistake at the Bay of Pigs as may be gleaned from the follow­
ing statement: "How could I have been so far off base?
32These circumstances probably account for the lack of influence commanded by Roger Hilsman, head of INR, with his appeal to not intervene. Ibid., 31.
33Ibid.« 35; Sorenson, Kennedv. 304.
^^Fuller, Year of Trial. 57.
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. . .  all my life I've known better than to depend on experts. 
How could I have been so stupid as to let them go ahead?"
While in this frame of mind reports from his task 
forces on Indochina portrayed a similar situation which pre­
sented him with the opportunity to profit from the Cuban ex­
perience. As indicated above, just before the Bay of Pigs, 
Phoumi Nosavan was on the run from the c<xnmunists in Laos. 
Kennedy interpreted the situation as presenting four alter­
natives: he could abandon Laos but this would lesson the
United States credibility in Indo-China, particularly in the 
eyes of the Chinese who were already calling the United States 
a paper tiger. A second alternative was the interjection of 
more military aid. But this would mean shoring up an unpop­
ular regime v;hich, by retreating from the communists, had 
proven its lack of courage. Also, in relation to military 
aid, there were other factors to consider, especially if send­
ing more United States personnel were contemplated. These 
factors included a lack of ports, railroads and other commu­
nications. As a third alternative the United States consi­
dered a partition of Laos between the communists and the non­
communists. However, besides the problem of maintaining 
sufficient troops there to guard the borders, the non-communists 
section would have to contend with a psychological problem 
of the first magnitude: the traditional site of the Royal
Capital, Luang Prabang, would r«nain within the grip of the
35Sorenson, Kennedv. 309.
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communists. This left the final alternative, neutralization, 
as the most practical solution.
It was the choice of this fourth alternative which 
finally brought Kennedy to the brink of military interven­
tion. The communists* rejection of his demand for a cease­
fire before negotiations over neutralization ensued caused 
him to heed the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
CIA to trigger a seventeen-part mobilization plan in March.
By May, however, the precedent of the Bay of Pigs alerted 
him to the dubious quality of the advice which he received 
from those experts. These were the same personnel whose wis­
dom he had not questioned during the Cuban situation. In 
general the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed the "falling do­
mino theory" which meant that if Laos fell so would all of 
Southeast Asia. This then was an argument for intervention. 
This time, though, Kennedy required than to present him in­
dividual written reports concerning all possible contingen­
cies. In this manner he found that those in direct command 
of troops were more cautious than those who viewed the situa­
tion from the Pentagon. The former pointed out that condi­
tions in Laos presented insurmountable logistical problems 
besides the everpresent possibility of Chinese intervention. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff countered these arguments by ex­
tolling the positive effects of the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons. It was their opinion that these would require less 
man power and also serve as a definite deterrent to the
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Chinese. Besides, they did not believe that the Chinese,
36and the Soviets for that matter, would intervene.
President Kennedy was hesitant to place credibility 
in the position of the JCS at this point. That group and 
the CIA had just recently advised him in a similar vein that 
the Cubans would rebel against Castro if the United States 
would provide the catalyst, advice which proved untrue. Why 
then should their prognostication on the state of mind of 
the Chinese and the Soviets prove any more reliable? It is 
therefore apparent that Kennedy's "in order to" motives had 
by now beccxne predisposed to disregard communiques from the 
upper echelons of the JCS and CIA as primaury sources of in­
formation on how to deal with the situation in the underde­
veloped areas. However he still had not sufficiently crys­
tallized his decision unit to the point where he was ready 
to give occupants of other spheres of competence the same 
degree of confidence that he had formerly given the CIA and 
JCS.
For these reasons Kennedy needed first to place his 
own advisors in the paramount spheres of competence in his 
decision unit and then weigh their information on the new 
situation before he determined the exact nature of his mili­
tary policy. The next chapter will consequently determine 
why and how he chose those persons and delineate the attitudes 
and frame of reference from which they defined the situation.
^®Ibid., 641-46.
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In this manner a more thorough analysis may be derived of 
why the policy of military civic action which evolved to 
meet the impending crises in Latin America and Vietnam be­
came subordinated to the concomitant policy of counterin­
surgency.
CHAPTER III
KENNEDY*S DECISION UNIT DURING 
DECISIONAL SEQUENCE
Whereas some individuals such as the members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency 
had lost credibility on the eve of the decisional sequence, 
others increased their roles in the decision unit at this 
time. This chapter will indicate why and how the occupants 
of these positions, Robert McNamara, McCeorge Bundy and Dean 
Rusk, along with others such as Maxwell Taylor, Walter W, 
Rostov; and Robert Kennedy came to constitute important c(xn- 
ponents of Kennedy's decision unit during the pre-decisional 
sequence and its immediate aftermath. How the changing sit­
uation during the decisional sequence served to reinforce 
the importance of these individuals in the formation of na­
tional security policy in general and to counterinsurgency 
and military civic action in particular will be treated in 
later chapters.
President Kennedy "took great pleasure in consider­
ing the theory of government" and had definite ideas about 
the place decision units would occupy in his administration. 
Many of these ideas derived from his experience on the Reor- 
ganiaatlon Subcommittee in the Senate where he assiduously
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studied organization in the White House. His sojourn as 
chairman of that subcommittee enabled him to wind up the 
Hoover Commissions investigation of the executive branch of 
government. Out of this experience, one of the strongest 
opinions he formed was that the president should be closely 
involved at every stage of decision-making: "The American
Presidency was not intended by its creators as primarily a 
ceremonial or coordinating job, with its most essential re- 
sponsibility delegated to non-elected officials."
This predilection for the primacy of the president 
came particularly from his analysis of Eisenhower's short­
comings in the executive branch: "We have found it [the ex­
ecutive branch] full of honest and useful public servants 
but their capacity to act decisively at the exact time ac­
tion is needed has too often been muffled in the morass of 
committees, timidities and fictitious theories which have 
created a growing gap between decision and execution, be­
tween planning and reality, in a time of rapidly deteriorat­
ing situations at home and abroad; this is bad for the pub­
lic service and particularly bad for the country. We mean
2to make a change."
His determination to infuse new life into the execu­
tive branch induced him to dispense with Eisenhower's
1Helen Fuller, Year of Crisis: Kennedy's CrucialDecisions. 48.
^Ibid.. 49.
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convention of weekly cabinet meetings; in fact Kennedy held 
only ten formal meetings in his first eight months in office. 
He was more interested in how cabinet members functioned as 
individuals in their ovm fields than their contribution to 
group decisions. He wanted closer contact by direct consul­
tation. This emphasis on a close relationship necessitated 
that he have men on the "same wave length" as himself in his 
decision unit.^
In practice this meant the primacy of intellectuals. 
Kennedy's has been termed the most intellectual administra­
tion in the history of the United States. "He was the first 
president to staff a government with men whose primary quali­
fications were their knowledge of problems, their understand­
ing of theory and their capacity for logical analysis."^
One such man was Robert S. McNamara.
McNamara possessed all the best qualities of a pro­
fessional manager. He had the ability to range over broad 
areas of interest, he was interested in ideas, had an analy­
tical mind and a capacity for action. He did not worry over 
details or the possibility of making mistakes. He did not 
nibble decisions to pieces, and he would not be scared off 
from a decision by someone else's reservations.^
^Ibid.. 43-44.
"̂Ibid., 42-43.
5Business Week. February 11, 1961.
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Former Defense Secretary Robert Lovett recommended 
him for the position of Secretary of Defense and on the face 
of it the choice was a conventional one; for. one day after 
Kennedy's election, McNamara succeeded to the presidency of 
the Ford Motor Company and thereby reached that pinnacle of 
big business from which Eisenhower had drav/n his three secre­
taries. McNamara's road to success lay in his specialty, 
statistical control, which brought him into contact v/ith the 
Army Air Force in World War II where he helped keep track 
of its v.'orld-wide inventories, determining what it was going 
to need next and what supplies it could begin to discard. 
After the war, he and nine associates moved as a package to 
the Ford Motor Company where he ascended to the top through 
finance and product planning.^
That McNamara intended to be an integral part of the 
planning process as Secretary of Defense is seen in the fol- 
lov/ing comment: "I see my position as being that of a lea­
der, not a judge. I'm here to originate, to stimulate new
7ideas and programs and not just to ajudicate arguments," 
McNamara's self-image then seems to fit Snyder's innovative 
personality type,
Kennedy immediately gave him the opportunity to
^William Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy (Nev; York: 
Harper & Row, 1964), 44-46,
7Lester Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle (New York: Van
Rees Press, 1961), 172,
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stimulate new ideas as seen in the following directive: "I
have instructed the Secretary of Defense to reappraise the 
entire defense industry— effectiveness, vulnerability and 
dispersal of our strategic bases, forces, warning systems, 
efficiency and economy of our operations and organizations, 
elimination and obsolete bases and installations, and fi­
nally the adequacy, modernization and mobility of our conven­
tional and nuclear weapons in the light of the present situa- 
8tion*" Kennedy wanted his secretary's preliminary conclu­
sions by the end of February, 1961, along v/ith a determina­
tion of force structure without regard to budget ceiling.
In short, his dual directive to McNamara ordered him to as­
sert civilian supremacy over the Department of defense and
9to logically derive a military strategic concept. Before 
assessing McNamara's response to this directive it is in­
structive to survey the simultaneous and complimentary de­
velopment of precedents toward augmenting civilian supremacy 
over a strengthened Department of Defense and the formula­
tion of a strategic concept.
The movement toward a post-World War II strategic 
concept began before the end of the war. On April 2, 1945, 
the Secretary of State advised the Secretaries of War and 
the Navy of serious deterioration on our relations with the
^Kaufman, McNamara Strategy. 47-48.
9Ibid.; Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper and Rov/, i960), 87.
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U.3.S.R. Only a few days later Ambassador Averil Harriman 
warned from his post in Moscow that "we must clearly realize 
that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitari­
anism, ending personal liberty and democracy as v;e know it
10and respect it."' According to Harriman the Soviets were 
simultaneously pursuing three lines; collaboration with the 
United States and Great Britain in establishing a world se­
curity system; creation of their ovm security system by ex­
tending their sv/ay over their neighbors; and extension of 
their influence into other countries through local communist 
parties and the opportunities offered by economic chaos and 
democratic freedoms. He perceived the Soviets as opportun­
ists who considered the "generous and considerate attitude 
of the United States as a sign of weakness." He therefore
advocated a hard line, indicating that we should hurt them
11if they hurt us.
The Harriman analysis represented the first effort 
to assess the overall nature of the Soviet threat and to 
spell out an approach to deal with it. Events conspired to 
underwrite the validity of his perception as Soviet influence 
extended westward into Poland, the Balkans, Iran and the Dar­
danelles. In September, 1945, the United States, for the
10Samuel P. Huntington, "The Interim Years: World
War II to January, 1950," 298-306 in Raymond G. O'Connor, 
ed., American Defense Policy in Perspective (Nev/ York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1965).
^^Ibid.
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first time, allowed a high-level conference with the Russians 
to break dov/n without agreement rather than make further con­
cessions to their demand. This abortive meeting of the Coun­
cil of Ministers marked the beginning of post-war great pow­
er rivalry.
The seeds of the United States' perception of Russia 
as a pragmatic enemy which Harriman's analysis had sown re­
ceived reinforcement and crystallisation through the commu­
nique of George Kennan, Kennan reacted precipitously to a 
speech by Premier Stalin on February 9, 1946 in which the 
Russian dictator argued that a peaceful international order 
was impossible under the present capitalistic development of 
world economy and announced a five-year plan for massive in­
dustrial expansion. Kennan declared that the Soviets had in­
herited the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of in­
security which reinforced their adherence to Marxist dogma 
and their view of the inevitability of conflict between the 
capitalist and communist worlds leading to the victory of the 
latter. He warned that Russia would use every means to fill 
every available power vacuum, even though at times, for tac­
tical reasons, they would strive to appear friendly and 
amenable to negotiation. The following quote succinctly de­
lineates Kennan's definition of the Communist threat:
We have here a political force committed fanatically 
to the belief that with the United States there can 
be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable 
and necessary that the internal harmony of our soci­
ety be disrupted, our traditional way of life be de­
stroyed , the international authority of our state be
45
broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This poli­
tical force has complete power of disposition over 
the energies of one of the world’s greatest peoples 
and the resources of the world's richest national 
territory . . .  The problem of how to cone with this 
force is undoubtedly the greatest task our diplomacy 
has ever faced and probably the greatest it will ever 
have to f a c e . ^2
Out of this admonition of Kennan's emerged the poli­
cy of containment which was the application of counterforce 
corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.
The military strategy which evolved to complement contain­
ment possessed two basic tenets: on the one hand tie neces­
sity of a huge military force; and, on the other hand, one 
which followed certain specifications. The envisioned force 
then would evidence both quantitative and qualitative charac­
teristics. On both counts the United States Armed Forces 
suffered short-comings in 1947. As for quantity, the United 
States had followed its usual norm of practically total dis-
13armament to almost total armament to disarmament once again. 
The figures speak for themselves: In 1938 this country pos­
sessed 322,932 men in arms, while in 1945 the total had 
reached 12,123,455, and in 1947 the figure was approximately 
1,600,000 and falling.
Also the qualitative aspects of the available forces 
did not please the author of the containment policy. From
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
14Kaufman, McNamara Strategy. 3,
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the point of view of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, 
the three major components of American military strength 
were exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, the United 
States' great productive capacity and its predominant sea- 
power. According to Kennan's perception of the situation 
these components of power were actually beside the point 
for they could offer little help in preserving the integ­
rity of Iran, in suppressing guerrillas in Greece, or in 
deterring an attack in Korea. To meet these types of threats 
through a policy of containment ground troops were necessary.
In July, 1949, Kennan warned the Joint Strategic Survey Com­
mittee that the United States was limiting its choice, in 
the event of Soviet aggression, either to replying with the 
atomic bomb or to doing nothing. He further clarified his 
position by declaring the necessity for two or more mobile
and mechanized divisions, trained and ready for instant use
15in "brush-fire" wars.
The two principal implications for a strategy of con­
tainment were seen from a different perspective by Harry S. 
Truman. To him the most relevant factor in the setting con­
sisted of the domestic environment and those who kept per­
haps the closest watch on its pulse, the United States Congress, 
Congress was not predisposed in the late forties to appropri­
ate the necessary funds to successfully implement a strategy 
of containment. Particularly in the election year of 1948
15Huntington, "The Interim Years."
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it was not going to jeopardize its position with the elec­
torate by raising the necessary taxes. Therefore over 
Truman's veto it lowered taxes.
The effort to strengthen the military forces received 
a further setback through Truman's determination to maintain 
a balanced budget. He decreed that in FY 1948 military ac­
tivities could have one-third of the funds remaining after 
fixed charges had been met. This "remainder method" left 
the military budget from 1947 until 1950 with an average of 
approximately fourteen billion dollars a year.
It is apparent, then, that the main hinderances to 
a successful policy of containment in the late forties were 
a lack of finances and disagreement over the proper strate­
gic concept. In relation to the latter it may be instructive 
to note that the air force favored a doctrine of deterrence 
through air power while retaining a desire to concentrate 
upon winning a war if it should occur. On the other hand, 
the army favored universal military training in preparation 
for rapid mobilization on the outbreak of hostilities as the 
best method of meeting the communist threat. It is also im­
portant to note that two of the country's most respected 
military authorities, George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, 
espoused this army point of view along with the conviction 
that rather than engaging in mere containment measures the 
United States should strive to win any encounter with the 
Soviets. The third point of view in respect to strategic
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concept came from the State Department and it illustrated 
a major schism in the United States Government. By advo­
cating the primacy of deterrence through both air and ground 
forces over the idea of actually winning in the World War II 
sense, this view pointed out the divergence between the 
diplomatic-civilian perception of correct policy on the one 
hand and that of the military on the other.
An attempt to establish a single strategic concept 
came with the passage of the National Security Act in 1947. 
This act placed the capstone on the new governmental struc­
ture deriving from the experiences of the Second World War. 
Subsequent developments were to flow from the lessons of the 
post-war period. The act represented a basic charter of 
civil-military relations and of security policy formation. 
The core of the system was the National Security Council 
which in theory would receive already analysed information 
from the Central Intelligence Agency which it would utilize 
to promulgate policy through its Basic National Security 
Policy Documents. This policy would enable the State De­
partment to conduct its international negotiations within 
a deeper perspective. Furthermore the Military Establish­
ment could devise the strategic and logistic plans necessary 
to support the agreed policy while also assuring that no 
policies were adopted making demands beyond the available
49
military capabilities. As a further step the National Se­
curity Resources Board was charged with all problems of in­
dustrial, manpower and raw material mobilization. Its func­
tion consisted of preparing mobilization plans to support 
military strategy and in keeping the strategic planners 
within the bounds which the national resources could sus- 
tain.
The military establishment was composed of three de­
partments, each independently administered by its civilian 
Secretary and each sustaining a military service under the 
command of its Chief of Staff, These were now linked to­
gether by a series of joint agencies. The strictly military 
officials in this system constituted the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff who theoretically served as advisers to both the Sec­
retary of Defense and the President, and who possessed au­
thority to transmit Presidential decisions to the affected 
services.
Military administration, as distinct from military 
command, was in theory to be coordinated by the Secretary 
of Defense. His sphere of competence was limited to general 
direction, authority and control over the departments. Fur­
thermore, he was expressly forbidden to maintain a military 
staff or to appoint more than three special assistants from 
civil life. The three secretaries and their corresponding
17Walter Millis, "The National Security Act," 307-11 
in Raymond O'Connor, American Defense Policy in Perspective.
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Chiefs of Staff constituted his advisory War Council. Two 
other agencies accompanied the Secretary of Defense: a
Munitions Board to coordinate military procurement and a 
Research and Development Board to coordinate military re­
search.
Although the Secretary of Defense possessed limited 
authority as originally constituted, he held one significant 
power which would eventually place him at the pinnacle of 
the Military Establishment, This was his power to super­
vise and coordinate the budget estimates. The nev/ system 
recognized the budget as the controlling factor over the 
course and development of military policy. In theory the 
military and civilian responsibilities for the budget were 
meshed. The Joint Chiefs would follow the guide lines of 
the National Security Council in preparing complementary 
strategic plans and would then assign to the respective ser­
vices both their strategic and their logistic responsibili­
ties for fulfillment of the plans. The services would then 
make their own estimates of what they required to enable 
them to reach the assigned responsibility. The result would
be embodied in three departmental budgets which would go
“ISback to the JCS for review and consolidation.
In 1949 the Secretary of Defense received an impor­
tant addition to his authority when a Comptroller of the
^®Ibid.
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Department of Defense was constituted as his principal advi- 
19sor. This officer and the Secretary of Defense would re­
view the JCS budget before final presentation to the presi­
dent and the Budget Bureau.
In theory, then, military appropriations originated 
in the policy determinations of the NSC and the president 
from where they were translated into military terms by the 
JCS and revised by the Secretary of Defense, to return to 
the White House and its Budget Bureau for final integration 
into the total national policy. In practice this coordina­
tion system did not live up to its potential. For one thing 
the JCS could not handle the impossible job of determining 
the correct percentages of the national resources which 
should be allocated to defense and then accomplish the even 
more formidable task of determining the correct allocations
among the services against the background of competing wea-
20pon systems and strategic theories. The resultant inef­
ficiency, when coupled with the situation induced by the 
Korean conflict, served to enhance the potential power of 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
The Korean Conflict presented many lessons to those 
with eyes to see; however each perceived the situation ac­
cording to his particular motivational background. But
19Burton Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign 
Policy (New York: Frederick Praeger Co,, 1966), 147,
20Millis, "National Security Act,"
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most agreed that something happened there for which United
21States strategic doctrine was unprepared, A cursory glance 
would indicate that the advocates of increased limited war 
capability profited the most from the Korean experience.
They could point to the fact that atomic weapons were of no 
use. Among the reasons that they failed were the following: 
a desire by the United States to save resources since its 
stock-piles at that time were scarce; the targets there were 
unsuitable; there was fear of alienation of our allies, par­
ticularly in the area of NATO where a counter move by Russia
was a distinct possibility; finally there v;as the fear that
22the Soviets would retaliate against Pusan and Japan. Also
relevant from the perspective of the advocates of limited
war was the fact that the United States was not able effec-
23tively to utilize the tremendous power of its carriers.
On the other hand advocates of the primacy of air power and 
rhe atomic bomb could with some truth point out that it was 
only the lack of will on the part of the politicians which 
prevented our using the bomb.^^
Although the results of Korea were viewed from many 
different perspectives, the one which counted most in relation
21O'Connor, American Defense Policy, 313.
22Morton Halperin, "The Limiting Process in the Korean 
War," 314-323 in O'Connor, American Defense Policy.
23Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1960), 15-16.
24Halperin, "Limiting Process in Korea."
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to a strategic concept was that of the new president, Dwight 
David Eisenhower. He had seen the Truman Administration move 
from under to over response before and after Korea, respec­
tively, in an economic sense. From a defense budget which 
averaged approximately 14 billion dollars before the war 
Truman jumped to over 40 billion during the crisis. Fur­
thermore, the president stated his opinion that the defense 
budget should remain at over that figure during the fifties.
It was this cold fact of the influence of the budget that 
Eisenhower perceived as the most relevant factor concerning 
the Korean conflict. He believed that the Soviet Union had
"hoped to force upon America and the free world an unbearable
25security burden leading to an economic disaster,"
It was Eisenhower's opinion that the Pentagon bud­
get must be one which this country could bear for a long and 
indefinite period of time. Among others. Senator Stuart 
Symington declared for a greater budget but the aura of 
Eisenhower prevailed, even over the JCS.
This situation presented another opportunity to en­
hance the authority of the Secretary of Defense, as Eisenhower 
perceived the need for overcoming the lack of cost conscious­
ness on the part of the military. To this end he created a 
panel to recommend measures of reorganization which would 
ensure an "ever-prepared Pentagon" with "clear and unchallenged
25Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon (New York; G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967), 164-65.
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civilian responsibility" and "maximum effectiveness at mini- 
mum cost," As a result a decentralization of operations 
in the Department of Defense occurred in ord^r to ensure 
civilian leadership» Six assistant Secretaries of Defense 
were added, while the Munitions Board, the Research and De­
velopment Board and the Supply Management Agency were abo­
lished because they were regarded as too cumbersome to be 
effective management tools.
In a further move at civilian control the authority 
of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the JCS increased 
at the expense of the JCS and the Joint Staff. The Secre­
tary received the authority to select and determine the ten­
ure of the Director of the Joint Staff, v/hile the Chairman 
obtained the privilege of approving the selection and tenure
of the members of the Joint Staff, Also the Chairman re-
2 7ceived the responsibility for managing the Joint Staff,
In still another move to enhance civilian control 
over the military Eisenhower initiated a change in personnel 
in the JCS, including the appointment of Admiral Arthur 
Radford to succeed General Omar Bradley as Chairman. To 
ensure that he would retain control of the situation 
Eisenhower made the new appointments subject to review every 
tv/o years. With his nev/ civilian and military defense team 




28Defense budget below the forty billion dollar level,
Eisenhower's efforts to curtail defense spending 
through his control over the administrative branch of gov­
ernment were strengthened due to certain events surrounding 
the Joseph McCarthy loyalty hearings in 1954, On May 17, 
Eisenhower refused to allow Army Counsel John Adams to test­
ify before McCarthy's committee on the grounds of executive 
privilege and thereby reinforced an important precedent in 
executive-legislative relations. The importance of the case 
was not realized at the time because of several extenuating 
circumstances: Brown vs The Board of Education of Topeka
was decided on the same day thereby relegating Eisenhower's 
action to the back-burner of the news; McCarthy's tactics 
had so alienated him before the public on live television 
that people were blind to the importance of the incident, 
Eisenhower's tremendous popular support allowed him to just­
ify his position by the debatable statement that Washington
and Jefferson had utilized executive privilege in order to
29maintain separation of powers.
The utilization of executive privilege enabled the 
Department of Defense simultaneously to increase its inde­
pendence from Congress and to diminish the authority of the 




FY 1958 expenditures for the Air Force ballistic missile pro­
gram exceeded the limit allotted to the Air Force prompted 
the Comntroller General, Joseph Campbell, to attempt to audit 
the program. However his request by letter to Air Force 
Secretary James H, Douglas on June 13, 1958 was refused on 
the grounds of executive privilege.This prompted Campbell 
to write to Representative F. Edward Hebert, Chairman of a 
House Armed Services Subcommittee interested in the ballis­
tic missile program, and to Secretary of Defense Neil
31HcElroy. Further correspondence on this subject went to 
John Moss, Chairman of a House Government Operations Sub­
committee conducting a study on the availability of informa-
32tion from federal departments and agencies.
The Moss Subcommittee issued a report on the affair 
on January 25, 1960 in which it reached the following conclu­
sions: Eisenhower had violated Article II section three of
the constitution which stated that the President should 
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed;" there was 
no foundation whatever for the principle of executive privi­
lege to withhold information from Congress or the General 
Accounting Office; this action was a clear violation of the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, section 313; the prece­





privilege to withhold information from the representatives
of the people is contributing to corruption and inefficiency
33and is a danger to democratic government.
Still another precedent increasing the authority of 
civilians in the Department of Defense under Eisenhower re­
sulted from his appointment of James R. Killian as his Spe­
cial Assistant for Science and Technology. Killian was in­
strumental in persuading Congress to implement the Director­
ate of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of 
Defense. In order to carry out its responsibilities of moni­
toring and controlling service expenditures on future weapons 
the Directorate needed personnel trained in business statis­
tical procedures,According to Burton Sapin this is now
35the third most powerful position in the Department of Defense.
Almost coinciding with this precedent was the reor­
ganization of the Department of Defense in 1958. This action 
added considerably to the Secretary’s role by clarifying his 
authority vis a vis the three service departments. The Ser­
vice Secretaries were to "function under the direction, 
authority, and control" of the Secretary of Defense.
In summary, Eisenhower's Defense structure possessed 
four major instruments to enable him to implement his policies:
^^Ibid.. 230.
34Kaufman, McNamara Strategy. 32.
35Sapin, Making of U.S. Foreign Policy. 167. 
^^Ibid., 148.
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The first was the National Security Council which issued an 
annual Basic National Security Policy Document. This in­
strument provided guidelines by which the Jo" t Chiefs of 
Staff, through their Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, pro­
jected force requirements five years into the future. The 
second instrument through which Eisenhower achieved his pur­
poses was his utilization of the fixed budget in a manner 
similar to that of Truman: after other budgetary expenses
were met the military would receive one-third of the remain­
ing funds. Between 1955 and 1966 this amounted to approxi­
mately nine to ten percent of the budget. Under the New 
Look, funds for the services were stabilized at the follow­
ing figures: Air Force 47%, Navy 29%, Army 22%. Thirdly,
Eisenhower reorganized the Department of Defense to place 
greater power in the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Finally, he established groups of ad hoc citizens commit­
tees to review procedures and chart economically feasible
37courses.
According to General Maxwell Taylor this structure 
failed to provide unambiguous military strategic policy.
The procedure through which the Basic Strategic National Po­
licy document was formualted necessitated compromise in order 
to meet the common denominator of its member's positions on 
various issues. The most incendiary of these issues concerned
37Kaufman, McNamara Strategy. 22-23.
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38the credibility of the doctrine of massive retaliation.
The documents were so vague that both the advocates of
massive retaliation and its opponents could claim victory
39for their position. Since these debates placed in per­
spective the influence of Eisenhower's defense structure 
on the state of military strategy at the time of Robert 
McNamara's appointment as Secretary of Defense, it will be 
instructive to review the arguments which raged during the 
Eisenhower administration over that topic.
One of the high-points in the decline of the doc­
trine of massive retaliation occurred in 1954 when the for­
ces of Ho Chi Minh besieged the French at Dien Bien Phu in 
Indo-China. In desperate straits the French appealed to the 
United States for assistance. Secretary of State John F, 
Dulles reportedly was in favor of United States involvement; 
however, when he confronted Eisenhower he was told to first 
gain the consensus of our European allies, a project which 
he was unable to accomplish. This was one political reason 
why the United States failed to assist the French at this 
time. But there was a strictly military reason: General
Matthew Ridgway disagreed with Admiral Radford's assertion 
that atomic bombs should be utilized to aid them. It was 
the contention of the former that the bomb would not only 
annihilate the communists but it would also destroy those
38Mollenhoff, Pentagon. 163.
39Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 82-83,
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whom v/e were trying to protect.This was not the only 
time that Ridgway criticized the doctrine of massive re­
taliation ? in fact it was his critique of that nolicy which 
finally led to his retirement as Chief of Staff of the army 
in 1555.4^
Military personnel were not the only ones to criti­
cize that doctrine, for civilian critics of national de­
fense policy informed the public of the limitations of over­
dependence on nuclear strategy in the middle fifties. Among 
the writings on the subject was George Kennan's 1954 book,
The Realities of American Policy, in which he stated that 
"The day of the total v;ar has passed. . . .  from now on 
limited operations are the only ones which could conceivably 
serve any coherent purpose." Similar articles by R. II. 
Liddell Hart, W. W, Coffman, Vannevar Bush and Bernard Brodie 
pursued the criticism of the policy of massive retaliation,^^
Eisenhower had to contend with questioning of the 
doctrine within his own supposedly impervious administrative 
branch when the National Security Council made its first 
comprehensive review of the 1953 statement of the Nev; Look. 
For the first time in this review, recognition v/as given to 
the possibility of a condition of mutual deterrence and the 
importance in such a period for the United States to have
^^Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 101-02.
^^Mollenhoff, Pentagon, 167,
42Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 26.
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versatile, ready forces to cope with limited aggression.
Otherwise the country might have to choose between yielding
to local aggression or applying the undiscrirainating power
A3of nuclear destruction. '
Another landmark in the demise of massive retalia­
tion came as a result of the Russian incursion into Hungary 
in 1955. This crisis marked a definite shift in the credi­
bility of the Eisenhower administration for it proved its 
inability to keep its promise to roll back the iron curtain; 
American intervention into Hungary v/ould have meant the use
of military force which was not contemplated in Dulles' and
A4Eisenhower's original statements on "roll-back,"'
The end of massive retaliation as a viable policy
occurred during hearings over the defense budget for FY 1960.
According to Maxwell Taylor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
usual, took no part in its formulation. In his terms, the
budget was compiled vertically, with each service isolated
from the others. Then the Joint Chiefs were asked to present
in writing their acceptance of the nev/ budget before it went
to Congress. Following is the memorandum which they presented
in response to this request:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the FY 1960 
budget proposed expenditure figure of $40,954,000,000 
is adequate to provide for the essential programs
^^ibid.. 26-27.
44Paul Y. Hammond, The Cold War Years: American For­
eign Policy Since 1945 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1969), 93,
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necessary for the defense of the nation for the per­
iod under consideration. They find no serious qaps 
in the key elements of the budget in its present 
form but all have reservations with respect to the 
funding of some segments of their respective ser­
vice programs.
The Secretary of Defense relayed this memorandum to Congress 
where it boomeranged when Congress called the Joint Chiefs 
individually to present in person their reservations,^^
Taylor was asked to present a written statement en­
compassing his views. He responded by elaborating on the 
following four points on which he held reservations: army
modernization; the Nike/Zeus anti-missile missile; person­
nel strength of active army and reserve forces; army surface- 
to-air missile program.
The issues raised through Taylor's open testimony 
along with testimony released from other hearings had a 
country-wide impact. It revealed for the first time the 
magnitude of the schism within the Joint Chiefs of Staff
46over massive retaliation and related matters of strategy.
Not the least important of these results was the investiga­
tion led by John P, Kennedy's future vice-president, Lyndon 
Baines Johnson.
Johnson and his Preparedness Subcommittee of the Sen­
ate Armed Services Committee received some interesting com­
mentary from Taylor on the Eisenhower administration's
^^Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet. 69-73, 
^^Ibid,. 74-78,
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defense policy. Among the opinions which the general ex­
pressed were the following: The defense of the United States
was presently controlled by nonmilitary factor^ or military 
factors which had become outmoded; the United States needed 
a one million man army and a defense budget of fifty to 
fifty-five billion dollars for five years to close the gap 
for "there is no living with communism as an inferior;" it 
was necessary for the United States to maintain a capability 
to fight brush-fire wars as well as nuclear ones.^^
Motivated by this testimony the Johnson Committee 
began an investigation into army modernization, after which 
it emerged with several conclusions of its own: There existed
a definite need for balanced forces including those especi­
ally trained for brush-fire wars since we were now at a stand­
off in the field of nuclear missiles. In general the United 
States possessed limited weapons and equipment, however the 
need was for production and issuance to the men in the field. 
Another conclusion concerned Eisenhower's budgetary short­
comings: although the budget for FY 1962 contained a request
for $1,524,000,000 in army procurement money the army stressed 
that this was mostly to replace losses through consumption 
in training and obsolescence. Therefore the need was for 2.5 
billion for modernization. On top of this Johnson indicated 




To illustrate the need for increased man-power 
Johnson compared the Russian and the United States armies. 
Russia possessed 175 divisions to the United States' 14, or 
2,5 million men to 870,000; however he qualified his state­
ment with the information that only 60% of the Russian divi­
sions possessed sufficient man power to operate on short no­
tice. On the other hand if the United States marines were 
added to the total of this country's forces the total would 
come to 1,045,000 men for the United States. But this would 
still mean a ratio of two and one-half to one in favor of 
Russia. Therefore since the United States had fewer men it
48needed superior firepower, mobility and strategic planning.
In regard to strategic planning it should be inserted 
that the Eisenhower administration was not completely imper­
vious to demands for an increase in ground forces. It appar­
ently heeded the advice from many sources including the Draper 
49Committee, to begin making this a priority project. In 
fact his last Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, indicated 
in his final report to the president that most of the forces 
in the next years army would be troops trained to fight in 
a limited war situation.Thus the republicans laid the
48Report of the Preparedness Investigation Subcommit­
tee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 86th Congress, 
2nd Session, 1-22.
49The President's Committee to Study the United States 
Military Assistance Program, William U. Draper, Jr., Chairman, 
708 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington 25, D. C., June 3, 1959.
^^Kaufman, McNamara Strategy. 34.
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foundation for the break with massive retaliation which came 
to fruition during the Kennedy administration.
At this point an assessment may be made on the posi­
tion of the Secretary of Defense on the eve of McNamara's 
appointment in accordance with Snyder's terminology of spheres 
of competence: The National Security Act of 1947 and its 
amendments in 1949, 1953 and 1958 had resulted in the Secre­
tary of Defense occupying the top authority relationship in 
the Department of Defense. However conventions had prevented 
the various secretaries from converting potential into actual 
power; civilian leaders were still reluctant to interfere 
with the military experts to the extent authorized by their 
elevated position. One particularly important example of 
the potential consequences for tampering with what the mili­
tary considered non-civilian business occurred when Louis 
Johnson, against the advice of his military advisers, reduced
military spending just before the Korean war, an act which
51"cost him his political neck." The fact that the civilians 
were still relatively timid in the face of the military was 
a major reason that inter-service disputes over strategic 
concepts continued. It was Kennedy's opinion that McNamara 
was the type of person who as Secretary of Defense would not 
feel burdened by these conventions of civilian timidity. 
Rather he would see that conventions complemented rules to 
make him master of the Department of Defense in practice as
S^Ibid.. 20.
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well as theory. Upon McNamara's ability to accomplish this 
task depended the success of the Kennedy administration's 
search for a strategic concept with which to replace the doc­
trine of massive retaliation.
The possibilities which McNamara perceived as provid­
ing the elements of that concept were three: "minimum deter-
ence," "optimum mix" and "flexible response." The first of 
these de-emphasized numerical superiority in favor of small 
well protected forces aimed at Soviet cities. It was be­
lieved that these would decrease the arms race and likewise 
diminish the possibilities of a Soviet attack. The second 
possibility, optimum mix, advocated a knock-out blow. Fi­
nally, flexible response provided for a matrix of possibili­
ties: the United States could counter attack the enemy's de­
fense installations and maintain reserves with which to at­
tack his cities and still exert pressure to end the war on 
United States' terms.
Flexible response held several basic premises: cir­
cumstances would occur under which deterrence might not work; 
the number of lives lost in a nuclear war would vary with 
the types of targets attacked; the best defense from great 
damage lay in destroying enemy installations and in utiliz­
ing civil defense at home; avoiding enemy cities and holding 
forces in reserve would give the enemy incentive to limit 
damage to the United States' allies by focusing its attacks
52Ibid.. 51-52; McNamara, Essence of Security. 71-72.
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only on our defense installations; since a nuclear war would
not eliminate United States interest in the world it would
53be necessary to mop up the enemy's residual capability.
On comparing these three approaches McNamara found 
they had some similarities. For example they all stressed 
second strike forces of great survivability and the importance 
of command control. On the other hand they differed in size 
and composition of offensive forces, role of active and pas­
sive defenses and in targets to be attacked. Of the three, 
minimum deterrence was the most extreme for it assumed that 
the Soviets could or would not be able to counter by anti­
submarine or anti-missiles. It also ignored our overseas 
commitments. It was in short, too dependent upon Soviet re­
straint, and like massive retaliation, it presented limited 
options if deterrence failed.
Therefore in February, 1961, the United States for­
mally became committed to a strategic concept embodying the 
doctrine of flexible response. It was assumed that now the 
United States could survive a surprise attack and still re­
spond cooly and deliberately under control of the constituted 
authorities. To initiate this strategy McNamara ordered 
several "quick fixes:" an increase in the Polaris and Min- 
uteman missle system, the development of an unambiguous warn­
ing system and the placement of more B-52's on alert,
53Kaufman, McNamara Strategy. 52, 
S^ibid., 52-54.
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It was within the context of flexible response that
counter-guerrilla war played its role. Like John Kennedy,
McNamara had been influenced greatly by Khrusc^ ev's Speech
on January 6, 1961, The nev/ Secretary of Defense alluded
to that speech while expounding on flexible response; "The
communists are resolute opponents of nuclear war or local
55wars, thus they like wars of national liberation," This 
gave the Secretary a reason for strengthening the position 
of special forces beside the other conventional forces which 
would operate under the now passive nuclear shield. These 
would prevent the recurrence of situations such as Laos and 
the Bay of Pigs, where the United States lacked sufficient 
conventional forces to fight more than one war at a time. 
Therefore McNamara requested an additional $1,8 billion in 
military assistance funds to enhance this country's ability 
to respond at any time to any type of threat, including guer­
rilla war.
His perception that different countries faced differ­
ent types of threats led him to divide them into two cate­
gories, single threat and double threat countries. The for­
mer catagory included those underdeveloped countries of Asia, 
the Middle East, Africa and Latin America that were not con­
tiguous to the Sino-Soviet bloc but were targets for indirect 




assistance needed here was economic and social with the mili-
57tary providing the necessary stability for development.
He added that military assistance should contribute to eco­
nomic progress in the tradition of the army corps of engi-
53neers in village development, sanitation and road building.
Countries facing a double threat occupied territory
near the Sino-Soviet border exposing them to a direct threat
from without and within. Vietnam was a classic example of
how these threats could reinforce each other. To meet this
situation more types of forces in terms of arms, equipment
and personnel were necessary. Local forces must meet the
initial thrust until the advent of free world aid. There
was also a need for base facilities and infra-structure on
the spot which meant more military assistance than that needed
59by the single threat areas.
McNamara's strategy enabled him to meet the Soviet 
threat without being forced to choose between doing nothing 
or deliberately initiating nuclear war. He also carried this 
flexibility into his decision-making procedure in the Depart­
ment of Defense. He stated his intention to follow the pre­
cedent of Eisenhower's last Secretary of Defense, Thomas 
Gates, and attempt to draw the Joint Chiefs more into the
57McNamara, Essence of Security. 149,
58Kaufman, McNamara Strategy. 60-62,
59^^Ibid.. 62-63.
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mainstream of decision-making,^^ He therefore established 
regular meetings with them in which a dynamic exchange of 
views occurred, and in his reports to the president he strove 
for objectivity in summarizing their contrasting opinions.
In addition he relied heavily on the four hundred man joint 
staff for advice.
Although he initiated a smooth working relationship 
with his military advisors he still took advantage of Eisen­
hower's precedent of executive privilege to keep Congress 
ignorant of any dissent within the Department of Defense. 
Evidence for this is seen in the directive of May 31, 1961 
in which he stated that Defense officials should avoid dis­
cussion of foreign policy matters. Many congressmen viewed 
this loss of a prime information source with alarm.
This directive was apparently in retaliation for an 
incident which came to light through a release of information 
obtained in a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
in April, 1961. The information pointed out that McNamara 
favored misinforming the public on the Nike-Zeus program.
It was his opinion that if he told the public the truth then 
the U.S.S.R. would know that things were not going smoothly
COon this project; to him this was unnecessary.
G°lbid.. 237-38.
G^lbid.. 238-40.
62Mollenhoff, Pentagon « 269. 
G^lbid.. 247.
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It was at least partially in order to smooth over
these brusk relations with Congress that Roswell Leavitt
Gilpatrick became Deputy Secretary of Defense. This Ivy
League lai.yer possessed experience in dealing with Congress
and with the military-industrial complex which made his half
of the "Bob and Roz" team indispensible to the compatibility
64of the Department of Defense and Congress, a compatibility 
that was essential to gain the necessary funds to success­
fully implement counterinsurgency forces and civic action 
teams.
The rest of the Department of Defense under President 
Kennedy included the following: Elvis J. Stahr, the Secre­
tary of the Army, v/as a bright young man in the Kennedy pat­
tern who was a former Rhodes Scholar and president of Purdue 
University. McNamara managed to influence the appointment of 
John Connally as Secretary of Navy in spite of the fact that 
President Kennedy had originally suggested Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Jr. The Secretary of the Air Force was Eugene Zuckert, a 
friend of McNamara's from Harvard Business School. The Joint 
Chiefs included the holdovers General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chief 
of Staff, and General George Decker, Army Chief of Staff.
The new appointees found Admiral George Anderson replacing 
Admiral Arleigh Burke as Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen­
eral Curtis LeMay succeeding General Thomas White as Air Force
G^ibid.. 243.
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Chief of Staff.These, then, were the men of the Pentagon 
who would advise Kennedy.
The Department of Defense, though, was not the only 
important institution whose leaders communicated information 
on national security affairs to the president. V/hen Presi­
dent Kennedy accepted the suggestions resulting from a two 
year study by Senator Henry M. Jackson, the President's Spe- 
cail Assistant for National Security Affairs came to occupy 
a high sphere of competence in these matters. Jackson's 
Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, a subgroup of the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations, presented to the 
president the following nine basic suggestions concerning 
the "humanizing" of the National Security Council process:
1. The Council should meet only to advise the Pres­
ident or receive his decision on specific major 
items. "Council meetings and the Council agenda 
should never become ritualistic."
2. The Council should offer a clear expression of 
alternate courses of action and their implica­
tions and "not spare the President the neces­
sity of choice."
3. Council meetings should be "considered gatherings 
of principals" and restricted to top officials, 
with staff attendance "tightly controlled." A 
written record of decisions should be kept.
4. The Planning Board should be replaced by a group 
"used mainly to criticize and comment upon po­
licy initiatives developed by the departments or 
negotiate or secure agency concurrences. More 
use might be made of "informal working groups" 
or outside consultants.
5. "The President must rely mainly upon the Secretary
^^Ibid., 244-45; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 153,
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of State for the initial synthesis of the po­
litical, military, economic, and other elements 
which go into the making of a coherent national 
strategy." The Secretary was "crucial to the 
successful operation of the Council."
6. The OCB [Operations Coordinating Board] should 
be abolished and "responsibility for implemen­
tation of policies cutting across departmental 
lines should, wherever possible, be assigned 
to a particular department or . . . action of­
ficer, possibly assisted by an informal inter­
departmental group."
7. The NSC staff should be reduced and more closely 
integrated. A small presidential staff, work­
ing "outside the system," should closely assist 
the chief executive by providing information, 
suggesting "policy initiatives," and "spotting 
gaps in policy execution."
8. The membership on the Council of the Chairman,
NSRB [Rational Security Resources Board] , sub­
sequently replaced by the Director, OCDM [Of­
fice of Civil Defense Mobilization], was in­
tended to provide the NSC with perspectives on 
the domestic economy and resources. Since OCDM 
was less concerned with these problems than
with civil defense, the statutory membership gc 
of its director on the NSC might well be dropped.
Immediately upon occupying office Kennedy took steps 
which eventually resulted in the implementation of these sug­
gestions. To ensure that these reforms were implemented 
Kennedy wanted as his Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs a highly skilled generalist who could channel infor­
mation from the State and Defense Departments and other se­
curity agencies to the president and monitor all security
67decisions to see that they were fulfilled. Three weeks
Stanley Falk, "The National Security Council under 
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," 403-34 in Political Science 
Quarterly, September, 1964, Vol. LXXIX, No. 3.
^^Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle, 37,
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before his inauguration Kennedy decided that McGeorge Bundy
68was suited for this role.
Bundy was another of the intellectuals who fit the 
Kennedy style. Among other accomplishments he had been a 
Dean at Harvard at the age of thirty-four. Evidence that he 
was cognizant of the importance of his affinity for the pres­
ident's style is seen in a sampling of his statements: "John
Kennedy's temper is different from that of Eisenhower. . . .  
The National Security Council is an instrument of the presi­
dent. . . . I'm to be the president's staff officer in the 
National Security Council. . . .  My problem is to utilize 
the council to conform to the president's style.
Bundy conscientiously carried out his task. As over­
all director of the National Security Council Staff he par­
ticipated in all council-related activities. He and his as­
sistants suggested areas for consideration and mechanisms 
for handling problems, followed studies through the planning 
stage and saw that they were properly coordinated, staffed 
and responsive to the needs and desires of the president.
He also ensured that a written record was made of all deci­
sions reached, whether at the formal NSC meetings or not.
Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, eds.. The 
President and the Management of National Security: A Report
by the Institute for Defense Analysis (New York: Frederick
Praeger Co., 196$), 70.
^^Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle. 38; Arthur M. Schle­
singer, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houahton Mifflin Co..1965), 209.   '
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and he kept tabs on the implementation of whatever policy
had been adopted. He and his staff coordinated closely with
other parts of the president's staff and the B”dget Bureau,
70performing whatever liason was necessary.
Although the Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs was essential as a coordinator of
information concerning national security policy, it was the
president's belief that the most important coordinator of
agencies concerning foreign policy was to be the Secretary
of State. Kennedy had come to office determined to make that
Department the central point below the presidency itself in
the conduct of foreign policy. He wanted no questions to
arise concerning "the clear authority and responsibility of
the Secretary of State, not only in his own Department, and
not only in such large-scale related areas as foreign aid
and information policy, but also as the agent of coordina-
71tion in all our major policies toward other nations."
To see that the State Department enacted this role 
Kennedy wanted an experienced practitioner of international 
relations who would carry out, not decide, foreign policy; 
the president himself would make decisions in that realm un­
der his constitutional authority. In addition to these
70Paulk, "The National Security Council," 163; Fuller, 
Year of Crisis, 61.
71Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Reconstruction of 
Diplomacy," 123-132 in Martin B. Hickman, ed., Problems of 
American Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills: The Glencoe Press,
1968).
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qualifications, Kennedy wanted his secretary to be an indi­
vidual whose past actions would not foreclose bipartisan 
support from Congress. He did not want Congress to think 
his policies were a foregone conclusion. On balance, Dean 
Rusk seemed to suit his specific needs the best.
Rusk came highly recommended. Such personalities 
as Dag Hammarskj old, Dean Acheson, Charles Bohlen, Senator 
Fulbright and Robert Lovett concurred in his appointment, 
Even though he received these illustrious recommendations 
he was less known than his principal subordinates such as 
Adiai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, G, Mennen Williams and
Averill Harriman, In fact Rusk and Kennedy met only four
72days before his appointment.
Rusk would probably accord with Snyder’s personal­
ity type of career officer. He considered his role to be 
that of providing alternatives to his chief rather than 
solutions, and he would usually not even do that except in 
private conferences. He preferred to hold information in­
side of him until it was finally shaped. On the negative
side, this meant that it entered the world untested and
73without public preparation. He was an advocate of quiet 
diplomacy believing that a diplomat should expecially note 
little things such as social arrangement and casual
^^Fuller, Year of Crisis, 45.
73Tanzer, The Kennedy circle. 119,
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conversations.
Although Kennedy was impressed with the potential 
role of Rusk and of the State Department in general, for 
several reasons he evinced a mixed attitude toward the pro­
fessionals in the Department: he probably received his at­
titude in part from his father, Joseph P. Kennedy. As an 
ambassador to England, the senior Kennedy "inveighed elo­
quently against the career boys . . .  insisted that the 
State Department did not know what was going on . . . that
nothing got to the President straight unless he sent it to
75the President direct.** Another precedent which conditioned 
the president*s attitude derived from his visit to South­
east Asia as a young congressman in 1951. He returned with 
the impression that Foreign Services officers often knew 
all too little about the nations to which they were accre­
dited, were indifferent to their language and customs, did 
not represent contemporary America, and spent too much time 
at tennis and cocktails. In spite of these precedents, 
however, he looked forward to fruitful collaboration with 
the State Department*s professionals.
To these personal situations in Kennedy*s life which
74"The Formulation of Foreign Policy: Informal Re­
marks Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) Before Policy­
making Officers of the Department of State, February 20,
1961,'* 22-28 in American Foreign Policy Current Documents,
1962. ------------- ^ ^ -----------------
75Schlesinger, "The Reconstruction of Diplomacy." 
^^Ibid.
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conditioned his attitude may be added several historical
precedents which had placed the State Department in some-
v/hat of a subservient position within the myriad of agencies
concerned with foreign policy. The decline of State began
during World War II when competition from other institutions
such as the military and intelligence agencies increased.
This competition caused the Department to re-examine itself,
asking three questions; should it be expanded to include
all non-military foreign policy related issues and bring them
under the same roof? should the emerging aspects of foreign
policy be assigned to newly created organisations? or should
existing governmental agencies be permitted to expand their
77functions to include foreign policy related issues?
All three of these occurred in part. But in spite 
of sharing responsibility with other agencies the State De­
partment suffered growing pains. This was evidenced in 
several ways. For example layering, the bureaucrat's term 
for the imposition of one level of administrative responsi­
bility on top of another, created a system of concurrences
which required every proposal to run an obstacle course be-
78fore becoming policy. Dean Rusk stated that he often v/ould 
read morning telegrams which stated questions to which he 
was prepared to give an immediate answer; however each tele­
gram would still have to go "on its appointed course into
77Hickman, ed., Problems of American Foreign Policy. 118. 
^®Ibid.
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the Bureau, and through the office and down to the desk.
If it doesn't go down there, somebody feels that he is being 
deprived of his participation in a matter of ^'.s responsi­
bility. Then it goes from the action officer back up through 
the Department to me a week or ten days later, and if it
isn't the answer that I knew had to be the answer, then I
79have to change it."
Another problem which the Department had to face as 
it increased in size and complexity involved the type of per­
sonnel which would serve it. Before World War II the role 
of American diplomacy had been largely ceremonial. However, 
in the post-war era personnel in more than a hundred coun­
tries around the world of necessity needed regional knowledge 
and technical skill in order to cope with the new situation. 
This meant, among other things, the enhanced importance of 
language training. These new ideas conflicted v/ith the con­
ventions of State Department overseas representatives who 
had been trained in the tradition of political officers.
They continued to see themselves as gentlemen rather than 
as players. In short the premium remained on the generalist 
over the specialist.
Further stereotyping of State Department personali­
ties occurred during the era of John Foster Dulles because 
of his cooperation with Joseph McCarthy’s hunt for communist 
sympathizers. These years saw the ostracism of diplomats
79Schlesinger, "The Reconstruction of Diplomacy."
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such as John Davies and Charles Bohlen, "The McCarthy era,
by demonstrating the peril of dangerous thoughts, elevated
80conformism in:o a conditioned reflex." Career diplomats 
consecrated themselves to the cliches of cold war whether 
they really believed in their credence or not. Thus many 
cautious mediocrities rose to the top of the service.
These then were some of the problems facing the 
Service as Kennedy entered office, but in the opinion of 
some career officers his personal style tended to make mat­
ters worse. This is illustrated in a conversation which 
Kennedy and Charles Bohlen held in which the president asked
Bohlen "What's wrong with that goddamned Department of yours,
8iChip?" to which he replied, "You are." Bohlen explained 
that Kennedy did not have sufficient patience with the points 
of view of the professionals who were not receiving enough 
time to consider the president's questions rationally from 
the proper angles. They did not have time to learn languages, 
master technical fields and fraternize with the people of 
the countries to which they were assigned as the president 
desired, and still proficiently transact business with their 
government. Another important official in the Department 
called Kennedy's procedure with State "crusading activism





Kennedy's statements to Arthur Schlesinger on one 
occasion indicate the validity of the concern of these of­
ficials: "I have discovered finally that the ^est way to
deal with State is to send over memos. They can forget 
phone conversations, but a memorandum is something which,
by their system, has to be answered. So let's put as many
83things as possible in memoranda from now on."
In spite of these circumstances JFK continued to 
search for ways to ensure State's leadership in the field 
of coordinating foreign affairs. As will be shown it be­
came progressively more difficult for him to maintain his 
enthusiasm between the Bay of Pigs invasion and January, 1962.
Since the process of crystallizing John Kennedy's de­
cision unit for national security policy occurred during the 
latter stages and immediate aftermath of the pre-decisional 
sequence, it is possible to isolate those who had been dis­
carded as major communicators of information from those who 
had begun to constitute an inner circle at that time. Iron­
ically many of those who were to progressively find them­
selves on the outside looking in were the most in accord
with Kennedy's personal outlook. In general these "Stevenson 
84Democrats" claimed that the military threat to Western 
Europe had diminished, that the American position in the un­
derdeveloped areas of the world was far too dependent upon
®^Ibid.
84Hammond, The Cold War Years, 156,
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military instr’imetits, and that a shift from military to eco­
nomic and political weapons in foreign policy would open up 
prospects for a détente with the Soviet Union. They saw the 
ideological conflict with Russia as an impediment to practical 
understanding and the source of unnecessary rigidities in 
American policy in the underdeveloped countries.
Two of the most prominent figures in this category 
were Adlai Stevenson and William Fulbright. As indicated in 
chapter two, Kennedy purposely overlooked them as a source 
of advice in relation to the Bay of Pigs situation because 
he realined in advance that their reaction would be negative. 
In fact their demise as members of the inner group had begun 
long before tha Bay of Pigs, when Kennedy considered and dis­
carded them as nominees for Secretary of State. Stevenson's 
handicap in this regard was his notability. As a veteran 
of politics he had on many occasions expressed his views on 
national security policy; therefore, from Kennedy's point of 
view, he was too vulnerable to Republican opposition. The 
closeness of Kennedy's election probably augmented the im­
portance of this factor. Although Fulbright suffered the 
same vulnerability as Stevenson because of his long political 
career, probably the main factor preventing his becoming Sec­
retary of State was his signature on the "Southern Manifesto" 
indicating his sympathy, probably for political reasons, for
®̂ Ibid.
83
the "southern way of life" in regard to racial matters.
In addition to the "Stevenson democrats" the hier­
archy of the CIA was forced to play a diminished role in 
regard to national security policy. After the Cuban inva­
sion President Kennedy reconstituted the President's Board 
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities under the 
new name of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board for the specific purpose of reviewing the functions 
of the CIA. On May 2, 1961, James R. Killian was appointed 
chairman. Concurrently, Kennedy summoned former Army Chief 
of Staff, Maxwell Taylor, to make a special study of the 
Cuban failure and of the United States' capabilities for 
paramilitary operations and guerrilla warfare. Taylor was 
assisted in this study by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 
Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke and CIA director 
Allen Dulles. Due largely to the study, the director and 
assistant director of the CIA were replaced within a year,
and paramilitary operations became centered primarily in a
87Special VJarfare section of the Pentagon.
The CIA was not the only institution concerned with 
national security policy which found itself out-flanked as 
an integral part of Kennedy's decision unit at the end of
Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle. 110; Fulbright also 
filed an amicus curiae brief against the government during 
the Little Rock crisis of 1957, which would hardly commend 
him to the new African States. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 
140. -------------
87Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 78-79.
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the pre-decisional sequence. The Bay of Pigs was just the 
latest in a series of events, as related above, that served 
also to diminish the authority of the JCS.
With the influence of the JCS, CIA, and Stevenson 
democrats diminished, an obvious political vacuum existed 
in their place. As indicated, it was only partially filled 
by the Department of State, which suffered a similar set­
back at the Bay of Pigs. The State Department entered the 
decisional sequence still theoretically the primary coordi­
nating agency in the field of national security policy al­
though in practice it progressively took a backseat to the 
new insiders.
As this chapter has pointed out, precedents placed 
Robert McNamara in a good position as Secretary of Defense 
to pre-empt much of States influence. Furthermore he man­
aged to play a minimal role in the Cuban affair which left 
him for the most part unscathed after that debacle. In 
addition he initiated one particular procedure which allowed 
him to fill an important vacuum created by ''bureaucratic 
layering" in State: the memorandums which he prepared for
the president bore his personal imprint as contrasted to 
the more impersonal State Department memorandums which al­
most inevitably required supplementary analysis or informa­
tion.®®
88Clark and Legere, President and Management of Na­
tional Security Policy. 76.
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McNamara helped prepare the way for another impor­
tant member of Kennedy's crystallizing decision unit when 
he developed the doctrine of flexible response- largely from 
the ideas of Maxwell Taylor. Taylor's official involvement 
in the Kennedy administration began with his appointment to 
the special committee on paramilitary war capability, as 
indicated above. Due at least in part to his performance 
on that committee he received an appointment as the presi­
dent's personal military advisor in June, 1961, thereby 
filling a glaring gap in Kennedy's decision unit. Taylor's 
appointment reflected the substantial diminution of the 
President's confidence in the Joint Chiefs and the intelli­
gence community. He was given liason duty between the pres­
ident and the Joint Chiefs, a position from which he worked
89to improve relations between them and the Chief Executive.
The man who reportedly recommended Taylor to Kennedy 
as his choice for special military assistant was the presi­
dent's brother, Robert Kennedy, who should also be included 
as a member of the president's inner group on national se­
curity policy. He debated whether to take some position as
a subordinate bureaucrat within the administration but was
90persuaded by his brother to become attorney general.
Since the president wanted intellectuals around him who were 
on his wave length it was logical that he should demand the
G*Ibid.
90Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle. 186,
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services of the individual most nearly approaching that pre­
requisite, As mentioned above, Robert Kennedy was cogni­
zant of national security policy through his membership on 
the special committee on paramilitary capability. The pres­
ident gave him additional responsibility in this sphere
when he singled him out as his primary coordinator of intel-
91ligence information.
Another member of the inner group on national secur­
ity policy on the eve of the decisional sequence was the 
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Af­
fairs, McGeorge Bundy, Although his staff was definitely 
within the inner circle in 1961 it did not constitute a ma­
jor influence on the formation of the policy under analysis. 
However it was, in general, more influential than the State 
Department. V/hen the State Department did not appear to be
responsive, the Bundy staff moved in to do the president's 
92work,
This assessment of the president's decision unit on 
the eve of the decisional sequence should not close without 
some discussion of another relevant figure, Walter W, Rostov/, 
Perhaps Rostow should have been mentioned within the context 
of Bundy's National Security Staff since he was originally 
appointed as Bundy's deputy. However, Rostow's appointment
91Faulk, "The National Security Council,"
92Clark and Legere, President and Management of National Security Policy, 81,
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v/as made to appease Dean Rusk who wanted George McGhee in
the State Department as head of the policy planning staff
93instead of Rostow# Although Rostow's official position
in the administration was somewhat tenuous, he was a highly
instrumental factor in Kennedy's military policy,
Rostow had been influential with John Kennedy since
before the presidential campaign. In fact he contributed
the main motif of that campaign: "Let's get the country
94moving again," He also is credited with suggesting the
95"New Frontier" as the name of Kennedy's program, Rostov/ 
met Kennedy in 1957 after the publication of his book, A 
Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy, which highly
influenced Kennedy as a member of the Senate Foreign Rela­
tions committee. This book, in addition to Rostow's "Cam­
bridge Lectures," was instrumental in reinforcing Kennedy's 
perception of the importance of the underdeveloped areas 
to world peace and to the security of the United States, 
Also, Rostow v/as a member of the "Cambridge Group" which met 
at the Harvard Club in Boston on January 2, 1960, in order 
to advise Kennedy concerning his coming campaign for the 
presidency. The following quote from Rostow during that
93Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle. 47; Besides his personal 
friendship for McGhee, Rusk had a temperamental preference 
for professionals, and he was determined to rebuild the morale 
of the Foreign Service after the shocks of the Dulles-McCarthy 
era, Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 151,
94Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle. 40,
^^Ibid,
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campaign reflected his future inportance to Kennedy's deci­
sion unit in relation to national security policy: "I did
the basic stuff on military policy and threw some other ideas 
into the pot."^^
Thus as the summer of 1961 began Kennedy's decision 
unit on national security policy had begun to crystallize 
around the nucleus of McNamara, Taylor, Rusk, Bundy, Rostow 
and Robert Kennedy. This nucleus was to be highly instru­
mental in determining the nature of the emerging doctrine 
of counterinsurgency, which was gradually to submerge the 
policy of military civic action developed mainly in response 
to relevant factors in the Latin American situation. The 
rationale for devoting the following chapter to a discus­
sion of the Latin American situation may be seen in a quote
from President Kennedy: "I regard Latin America . . .  as
97the most critical area in the world today."
*Gibid.
97Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 759<
CHAPTER IV
LATIN AMERICA'S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO 
"WARS OF LIBERATION"
President Kennedy perceived the most relevant factor 
in the Latin American situation to be its susceptibility to 
"wars of liberation" under the guidance of Khrushchev's pro­
tege, Fidel Castro:
I would not want to characterize Mr. Castro except 
to say by his own words he has indicated his hostil­
ity to democratic rule in this Hemisphere, to demo­
cratic liberal leaders in many of the countries of 
the Hemisphere who are attempting to improve the 
life of their people, and has associated himself 
most intimately with the Sino-Soviet bloc, and has 
indicated his desire to spread the influence of that 
bloc throughout this Hemisphere,1
Originally the Castro revolution was supported by 
the majority of the people. He promised free elec­
tions , , , but Castro has not kept that promise.
If the people of any country chose to follow a com­
munist system in a free election after a fair num­
ber of views had been presented, the U.S. would ac­
cept it. We object to a small militant group im­
posing its way by subversion, infiltration, , , ,2
Accordingly this chapter will focus upon those factors in 
Latin America's socio-economic situation which made that 
area a prime target for the Castro-communist offensive and 
upon efforts to change those factors through economic devel­
opment, In addition, the weaknesses of the hemispheric
1Kennedy and the Press, April 12, 1961, 60, 
^Ibid,. November 25, 1961, 133,
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security structure in quelling communist subversion will be 
illustrated, and the necessity for adopting a policy of bi­
lateral military civic action will be shown.
Several factors in Latin America's socio-economic 
situation made it vulnerable to the communist offensive.
Two hundred million people inhabited the southern half of 
the Western Hemisphere, and at least two-fifths of them were 
under fifteen years of age. Nearly fifty per cent of the 
population was illiterate while thirty per cent would die be­
fore their fortieth birthday. The population was multiply­
ing faster than in any other area in the world. Two per 
cent of the people owned fifty per cent of the wealth and
3seventy per cent lived in abject powerty. While these con­
ditions festered during the first decade of the post-war era 
the United States concentrated on Western Europe and Asia,
In fact the United States gave billions of dollars to Eu­
rope while allotting Latin America less than tv/o per cent 
of its world-wide economic and military aid under the mutual
4security program. Economic chaos abounded south of the Rio 
Grande on the eve of Castro's ascent to political power.
One factor in the socio-economic situation which 
gave cause for optimism was the commitment to commerce and 
industry by the middle sectors. According to John J, Johnson,
^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 186,
^Edwin Lieuwin, U.S. Policy in Latin America; A 
Short History (New York; Frederick A, Praeger, 112.
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in 1930 the traditional middle groups, who composed the lib­
eral professions such as the teaching corps, the bureauracies, 
the clergy of the Catholic Church and commissioned military 
officers joined forces with the new middle groups such as 
scientists, highly trained technicians, managers of business 
and leading officials of organized labor* The resultant middle 
sector became the dominant political force in Latin America.
Its various components possessed the common characteristics 
of being mostly urban, subject to wageworker contracts or 
fixed salaries, and of lacking the capability to take indepen­
dent political action in isolation. But their most signifi­
cant common characteristic, and the one which was to give 
some cause for optimism on the eve of the Kennedy administra­
tion, was their commitment to commerce and industry.^
This commitment to industry increased during the post- 
World War II period as the characteristics of the new conste- 
lation of world power became evident. The middle sector be­
gan to realize that this new situation would leave the v/eaker 
countries at an economic disadvantage because of the insta­
bility of their exchange resources, their sometimes uncontrol­
lable demand for imports and their relatively modest long-term
6capital inflov/. Consequently the movement toward the
John J, Johnson, "The Political Role of the Middle 
Sectors," 104-12 in John Martz, ed., The Dynamics of Change 
in Latin American Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,
1965).
^Victor Urquidi, The Challenge of Development in 
Latin America (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), 125.
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creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association began 
in 1956 with the establishment of a Trade Committee under 
the direction of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
to study the mechanics of establishing a Latin American 
common market. In 1957 the Organization of American States 
held a meeting of Latin American finance ministers at which 
the basic principles and resolutions of the Latin American
7Free Trade Association were derived. Finally in February 
of 1960 the Montevideo Treaty created the Latin American 
Free Trade Association. Its objective was to gradually and 
progressively achieve a Latin American common market and to 
favor the complementation and integration of the economies
gof the member countries. As a further aid to integration 
the General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration 
went into force in December 1960, It stipulated a five-year 
time limit for the creation of a Central American Common 
Market and bound the contracting parties to set up a cus-
9toms union with a single external tariff.
Although the Latin American middle sectors commanded 
the initiative in improving Latin America* s socio-economic 
conditions through economic development, during the post-war 
era the United States had not been completely inactive in
7John Mathis, Economic Integration in Latin America 
(Austin; University of Texas Press, 1969), 22-23,
8Urquidi, Challenge of Development. 129,
^Ibid,. 130,
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this sphere. After a faltering start in the early fifties, 
on the eve of the Kennedy administration the United States 
had initiated many important measures.
The work of reassessment began in the lower levels 
of the Eisenhower administration. John Moors Cabot, as 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 
fought for a hemisphere program of economic assistance and 
social reform in 1953. When George Humphrey, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, thwarted this effort Cabot resigned. His 
successor, Henry Holland, resumed the policy of making La­
tin America a safe place for conservative businessmen to
. 10 invest.
Although Cabot's effort in 1953 unfortunately failed, 
another event occurred in that year which v/as to have impor­
tant repercussions before the end of the fifties: Milton
Eisenhower made a trip south upon the request of his brother, 
the president. This marked the beginning of a re-evaluation 
of the Latin American scene by someone near the center of 
United States power. The Republican administration became 
dimly aware at this time of the need for structural changes 
including national control of economic development. This 
av/areness increased dramatically when Vice-President Richard 
Nixon was spat upon and in general molested on a Latin Amer­
ican trip in 1958,^^
10Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 189, 
^^Ibid,
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. Another important official in the Eisenhower regime 
who contributed to the renaissance of interest in Latin 
America was Douglas Dillon who became Under Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs in 1957. Although Dillon knew 
little about Latin Americans, he was struck by the anxiety 
which they exhibited at the Hemispheric Conference of Fi­
nance Ministers in Buenos Aires in 1957, Three weeks at 
this meeting convinced him that Washington * s diagnosis that 
Latin America was too prosperous to require external assis­
tance was in need of re-evaluation. Dillon was largely re­
sponsible for the creation of the Inter-American Develop­
ment Bank in 1959 as well as for the establishment of sev­
eral study groups to examine the question of stabilizing
• 12 commodity prices.
Dillon was not the only individual v/ith access to 
high counsel who preached the need for a new Latin American 
economic policy. Adolf Berle, former Assistant Secretary 
of State under the Roosevelt administration, had continued 
to press for social and economic reform in Latin America, 
Probably his most important contribution during the fifties 
to eventual socio-economic reform lay in cultivating his 
friendship with Luis Munoz Marin, the governor of Puerto 
Rico. Together these two statesmen developed a network of 
unofficial relationships with popular parties of Latin 




During the course of that trip on December 15, 1958, 
Kennedy delivered a speech encompassing the following points 
which he believed to be indispensable elements of a revised 
Latin American Policy:
1. An inter-American agreemei.t for stabilizing com­
modity prices and markets.
2. Pursuing the same objective, a re-evaluation of 
our tariff duties and quotas, of our programs 
for stockpiling strategic and nonperishable com­
modities, and of the possibilities for inter- 
American common markets and currency convertibil­
ity agreements.
3. An inter-American capital development bank, to 
which all Western Hemisphere nations contribute 
and in which all pairticipate, with a majority
of the capital being supplied by American dollars.
4. Concurrent with such a bank, the allocation to 
Latin-American projects of a larger proportion 
and total of the capital funds available from 
the Development Loan Fund.
5. The negotiation of individual tax treaties which 
would encourage the flow of private investment 
to underdeveloped lands whose tax forgiveness 
programs are now without effect in our own tax 
structure.
6. An increase in the exchange of students, and in­
clusion of undergraduates as well as graduates—  
not only to raise the educational standards and 
technical training in these nations, but also
to foster the spread of good will and a better 
understanding of both continents— in both con­
tinents •
7. A series of inter-American fellowships in medi­
cine cund public health, supported by all members 
of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, offering 
opportunities to study medicine and public
^^Ibid.. 192,
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health in the United States and elsewhere— in­
cluding the excellent schools of medicine and 
public health which have raised the standards 
so greatly in Puerto Rico.
8. The judicious use of our agricultural surpluses 
to relieve critical food shortages without dis­
placing the markets of other Latin-American na­
tions.
9. Finally, a new program of loans to encourage 
the establishment within other countries of a 
program similar to our own Farmers Home Admin­
istration, which through loans and guarantees 
enables small tenant farmers to buy their ownfarms.Ï4
Kennedy's perception of the feasibility of these 
points was reinforced during his first months in office by 
reports from various sources. One of these communicators 
of information was Authur Schlesinger, Jr., who summarized 
his report as follows;
1. Because population has been growing faster than 
output in recent years, Latin America has begun
to lose ground in the struggle for development. . ,
2. The Soviet Union, in association with Cuba, is 
exploiting the situation and providing the U.S. 
with unprecedentedly serious competition. . . .
3. Time is running out for the parties of the mid­
dle class revolution. . . .  The democratic par­
ties . . .  have thus far failed to deliver the 
goods to the satisfaction of the younger and 
more impatient members of the middle and work­
ing classes.
4. Latin America is waiting expectantly for new 
initiatives in Washington. . . .  The Inaugural 
Address evoked particular admiration. People 
are looking on J.F.K. as a reincarnation of 
F.D.R. To a surprising degree, the slate has 
been wiped clean of past neglect amd error.
The atmosphere is set for miracles. There is
^^Nevins, Strategy of Peace, 135-36.
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consequently real danger that the intensity of 
present expectations may lead to future disap­pointment.Ï5
Analysing this and similar information from sources 
such as Adlai Stevenson and Adolf Berle, Kennedy decided to 
supplement the positive actions in Latin America which the 
republicans had begun during the latter stages of their ad­
ministration. In 1960 President Eisenhower had sent an ur­
gent recommendation to Congress saying that we must "help our 
Latin American neighbors accelerate their efforts to strength­
en the social and economic structures of their nations and
*16to improve the status of their individual citizens." To 
emphasize the change in United States policy Eisenhower made 
a trip to Latin America the same year to show them that this 
country was serious in its nev; departure. Furthermore at 
the Inter-American Economic Conference held at Bogota in July 
1960 the United States offered to loan the Latin American
countries $500 million immediately and more later for social
• i. 17 projects.
Acting upon these precedents Kennedy announced in 
March 1961 an Alliance for Progress. This project stood for 
"a sustained and cooperative effort to accelerate growth and 
social progress throughout Latin America, working through
15Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 188.
16John Hopkins, The Alliance for Progress (New York; 
Harcourt and Brace, 1962), 13.
^^Lieuwin, U.S. Policy. 113.
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"18democratic institutions based on respect for the individual." 
The program was formally launched in August 1961 at Punta 
del Este, Uruguay where Douglas Dillon pledged $20 billion 
for the program over the next ten years. Approximately 55 
per cent of this support was to come from United States pub­
lic funds to be supplied at very low rates of interest; 15 
per cent would derive from United States private interests; 
international lending agencies such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would 
contribute 15 per cent; while the remaining 15 per cent v;as
19to come from public and private sources in Europe and Japan.
This more than quadrupled the previous United States 
commitment to Latin America, It was immediately the largest 
single foreign aid commitment of the United States. However 
the aid was conditional. The Latin American governments had 
to set up programs of social reform and to redistribute the 
land and wealth of the nations. Also over the ten year per-
20iod they were to contribute over $80 billion to the program.
The Alliance for Progress represented the affirmative 
side of Kennedy's response to Latin America's socio-economic 
situation as he perceived it. The other side was his absolute
IBLincoln Gordon, A New Deal for Latin America: The
Alliance for Progress (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 
106&); Sorenson, Kennedy. 533.
^^Lieuwin, U.S. Policy. 115.
20Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 773.
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determination to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting
that situation and gaining a second communist bridgehead in
21the hemisphere.
The basis for such a bridgehead was evident as commu­
nist parties had existed in Latin America since shortly af-
22ter the Bolshevik Revolution. Since that time Latin Amer­
icans had regularly been summoned to Moscow where they learned
everything from paramilitary warfare to political doctrine,
23and carried their lessons back to their homelands. This 
statement is borne out by the records of a hearing before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted in 1959, One of 
its participants was a Mr, Kornfeder, an Austrio-Hungarian 
who had studied at Lenin College in Moscow, and had been one 
of the principal founders of the communist parties of Colom­
bia and Venezuela before he broke with communism in 1934, 
Kornfeder indicated that potential agents were given a three- 
week intensive briefing by army officers in Russia who spe­
cialized in guerilla warfare. He added that South America 
was considered to have the proper topographical and politi­
cal terrain for this type of warfare.Evidence that the
21Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 773.
22Edwin Martin, "Communist Subversion in the Western Hem­
isphere," section VIII-C-1-26 in Readings in Psychological Oper­
ations, ST 33-151, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Port Bragg,
23Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 774,
^^U,S,, Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal 
Security Act and other Internal Security Laws; Testimony of 
Joseph Zack Kornfeder, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 195$,36.
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U.S.S.R. still believed Latin America to be ripe for exploi­
tation appeared in a Khrushchev statement in 1960: Latin Amer-
25ica reminds one of an active volcano."
During the decisional sequence it appeared to Kennedy
that communist efforts toward activating that volcano were
bearing fruit. In September, 1961, Cheddi Jagan, an avowed
26marxist, became the elected leader of British Guiana, and
during the following October he made his Washington debut.
After conferring with him Kennedy indicated his perception
of the nature of that regime:
Parliamentary democracy is going to be damn diffi­
cult in a country at this stage of development.
With all the political jockeying and all the racial 
tensions, it's going to be almost impossible for 
Jagan to concentrate the energies of this country 
on development through a parliamentary system, , . .
I have a feeling that in a couple of years he will 
find ways to suspend his constitutional provisions 
and will cut his opposition off at the knees,27
Kennedy had made clear to Jagan during their discus­
sion that his domestic policy per se was not the main concern 
of the United States;
I want to make one thing perfectly clear. We are 
not engaged in a crusade to force private enterprise 
on parts of the world where it is not relevant. If 
we are engaged in a crusade for anything, it is na­
tional independence. That is the primary concern of 
our aid. The secondary purpose is to encourage in­
dividual freedom and political freedom. But we can't 
always get that; and we have often helped countries 
which have little personal freedom, like Yugoslavia,




if they maintain their national independence. This 
is the basic thing. So long as you do that we don't 
care whether you are socialist, capitalist, pragma- gg 
tist or whatever. We regard ourselves as pragmatist.
These statements of Kennedy's serve to reiterate his 
belief that communism per se did not constitute a threat to 
his efforts to encourage the development of viable democracy. 
Only when a communist government attempted to subvert another 
people did its business also become that of the United States.
Accordingly although he considered Jagan only a po­
tential communist threat, Kennedy considered the danger from 
Castro's Cuba to be real. Cuba's main political philosopher, 
"Che" Guevara, indicated in 1961 the nature of that danger.
It was his belief that Cuba's contribution to communist ideo­
logy lay in its example of how to gain political power by 
capitalizing upon Latin America's chaotic socio-economic situ­
ation. To Guevara this situation composed the objective con­
ditions of revolution. In convincing the masses that they 
were being exploited through the maintenance of these condi­
tions and in instilling in them the will to instigate change 
through violence, the Cuban revolutionaries had created the 
"subjective conditions" of revolution. Furthermore Guevara 
believed the Cuban Revolution had identified the correct pro­
cedure for the resultant revolutionary struggle. It was his 
opinion that the struggle against imperialism should center
Z^ibid.. 775-76.
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29in the rural areas. In this he reinforced the threat in­
herent in Khrushchev's admonition of "wars of liberation,"
It was this threat of communist-induced guerrilla 
warfare which Kennedy needed to meet if the Alliance for Pro­
gress were to obtain success. However weaknesses in the 
hemispheric security structure which he had inherited would 
cause him frustration in his dealings with Castro. In or­
der to assess these weaknesses it is necessary to ascertain 
the nature of United States military-strategic policy in 
Latin America since World War II, It will be shown that an 
emphasis upon multilateral defense measures during and after 
that war frustrated Kennedy's efforts toward meeting the 
threat of communism.
Serious efforts toward formalizing hemispheric mul­
tilateral defense measures began as a result of the Dumbarton 
Oaks conference of August 21 to October 7, 1944, At that 
meeting the United States managed to impress its view upon 
its fellow great powers, the U.S.S.R,, Britain and China, 
that regional security organizations should be subordinate to 
the United Nations, It was the desire of the Latin Americans 
to counter this universalism with a strengthened Inter-American 
system which prompted them to convene an Inter-American con­
ference at Mexico City from February 21 to March 8, 1945, If 
there had to be a showdown between regionalism and universalism
29Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York; 
Monthly Review Press, 1961), 1-2,
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at the impending San Fransico Conference they wanted to be 
prepared with their arguments for the former.
As it turned out they received help at San Francisco 
from an unexpected quarter, the United States, when Senator 
Arthur Vandenburg, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela­
tions Committee, argued their case. It was his contention 
that the United Nations should allow regional security organ­
izations the right of individual and collective self-defense
30against armed attack. Articles 52 and 53 supplemented this. 
The former gave regional organizations the primary responsi­
bility for pacific settlement of local disputes before they 
were referred to the Security Council* The latter, however, 
apparently subordinated regional organizations in its direc­
tive that they must refrain from enforcement action until 
they received the authorization of the Security Council.
These articles were very much on the minds of the 
Latin Americans as well as the United States delegates as 
they convened at Rio de Janeiro in September of 1947 to write 
the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Article 3 of that 
document maintained consistency with article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter in that it authorized collective resistance to armed 
attack. However the Rio Treaty over-stepped article 53 of 
the Charter when it promulgated article 6, for this provision 
allowed the regional group to immediately determine collective
^^J. Lloyd Mecham, United States Latin American Rela­
tions (Dallas; Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 15?-6È.
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31measures against other than an armed attack.
With the loopholes thus established in the Rio Treaty 
for the Latin Americans to exert some influence over the U.N. 
they set about to establish an organization to coordinate 
collective measures. The result was the meeting at Bogota, 
Colombia in 1948 to establish the Organization of American 
States.* According to this treaty the Conference of Foreign 
Ministers v/as to be the major organ concerned with security. 
However the GAS Council soon usurped this role through con­
venient loopholes in the Rio Treaty. One was article 6 which 
had taken a flexible position on what constitutes aggression: 
"any fact or situation that affects the inviolability or in­
tegrity of the territory or sovereignty of any American State." 
This meant that aggression was, in effect, what two-thirds 
of the American States decided upon at any given time. The
other loophole, found in article 12, made the Council the
32provisional organ of consultation.
The completion of the Rio Treaty, along with an OAS 
to implement it, set the stage for the next issue in the Inter- 
American system: what policy would the OAS utilise to keep
the peace? In the early post-war period several nations, in­
cluding the United States, chose a policy of intervention in
31Jerome Slatter, The OAS and United States Foreign 
Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press', 1967), 30-31.
^^Ibid.. 41-43,
•Hereafter referred to as the OAS.
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33order to overthrow dictatorial regimes, Hov/ever the set­
back which the United States suffered at the hands of Juan 
Peron v/hen it attempted to equate him with fascism and total­
itarianism caused a re-evaluation of this policy. Peron 
turned this potential misfortune into a defeat for the United 
States when he labeled that country's efforts at propaganda 
through Spruille Braden's Blue Book as Yankee imperialism.^^ 
After this incident the United States moved from promoting 
a policy of anti-dictatorial alliance within the OAS to one 
of collective security. The latter policy better fit the 
interest of the United States as Truman, and particularly
Eisenhower were primarily concerned with providing a stable
35climate in Latin America for business investments.
The United States successfully utilized collective 
security in many of the disputes which raged in the Caribbean 
area from 1948 until 1960. The first of these concerned an 
armed invasion by Costa Rican exiles of their homeland from 
a base in Nicaragua. Since Latin American opinion in general 
favored democracy it was unwilling to allow the liberal lea­
der, José' Pigueres, of Costa Rica to be subverted by the dic­
tator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza. Therefore collective 
security worked and stability was quickly restored. In the
33Mecham, U.S. Latin American Relations, 172-73.
^^George I. Blanksten, Peron's Argentina (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953),59.
35Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy. 183.
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process a number of precedents were established: exile move­
ments were to be considered a threat to hemispheric stability 
rather than an internal matter and hence to be subject to 
OAS intervention under article 6 of the Rio Treaty; the Coun­
cil was to outflank the Foreign Minister's Conference as the 
primary organ of consultation in security matters; the OAS 
would act mainly through investigating committees, and it 
would present the threat of sanctions. In 1955 under simi­
lar circumstances conservative Costa Rican exiles were again 
thwarted in an attempt to invade Costa Rica as the United
States again obtained its objective of stability through
36collective security.
The United States experienced little difficulty in 
gaining consensus in the OAS for these two ventures as they 
both pitted democracies against an aggressive dictatorship; 
however, difficulty and criticism did ensue when the policy 
of collective security protected dictators. In response to 
this criticism Washington replied that democracy cannot be 
imposed by force but must come from within. Furthermore it 
added that collective security actually contributed to demo­
cracy by allowing each country to develop its political life
37free from outside interference.




security occurred in 1950 in relation to a dispute between 
the Dominican Republic and Haiti in which the latter charged 
the former with aiding an exile plot to overthrow the Estimé 
regime. The dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael 
Trujillo, denied these allegations and countered with some 
of his own. It was his contention that the Caribbean Legion, 
a force comprising various liberal elements from throughout 
the Caribbean region, was attempting to over-throw his govern­
ment. After it substantiated both claims the OAS investigat­
ing committee experienced much criticism in stating that the 
pursuit of democracy by the Caribbean Legion did not justify 
its violating the norms of non-intervention. Criticism in­
creased when for all practical purposes this incident caused
38the disbanding of that liberal group.
The United States' pursuit of stability through a 
policy of collective security connected the issue of dicta­
torship versus democracy to that of Castroist subversion in
39the spring and summer of 1959. The first case involving 
these issues occurred in April when an exile force from Cuba 
attempted to invade Panama and overthrow its government.
The OAS, with little dissension among its members, quelled 
the rebellion in short order when an investigation revealed 
that the basis for the invasion lay in the disgruntlement of 




gain the cooperation of some enthusiastic supporters of Castro 
in his endeavor to return to power. The investigating com­
mittee further revealed that Castro himself had nothing to 
do with this invasion. For the record the United States 
praised Castro at the time for his restraint,
Due mainly to a paucity of ideological issues in the 
Panamanian affair, there was little difficulty in gaining a 
consensus in the OAS to carry out collective security through 
the threat of sanctions. This was not the case though when 
a group of exiles from Nicaragua, with the aid of Costa Rica's 
government, attempted to overthrow the Somoza regime. Here 
was a case of potentially labeling a liberally composed in­
vasion force the aggressor, and this most of the Latin Ameri­
cans were unwilling to do. They had a good argument too, for 
Somoza had carefully refrained from labeling Costa Rica the 
aggressor. He merely indicated that he was experiencing a 
rebellion and requested aid in repelling it. In spite of 
this chance to favor the liberal cause the United States de­
cided to stick to its policy of collective security and sta­
bility first. Since nationality had not been considered in 
any of the previous exile invasions the United States held 
that it should not be a factor in this case. As a result 
the exile force suffered defeat and the Somoza regime re­
ceived a new lease on political life. As in the Panamanian
40ibid.. 84-86,
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affair Castro was absolved of any complicity,
Apparently encouraged by the OAS action in repelling 
invasions in Panama and Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic 
requested the assistance of that organization in meeting the 
threat of invasion from leftists in Cuba and Venezuela. The 
United States was willing to abide by collective security 
and honor the Dominican request, but the majority of the Latin 
Americans were not so disposed. The had acquiesced in the 
Somoza case, but now in the case of Trujillo this was going 
too far. Realizing the nature of the imbroglio the United 
States temporarily eluded the Trujillo issue and called for 
a consultative conference to deal with the general situation 
in the Caribbean and the question of democracy.
The strategy of the United States at the resultant 
Santiago Conference was to minimize the issue of dictatorship 
and attempt to link the disturbance in the Caribbean to com­
munism in the hope of obtaining a Latin American consensus 
for meeting that threat. The United States suffered disillu­
sionment with this strategy on two counts. One was that the 
Latin Americans exhibited little apprehension of communism. 
About the only concession they were willing to make on this 
issue was to increase the powers of the Inter-American Peace 
Committee to enable it to consider problems before they 
erupted into violence and hence to act as a monitor on the 
political climate of the area. The other count on which the
^^Ibid.. 86-90.
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United State." suffered disillusionment concerned the fact 
that anti-communist measures required a violation of the norms 
of non-intervention. Venezuela and Cuba were prepared to en­
gage in intervention practices. However, since the avowed 
purpose of these two countries was no suppress dictators and 
protect democracy and human rights rather than to combat com­
munism the United States was uninterested in their arguments 
at this time.^^ Washington was willing to drop the policy 
of collective security and hence of non-intervention only if 
it could obtain a Latin American consensus for intervention 
against communism, i.e. against Castro; however on the few 
occasions that it had attempted to force the OAS into an 
anti-communist alliance it had been unable to obtain that 
concensus. This statement may be borne out by a survey of 
the basic elements involved in those occasions.
The first instance in which Latin Americans were called 
upon to align against communism was at the Bogota Conference 
of 1948, After much debate consensus emerged around a decla­
ration which stated that the Inter-American system was incom­
patible with international communism. The strength of the 
document was somewhat dissipated by the addition: "and all
totalitarian doctrines.
Another opportunity for Latin Americans to align 
against communism came in the Korean crisis of 1950. At that
^^Ibid., 90-97.
^^Mecham, U.S. Latin American Relations, 211.
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time a consultative conference convened at Washington in or­
der to determine the part to be played by the Americas in 
quelling that communist threat. Its recommendations included 
strengthening and increasing the availability of the armed 
forces of the Latin American region, strengthening the Inter- 
American Defense Board as coordinator of hemisphere defense 
and increasing the effort on the part of Latin Americans to 
control communist subversion. These objectives were not 
carried out to any great extent. Only Colombia contributed 
armed forces to Korea, and this was mainly to alleviate a 
domestic crisis. The Inter-American Defense Board remained 
relatively insignificant except in the realm of the symbolic, 
and little effort went into eradicating communist subversion. 
In short, then, the precedent set during the Korean crisis 
was that operational hemispheric solidarity did not include 
a meaningful alliance in support of United States policies
and actions aimed at the eradication of international com-
44munism overseas.
In Guatemala in 1954 the United States learned that 
the Latin Americans were not really disposed toward the era­
dication of communism within the hemisphere either. The 
basis for that crisis occurred during the regime of Jos^ 
Arevalo, a proponent of social reform who took over Guatemala 
after a revolution ended the regime of the dictator Jorg^ 
Ubico in 1944. Instead of supporting Arevalo's reform
44^^Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy. 110-15,
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measures the United States adhered to its usual policy of 
maintaining the status quo through collective security. 
Arevalo ruled Guatemala for six years. During this time the 
communists made significant gains through filling the poli­
tical vacuum which resulted from an insufficient number of 
trained administrators of liberal bent.
The communists clandestinely organized as a politi­
cal party in 1949, and by the time Jacobo Arbenz took office 
in 1950 they were the strongest party in the country. Since 
Arbenz»s political tastes were further left than those of 
Arevalo he allowed them to operate openly. Capitalizing upon 
this opportunity the communists infiltrated labor, agrarian 
agencies, the bureaucracy and the National Democratic Front 
which was a coalition of leftist groups. Under Arbenz com­
munism came to be viewed in Guatemala as only an idea and 
not as a threat.
After the communist party exhibited ties with Moscow 
and Guatemala expropriated properties of the United Fruit 
Company the United States became increasingly concerned. 
Concern turned into frustration when no legal remedy under 
the Rio Treaty could be found. For this reason the United 
States, through the insistence of John Foster Dulles, con­
vened the Caracas conference in March, 1954, for the purpose 
of gaining multilateral legitimacy for action against Guate­
malan communism.Although Dulles claimed otherwise, the
45Mecham, U.S. Latin American Relations. 213-16.
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United States did not gain complete Latin American disap- 
proval of Guatemalan communism. The Caracas Declaration in­
dicated that communist governments in this hemisphere consti­
tuted a threat if they were controlled by international com­
munism, however it did not impair the right of states to 
freely choose their own form of government. From the point 
of view of the Latin Americans, communism per se was not con­
sidered a threat. In effect they were repeating the position 
which they had held during the Korean crisis.
In May the Guatemalans lent credibility to the United 
States charges of international communist influence when they 
accepted armaments shipped from the Soviet bloc. However 
there was another side to the story; the United States had 
been arming Honduras and Nicaragua for several months to meet 
the impending chreat of communism, therefore there is a possi­
bility that Guatemala was arming for self-defense. At any 
rate the shipment of Soviet bloc arms gave the United States 
the opportunity it was looking for. Its strategy then became 
two-fold. On the one hand it would supply the non-communist 
Guatemalan exiles training in Honduras and Nicaragua with 
armaments. On the other hand it would use the OAS as a smoke­
screen to prevent the U.N. from entering the scene.
Carlos Castillo Armas led the exiles into Guatemala 
on June 18, 1954, and on June 19 Guatemala simultaneously 
called upon the OAS and the U.N. for assistance. By this
^^Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy. 121-22.
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act Guatemala again inadvertently aided the United States, 
for that country constituted the dominant power on the OAS 
investigating committee besides the fact that it possessed 
a veto power in the Security Council. Therefore the United 
States could block any effective action by either the U.N, 
or the CAS, Arbenz immediately realized his mistake and 
attempted to call off the OAS, only to see Honduras and 
Nicaragua reconvene it. Meanwhile, in addition to the ob­
vious threat from its veto power, the United States utilised 
another weapon to prevent action by the U.N, Henry Cabot 
Lodge was the president of the Security Council and as such 
he initiated effective delaying tactics. He charged that 
the rebellion was only a civil war and that Guatemala was a 
tool of the Soviet Union because it was attempting to by-pass 
the OAS. He also threatened the U.N. with disintegration 
if it tried to preempt the OAS, for this would enjoin the 
issue of universalism versus regionalism and the former 
would surely lose. On June 26, the U.S. formally called a 
meeting of the OAS and on June 27, Arbenz surrendered to 
Castillo Armas.
The Guatemalan and the Korean cases showed that the 
OAS was not an effective collective defense mechanism against 
communism, for in both cases communism was met not through 
multilateral organization but through unilateral United States 
action. As in 1950 and 1954, there was not a consensus in
^^ibid.. 122-26.
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Latin America that communism was a threat in 1960, Now the 
dilemma v.'hich the United States faced in that year may be 
brought into perspective: On the one hand it was committed
to a policy of collective security which by its nature was 
wedded to non-intervention, while on the other hand it wished 
to legitimize intervention in order to quell Castro and com­
munist subversion. Unless the United States was willing to 
outrage Latin America and intervene unilaterally as in Guate­
mala it was going to have to find some way to legitimize mul­
tilateral intervention. Such an opportunity presented itself 
in the Dominican Republic where the regime of Rafael Trujillo 
was on the verge of collapse in 1960,
For thirty years Trujillo had ruled the Dominican 
people. During that time he obtained control of more than 
50 per cent of the national wealth and monopolized most major 
enterprises by forcing or frightening competitors out of bus­
iness, His family eventually owned 65 per cent of the country's 
sugar production, 12 per cent of its sixteen sugar mills, 
and 60 per cent of its best land. In fact the Trujillos pro­
cured a share of every business except drugs. At least 80 
per cent of the nation's workers labored for them, about half
on company payrolls and the other half on military and gov-
48ernment payrolls.
While these investments brought him prosperity.
48Dan Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned (New York: Putnan's
Sons, 1965), 46,
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Trujillo was sowing the seeds of his destruction through his 
brutal domestic methods. Literally thousands of his politi­
cal enemies died in secret dungeons, many of than after suf­
fering tortures inflicted with electrical devices, finger­
nail extractors, decapitation collars, and leather-thonged 
whips. A visit to his dungeons was like viewing a medieval 
torture chamber. These executions and tortures were almost
always justified on the grounds that the victims were com-
•  ̂ 49munists.
The OAS tolerated these atrocities until Trujillo 
attempted to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela.
At that point the OAS scheduled the sixth meeting of consul­
tation of Foreign Ministers at San Jos^, Costa Rica for 
50August 1960. At this meeting Venezuela asked for sanctions 
against the Dominican government, including intervention.
This time the United States was disposed to take a different 
view toward Venezuela's proposal than it had at Santiago the 
year before. Now it was in agreement with Venezuela concern­
ing the merits of intervention.
The main reason for the great change in the attitude 
of the United States was the increasing threaL which it per­
ceived from Fidel Castro. This threat v/hen coupled with the 




Juan Bosch, The Unfinished Experiment (New York: 
Praeger ., 1965), 10.
Ibid.
117
formula: as Batista was to Castro so Trujillo will be to
SI_____ _______ , The Dominican situation presented an op­
portunity for the United States to obtain its two currently 
imperative objectives: set a precedent and create the machin­
ery for intervention against dictatorships which could later 
be used against Castro, and induce a liberalization in the
internal Dominican political climate which could forestall
52a Castro-rtype revolution.
The increase in investigative powers which the Inter- 
American Peace Committee received at Santiago in 1959 now 
was to help the United States prepare the Latin American cli­
mate for a favorable view toward intervention. One aspect 
of that committee’s report blamed the international chaos 
resulting from the various exile invasions on the regime 
creating the exiles instead of on the exiles themselves and 
the regime aiding them. Another supplementary report con­
demned internal repression by dictators and implied that in­
tervention to restore stability was now a legitimate function 
of the OAS. These developments created the opportunity for 
the United States to rationalize itself out of the strait- 
jacket it created when it indicated that democracy can come 
only from within. Now the United States could state: "When­
ever a flagrant and notorious situation develops . . .  inter­
vention may be justified." Within the context of this
^^Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy. 190-91. 
S^lbid.. 186.
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situation the OAS decided at San Jos^ to break diplomatic
53and economic relations with the Dominican Republic, In
pursuit of this directive Eisenhower "imposed a fee of two
cents per pound on Dominican sugar, thereby depriving the
Trujillo regime of the usual United States margin above 
54world prices,"
These efforts by the OAS to gradually bring the dic­
tatorship to an end were abetted by the Dominicans themselves 
when a group of them assassinated Trujillo on May 30, 1961. 
Following this event the Dominican Republic lapsed into chaos, 
The nominal ruler was Joaquin Balaguer, who had been presi­
dent during Trujillo's regime. However he failed to lead 
any political movament of note. In the meantime Trujillo's 
son, Ramfis Trujillo, who had been in Paris at the time of
the assassination, flew home to take control of the armed 
55forces. Under his direction eighteen of the twenty plot­
ters were captured and killed. As he began to assert his 
authority, he was confronted by OAS pressure to relinquish 
power to President Balaguer, At this point the effect of 
the OAS boycott began to be felt, for it was in an effort 
to loosen these constraints that the Trujillos agreed to re­
linquish power to Balaguer,
Only a month after the assassination Kennedy put
S^Ibid,. 186-89,
S^Ibid,. 193,
^^New York Times. June 1, 1961,
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pressure on the Trujillos and Balaguer to moderate their ac­
tions. The United States was beginning to be looked on as 
the savior of the country by the Dominicans, and Kennedy 
planned to capitalize upon this feeling. It was the belief 
of the United States President that in order to prevent com­
munism the Dominicans required both order and democracy.
Order v/as necessary immediately after Trujillo's death to 
prevent chaos, while democracy v/as necessary soon to provide 
an alternative to communism. He decided that Balaguer and 
the army were rhe best bet for achieving these goals, at 
least in the short-run; "Balaguer is our only tool, we must
use our influence to take Balaguer along the road to demo- 
57cracy." It was for this purpose that the Dominican army 
v/as converted into an anti-guerrilla organization.
The Balaguer-army coalition would be successful, then 
if it provided order long enough for an effective opposition to 
develop which could lead to democracy in the long-run. This 
opposition did not take long to materialize. Conservative 
anti-Trujillo leaders organized the National Civic Union (UQ4) 
and protested openly against the government's policies. On the 
same day that this organization conducted its first rally Manuel 
Tavares Justo received his freedom from prison. The event 
v/as important because he led the 14th of June movement
56John B. Martin, Overtaken by Events (Garden City, 
New York; Doubleday and Company, Ï966), È2.
57Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 770.
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which v/as named after the date of an abortive coup attempt 
against Trujillo. Feeling that the situation had indeed 
changed, the students demonstrated on October 17, touching 
off a general strike which closed most of the shops and 
businesses of Santo Domingo. The objects of this demonstra­
tion were Hector Trujillo, and Jose* Arismendi Trujillo, 
Rafis' uncles, v/ho had tried to impose a new terrorist re­
gime on the country. The rioting was quelled only after 
Ramfis had exiled these two from the country. Meanwhile, 
still another threat to the regime became manifest in the 
Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolutionario Do- 
minicano). The PRO received its leadership from Dominican 
exiles who had previously organized with the objective of 
driving Rafael Trujillo from power. Among these leaders 
v/as Juan Bosch,
Less than a month after the return of Bosch and the 
PRD and the violent demonstrations, Ramfis Trujillo decided 
that he had had enough of the pressure. He telephoned his 
uncles in Bermuda, telling them of* his plans to leave the 
country for Europe. . With their nephew out of the v/ay the 
uncles planned to return on November 15 and prepare to over­
throw Balaguer. These plans placed the United States in 
an untenable position. Only the preceding Tuesday, Novem­
ber 14, it had proposed to the 0,\S that that organization 
lift diplomatic and economic sanctions.On Thursday the
^^Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned. 52.
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proposal was withdrawn, and on Friday President Kennedy sent
a fleet of fourteen warships, including two aircraft carriers,
59to Dominican waters "to ensure a democratic solution." The 
next day. Secretary of State Rusk announced that the marines 
were available if Balaguer should need them.^^
With this power at his disposal Balaguer found the 
courage to oppose the Trujillos openly. Confronting them in 
his office Balaguer told that if he were killed the United 
States marines would come ashore under previously given au­
thority, and asked them to leave the country. On Sunday night 
Balaguer announced to the nation that the Trujillos had agreed, 
in a "generous, patriotic gesture" to leave for the United 
States.
Finally free of Trujillo terrorism, the Dominicans 
tore dovm signs bearing the name of Trujillo and changed the 
name of the capital from Ciudad Trujillo back to its original 
name of Santo Domingo. Many people who had been exiled under 
Trujillo returned, and political life, the expression of 
ideas and views, so long stifled, began to return.
Ho sooner had the Trujillos left than the United States 
mediators began pushing for the establishment of a temporary 
government and free elections. When the Uni<^ Civica Nacional 
called a strike for the purpose of deposing Balaguer, the
59Kennedy and the Press. November 29, 1961, 140, 
^^New York Times. November 19, 1961.
^^Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned. 53.
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beleaguered president agreed to the formation of a Council of 
State dominated by the U.C.N, which would consist of seven 
members.Thus encumbered, Balaguer remained as president 
when the new organization assumed control on January 1, 1962,^^
In assessing the Dominican situation as it developed 
during the decisional sequence from May 1961 until January,
1962 it is evident that the United States and the OAS success­
fully extricated themselves from the strait-jacket of non­
intervention. However during this time it was becoming evi­
dent that interventionism was only a temporary expedient in 
response to special circumstances: The Dominicans understood
and supported the U.S. policies; opposition groups were avail­
able to ensure a non-communist alternative; the Trujillos were 
vulnerable to the sugar embargo; the Trujillos were considered 
tyrants by a majority of the Latin American community and
United States cctions were supported and complimented by those 
64of the OAS. The most important factor that illustrated the 
temporary nature of the current mood of intervention was the 
response during this period with which United States initia­
tives for OAS intervention in Cuba were received.
Perhaps the most relevant factor determining that 
Kennedy would experience difficulty in his attempts to secure 
multilateral legitimacy for OAS intervention in Cuba lay in
62New York Times. December 18, 1961.
^^New York Times. January 2, 1962.
64Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy. 205.
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! he history of United States-Cuban relations. It was in Cuba 
that much of the Latin American bitterness against United 
States interventionism was nurtured even before Cuba became a 
nation-state. For example there were those who claimed that 
the sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor was planned and exe­
cuted by Wall Street business executives v/ho favored the ac­
quisition of Cuba. The United States, according to this viev/, 
transformed the Cuban War of Independence into the Spanish- 
American War for the economic domination of Cuba.^^ From 
shortly after Cuba's independence from Spain in 1893 until 
the rise to power of Castro, the United States controlled the 
policy-making apparatus of Cuba's governments, first through 
the Platt Amendment and then through control of Cuba's eco­
nomy.
It was within the context of this United States imper­
ialism that in 1953 Fidel Castro, then a young lawyer, at­
tempted to have Fulgencio Batista, the pro-U.S. president- 
dictator, declared unqualified to hold office by virtue of 
his illegal seizure of power. Foiled in this attempt he tried 
by means of strikes and work slowdowns to accomplish this task, 
Partially as a result of poor organization and a lack of com­
munication with the public, these measures also proved unsuc­
cessful. Therefore he tried, again unsuccessfully, to seize 
a military arsenal at the Moncada barracks in hopes of
Robert F. Smith, Background to Revolution; The De­
velopment of Modern Cuba (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966),
15.
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triggering a popular uprising against Batista and of winning 
the backing of the army at the same time. Following this fi­
asco, he was given a trial and sentenced to twenty years im­
prisonment. During the course of the trial Castro received 
much publicity from the world press. This gave him a largo 
following and eventually induced Batista to offer a general 
amnesty to all political prisoners. Martin Ebon states that 
this was the "greatest mistake of his [Batista's] life."^^ 
Capitalizing upon his popularity, Castro left Cuba 
with a few supporters in 1955 to train his "army" on a ranch 
near Mexico City for an invasion of Cuba. In December, 1955 
the yacht, "Granma," landed on a beach in Oriente Province
near the Sierra Maestra Mountains with Castro and eighty-two
67soldiers aboard. Since most of the force did not survive 
an ambush by Batista's forces the dictator made the mistake 
of assuming that the remainder of the group would not pose 
a major threat to his regime. However, they set up headquar­
ters in the mountains where they received shelter from the 
local inhabitants. With the aid of an underground radio sta­
tion Castro's propaganda campaign swelled his force to over 
a hundred men. They began to wage hit-and-run attacks on 
the government outposts which led to Batista's suspension of 
civil rights in order to prevent future attacks. Through
^^"On the Way to Castro," 33 in "Che:" The Making of 
a Legend (Hew York: Universe Books, 1969).
6 7Robert Taber, M-26: Biography of a Revolution 
(Mew York: Lyle Stuart, 1961), 52-54,
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this war of attrition Castro managed to link up with similar 
underground groups around the island until, aided by the apa­
thy of Batista's army, he v/as able to gain control of Cuba on 
January 1, 1959.^®
According to Arthur Schlesinger, several events indicate 
that 1959 saw the clear commitment of Cuba to marxism and the 
service of Soviet foreign p o l i c y , I n  January of that year 
Jos^ Figueres received an invitation to visit Castro, however he 
was unable to attend until March when he v/as scorned by many of 
Castro's aids as a tool of Wall Street. In July Manuel Urrutia, 
Castro's puppet president, resigned under pressure for criti­
cizing communism in a television speech. In October, Major 
Hubert Matos warned against communist penetration and received 
a twenty year prison sentence. In November, Manuel Ray, Minis­
ter of Public Works, and Felipe Pazos, head of the National Bank, 
resigned. In April, Castro and his finance ministers visited 
the United States. Castro's refusal to allow them to accept 
aid led Schlesinger to surmise that this experience was contrived 
in order to give him the excuse to tighten political controls; 
since Cuba v/as not to receive economic assistance it v/as neces­
sary for the state to ration its scarce resources.* Finally,
G^ibid.. 291.
69Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 220.
•It should be pointed out that this is a highly contro­
versial interpretation. For example John Sv/omley, among others, 
believes that the United States blatantly refused Castro aid at 
this time. John W. Swomley, Jr., American Empire; The Politi- 
cal Ethics of Twentieth Century Conquest (New York: Mhcmillan
Co., i970);~i7i-7'§;  —
126
the United Staten Ambassador, Phillip Bonsai, requested an in­
terview with Castro on May 8, which was not granted until 
June 13. That sur.imer he was left waiting even longer an he
made the request for an interview on July 23, and it was not
70granted until September 5.
Although the United States was suspicious of Castro's 
political intentions during his first year in power its poli­
cy toward him from 1959 until mid-1960 could be characterised
71as one of "watchful waiting." Washington was paying the 
price for its history of interventionism in Cuba and the rest 
of Latin America by witnessing a pro-Castro foreign policy by 
at least ten important Latin American countries. Another rea­
son for caution, though, lay in the State Department's opinion 
that the Soviets were seeking to press the United States into 
unilateral action in order to take world opinion off its forays 
into Hungary and Poland, Within this context the role of the
OAS was to do just enough to justify Eisenhower's inaction or
72unwillingness to take strong unilateral measures.
Several events occurred during 1960 which caused United 
States-Cuban relations to cool beyond the point of reconcilia­
tion, however. In February of that year Castro signed a 
treaty with the U.S.S.R. according to which he would trade 
five million tons of sugar for oil, iron, and steel machinery
70lbid.. 218-21.
71Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy. 136. 
^̂ Ibid.
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plus one hundred million dollars in credit. Between this time 
and August 1960, United States and British oil refineries re­
fused to refine Soviet crude oil, Castro expropriated major 
United States oil companies, the United States cut seven hun­
dred thousand tons off the 1960 Cuban sugar quota, Khrushchev 
offered Soviet rockets to protect Cuba from the United States 
and Cuba appeared before the U.N, to blast United States im­
perialism.
Toward the latter part of the summer of 1960, the 
United States was in the mood to risk a hemispheric split in 
order to secure OAS approval for intervention in Cuba. The 
United States' objectives in the impending Hemispheric confer­
ence were to invoke article 39 of the OAS Charter instead of 
article 6 of the Rio Treaty in order to keep the issue of ag­
gression low-key, to keep the U.N. where the U.S.S.R. held 
great influence, out of the affair, to lay the foundation for 
later and greater action and to pacify domestic critics of 
Eisenhower's do-nothing policy. In addition it wanted at 
least verbal condemnation from Latin America of Castro's ag­
gression. To this end it presented a memorandum to the OAS 
Peace Committee depicting what it considered were those acts 
of aggression: as an instrument of the "Sino-Soviet powers"
Castro v;as "undermining hemispheric solidarity" through sup-
7 0porting subversive movements in Latin America.
The seventh conference of foreign ministers finally
^^Ibid.. 142-43.
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convened at San Jose, Costa Rica, on August 22, I960, At that 
time Khrushchev's threat to unleash Soviet rockets had not 
frightened Latin America to the point that the United States 
could gain support for attacking international communism per 
se through evoking the Caracas Declaration. Therefore it con­
centrated its attack on Castro's threat to the hemisphere.
The Cuban strategy at the conference v/as to identify 
with Arbenz's Guatemala of 1954. It indicated that in that 
crisis the OAS had yielded to "Yankee Imperialism" and thereby 
forced Guatemala to turn in desperation to the communist bloc.
Cuba's non-intervention plea touched a responsive 
chord in the nations south of the Rio Grande as may be gleaned 
from an analysis of the Declaration of San Josê . That docu­
ment stated in part that the Americas were against the infil­
tration of extra-continental powers and that Inter-American 
norms were compatible only with democracy. These statements 
taken in isolation would seem to condemn Castro, however the 
third point showed his influence in that it reaffirmed the 
sacrosanct nature of non-intervention. Neither Cuba nor com­
munism was singled out for reprimand, nor were sanctions 
threatened. Even then the Latin Americans signed the declara­
tion reluctantly.
The tepidness which the OAS exhibited at San Jose  ̂in­
creased the domestic pressure on first Eisenhower and then 
Kennedy until an invasion of Cuba was almost inevitable. The 
result was the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, which has been
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related previously. Following that episode Kennedy's incen­
diary speech pointing out the United States* determination to 
do what it considered necessary to defend its interests with 
or without OAS support helped restore a climate somewhat more 
propitious for the United States. Shortly after his state­
ment, Costa Rica, Honduras, Venezuela, and Colombia joined 
the anti-Castro forces. However this still left six hold­
outs including the largest countries in the region.
In spite cf the restraining influence which those coun­
tries exerted, there were still several factors pushing Kennedy 
toward a hard-line against Castro during the decisional se­
quence following the Bay of Pigs. Probably the most important 
was the attitude of Congress, for without its support the Al­
liance for Progress would never get off the ground for lack 
of funds. Kennedy did not have long to wait before Congress 
made its mood perfectly clear. On May 14, 1961, a resolution 
passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 404 to 2 
which demanded that the OAS initiate steps to impose sanctions 
on Cuba. Other advocates of a hard-line were the Central 
American and Caribbean countries, with the major exception of 
Mexico, and important elements of the United States public.
With the situation characterized by such divisiveness 
Kennedy v/as not anxious to convene the OAS. He feared the 
harmful effects which public airing of these divisions might 
have. For this reason he was chagrined by Peru's unilateral 
invocation of the Rio Treaty in October, 1961, to propose an
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OAS conference. To make matters worse, Peru called for a re­
view of not only external but also internal Cuban policy 
which struck at the center of the explosive non-intervention 
issue. Fortunately the United States was able to postpone a 
meeting under these circumstances.
In November, Colombia unilaterally called a meeting
of the OAS to consider only external issues which the United
74States felt it could not afford to postpone. Colombia
thought the failure of the Cuban invasion should be repaired
75by collective OAS action. That country and Venezuela both 
had militant communist minorities, a fact which caused Vene­
zuela to suffer the loss of thirty-two lives during the en-
76suing conference. Therefore they were anxious to extirpate
the source of this friction. When several more countries also
advocated a harder line on Cuba, it appeared that a display
of hemispheric unity might be within reach after all. In fact
Kennedy publicly stated his confidence that the negotiators
77would make their hostility to communism very clear.
The conference met at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 
January 22, 1962, and on January 31, twenty of them approved 
a resolution condemning Cuba as a Marxist-Leninist state tied
^^ibid.. 144-51.
75Carlos Stoetser, The Organization of American States 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 21.
on Castro," Time, LXXIX (February 2, 1962), 
28-29. ----
77Kennedy and the Press. January 24, 1961, 165.
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78to the Sino-Soviet block. They also labeled the Castro dic­
tatorship as incompatible with the inter-American system. On 
this crucial vote, Haiti abstained until the last but finally
cast the ballot that gave the measure the fourteen votes neces-
79sary for passage. This action meant that while the meeting 
could not legally expel Cuba as a member state, it could sus­
pend her from the OAS so long as she maintained her present 
incompatibility with the inter-American system. However, no
majority could be obtained to totally exclude Cuba from hemis- 
SOphere affairs.
The meaning of this division may be gleaned from the 
fact alluded to earlier that the six nations who most vehe­
mently opposed excluding Cuba were the largest nations in 
Latin America. This meant that countries accounting for nearly 
three-fourths of the population of Latin America were in op­
position to the United States on this issue. The communists 
capitalized upon this opportunity by trying to deepen the 
cleavage. Leftist newspapers hailed the courage of the six
countries in defying the United States, while labeling the
81other republics Yankee satellites.
78Mecham, U.S. Latin American Relations. 228-19.
79"spiit on Castro," 28-19.
80"Full Circle at Punta del Este," Time, LXXIX (Febru­
ary 9, 1962), 33-34.
81David B, Richardson, "V/here the U.S. Stands now in 
Latin America," U.S. News and World Report. LII (Februarv 12. 
1962), 4 9 - 5 0 . --------------------- -̂-- ’
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At this point an analysis of the reasons behind the 
defection of these large nations is in order. It will be 
shown that the delegates were more preoccupied with problems 
at home than with establishing hemispheric unity at that 
time.
In Brazil's case, economic factors were important in 
the refusal to back a hard line against Cuba. It was the old 
story of jealousy and misunderstanding of the United States 
intentions toward her. The Brazilians felt that the United 
States was more interested in Europe and Asia than in Latin 
America. The price of coffee, her mainstay, was low and it 
was felt in the largest Latin American nation that the United 
States, the biggest consumer of her coffee, v/as interested 
in keeping prices low to satisfy American consumers. As if 
this were not reason enough, her government was weak and 
divided. Communist strength v/as substantial, Brazil’s pre­
sidential candiate, J§nio Quadros, felt it necessary to call
on Castro in Havana rather than visit Washington in order to
82gain the support of Brazilian Castroites. Therefore, for 
political reasons also Brazil pushed for a plan of peaceful 
coexistence with Castro.
Argentina's problem v/as also both economic and poli­
tical. The former derived from a United States embargo on 
Argentine beef and from a flooding of American farm products 
on world markets. These policies adversely affected
82Sidney Kraus, ed.. The Great Debates, 414,
133
Argentina as a traditional cattle and wheat producing country. 
Politically, Argentina, like Brazil, voiced concern about the 
United States apparent neglect of her problems. President 
Arturo Prondizi felt that the United States should concentrate 
more on the problems of southern South America and less on 
the Caribbean area. To draw Washington's attention to this 
area, Frondizi advocated the establishment of an ABC block 
comprising Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It was largely for 
this reason that he did not antagonize the latter two countries 
by voting for sanctions against Cuba when they had abstained.
Mexico's position was a paradox. By abstaining on 
the Cuban issue she alienated foreign private investors who 
feared that this would encourage communist agitation from 
the active leftist segment of the nation. At the same time 
it was suffering a loss of foreign private investment. The 
answer seemed to be that Mexico thought it v/as large enough 
to fend for itself in the world; it was declaring its econo­
mic independence from the United States.
Chile's conservative government was struggling under 
the strains of leftist agitation brought on by a biting in­
flation. A prolonged strike in its copper mines deprived the 
country of much of its dollar earnings, and additional taxes 
were necessary to cover pay increases for hordes of government 
workers.
In Eduador, Carlos Julio Arosemena had just become 
president. The fact that many communists rode Arosemena*s
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coattails into office prompted Castro to allude to the poli­
tical upheaval as an impressive victory over Yankee imperi­
alism. To furrher clarify Ecuador's stand the nevi president, 
in his first speech after taking office, promised friendly 
relations with Cuba,
Bolivia's trouble stemmed from a faltering economy. 
Nationalization of the country's most important industry, 
tin mines, only increased left-wing agitation for better con­
ditions. This agitation led to rioting during the Punta del 
Este meeting.
The countries that voted for a hard line on Castro
were also having trouble at home, but in their cases, the
Cuba-based threat of international communism was the greater 
83issue.
The obstinacy of the major Latin American countries 
in refusing to enact collective intervention measures against 
Cuba was exhibited by most nations of the area in relation 
to the issue of collective anti-subversion tactics. This is 
seen in their position on the proposal at Punta del Este to 
establish a Special Consultative Committee on Subversion 
whose duties would be to investigate and offer suggestions as 
to how to cope with the problem of communist-induced subver­
sion. A major obstacle before a successful S.C.C.S. was the 
precedent of the Emergency Committee for Political Defense 
which had wielded great power in extirpating axis sympathizers
83Richardson, "Where the U.S. Stands Now."
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during World War II, To many Latin Americans this organisa-
84tion had reeked of super-statism and hence interventionism,
Latin .^erica, then, was not disposed in 1961, during 
the decisional sequence, to meet the threat of communism 
through international organisation largely because of obei­
sance to the norm of non-intervention. Therefore in order 
for Kennedy to counter communist "wars of liberation" he 
would have to operate on a bilateral basis.
84̂Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy. 166,
CHAPTER V
RISE .)\ND FALL OF MILITARY CIVIC ACTION:
FROM LATIN AMERICA AND VIETNAM 
TO BERLIN
Since the United States could not count upon the OAS 
to intervene in Latin American nations threatened by subver­
sion, the Kennedy Administration implemented a new military 
policy in that area. For this policy to be waged successfully 
military tactics needed to be coordinated with political, so­
cial, economic and psychological factors. One of the means 
through which the military could work with these non-military 
aspects would be civic action. This would help to discourage 
popular support for insurgent movements and encourage local 
populations to assist the military in operations against such 
movements. In other words, civic action was to be the inte­
grating factor between the military and the Alliance for Pro- 
1gress.
The relevant assumptions contained within the military 
civic action doctrine are summarized below:
1. It can be a subtle means of having troops in a 
strategic location. In an area where there is 
a threat of insurgency, it might be wiser to
1Willard Barber and Neale Ronning, Internal Security 
and Military Power: Counter-Insurgency and Civic Action in




send in a battalion that devotes at least a part 
of its time to construction or other useful labor.
It can secure valuable intelligence, and its pre­
sence might discourage potential insurgents with­
out antagonizing the uncommitted.
2. It can serve to alleviate some of the intolerable 
conditions of rural inhabitants and thus make 
them less inclined to join or assist insurgent 
movements.
3. It is a means of improving the image of the mili­
tary, the central government, or both, thus enlist­
ing the cooperation of local inhabitants when the 
army is in pursuit of rural insurgents.
4. By contributing to the general economic develop­
ment of the country, it will reduce the danger 
of insurgency.
5. It is a means of educating the armed forces and
the civilians by bringing the military into con­
tact with rural problems, inducing communities to 
work together and by teaching the officers and 
enlisted men useful civilian skills.2
The objectives of military civic action parallel those 
of the Caribbean interventions of the early twentieth century: 
internal security, economic development and the advance of stable 
government. Other similarities include the promotion of a re­
sponsible and non-military establishment; the extension of the 
central government * s authority into remote provinces and the 
diversion of military resources into socially constructive uses, 
especially where the civilian community lacks such resources.
The differences between the two eras lay in the Kennedy emphasis 
upon institutionalizing a state of mind which would be condu-




Toward this end President Kennedy pointed out the im­
portance of the United States Corps of Engineers as a model 
for Latin America: "Military assistance can, in addition to
its military purposes, make a contribution to economic progress. 
The domestic works of our own Army Engineers are an example of 
the role which military forces in the emerging countries can
4play in village development, sanitation, and road building."
Secretary of State Rusk added that the "United States 
Government would like to see Latin American armed forces in­
crease their part in modernizing the basic facilities of all 
the American Republics. We believe they could borrow profit­
ably from the long and honorable record of our own United 
States Corps of Engineers, in strengthening the civilian eco­
nomy."^
This highly favorable view of the military engineer­
ing function received reiteration by the well known Spanish- 
Mexican author, Victor Alba:
Latin America ought to put the thousands of military 
technicians to work. VJhat they learn in schools—  
the capacity to undertake enterprises, to plan public 
works and direct their execution— covers many of the 
technical problems that still remain unresolved not 
only for want of money, but also for the lack of pro­
fessional skills. The army that Latin America needs—  
and this is not a demogogic phrase— is an army of en­
gineers, of overseers, of constructors.6
4"Special Message Read by the President Before a Joint 
Session of the Congress, May 25, 1961," 28-37 in American For­
eign Policy Current Documents. 1962.
5Barber and Ronning, Internal Security. 74.
Sbid.
139
Several other scholars of the Latin American military 
have emphasized the "nev/** Latin American military, pointing 
out that it is no longer an ad hoc caudillo-dominated group, 
but rather that it is steadily increasing in professionaliza­
tion.^
This increase in professionalization was derived, in 
part, from the inter-American cooperation during and after 
World V/ar II. For example, the Inter-American Defense Board, 
alluded to earlier, became a permanent part of the inter- 
American system in 1945. Less than a year later it recommended 
for adoption by the member states a policy long advocated by 
the United States: the standardization of organization, equip­
ment and training. Another example came in the passage of the 
Mutual Security Act of 1951 as a result of the communist attack 
on South Korea. By July, 1959, the United States had training 
missions in nearly all Latin American countries and had pro­
vided $317 million in grants for military aid and equipment 
going to tv/elve countries. Seven other countries were receiv-
Oing equipment under the reimbursement provisions of the act.
The movement to implement the policy of military civic 
action in Latin America coincided with a similar effort in
7For example: Edwin Lieuwin, ^ms and Politics in
Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1961); and John Johnson,
Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1964).
g
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security. 63-64.
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9Vietnam. The United States had been involved in that area
since 1941 when Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to prevent the
10Japanese from inhibiting American access to rubber. In the
immediate post-war era the United States, through its policy
of supporting China's Chiang Kai-Shek, consequently supported
Chiang's allies, the Vietminh in their war against the French,
However upon Chiang's defeat at the hands of a communist-
controlled rebellion the United States became actively engaged
11in supporting the French,
Although the official United States line thereafter
gave uncritical support to France, its Saigon legation was
12"bitterly split about the wisdom of this policy," The poli­
tical section, backed by the economic aid people and the CIA, 
argued that the French could not organize successful resis­
tance on the basis either of military plans calling for conven­
tional assault or of political plans retaining Indochina as
13a part of France.
Within the context of this situation in 1951 Kennedy 
made a trip to French Indochina. In Saigon he made friends 
with the counselor of the American Legation, Edmund Gullion, 
who later recalled that Kennedy "bridaled under the routine
^Chester L, Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Viet­
nam (New York; Dodd, Mead & Co., 1970), 169.
10Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 537,
11Hammonds, The Cold War Years. 183,
12Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 320-21,
^^Ibid,. 321,
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embassy briefing and asked sharply why the Vietnamese should
14be expected to fight to keep their country a part of France." 
This viewpoint angered the French Commander, General Jean de 
Lattre de Tassigny, who issued a formal complaint to the Ameri­
can Minister.^’
Kennedy said upon his return to Washington that "in 
Indochina we have allied ourselves to the remnants of empire. .
. . To check the southern drive of communism makes sense but
16not only through reliance on the force of arms." He contin­
ued by identifying the task as one of relying on non-communist 
sentiment as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions 
of General de Lattre. Kennedy believed that to deny innately 
nationalistic aims spelled foredoomed failure. He gained new
perspective on the strength of nationalism in Southeast Asia,
17for without it "there is no hope of success."
Kennedy stated on April 6, 1951, in the Senate that 
"no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can 
conquer . . .  an enemy of the people. . . .  For the United 
States to intervene unilaterally and to send troops into the 
most difficult terrain in the world, with the Chinese able to 
pour in unlimited man-power, would mean that we would face a 







Further evidence of the strong feelings which Kennedy 
held about Indochina as a Senator may be gleaned from a Senate 
speech in 1956 in which he stated that Vietnam is the "key­
stone to the arch: militarily, politically and economically
19in Southeast Asia," He indicated the influence of China was 
increasing in the area while that of our ally, Japan, was de­
clining, He then indicated the importance of this fact: "the
fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy, in short,
depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Viet- 
,.20naraese narion,"
The Eisenhower Administration shared Kennedy* s concern
about Vietnam as seen in its 1954 pledge to help resist any
"aggression or subversion threatening the political indepen-
21dence of the Republic of Vietnam," The United States pledged 
itself to defend a country which had suffered one hundred years 
of colonial rule, a Japanese occupation and an eight year war 
with France, South Vietnam possessed few qualified adminis­
trators, a population which was four-fifths rural and a million
22refugees from the north. In addition, the government had to
i8Kennedy, "War in Indochina," 284-94 in John Kennedy, 
Compendium of Speeches, Statements and Ranarks in Congress.





contend with various independent sects such as the Hoa Hao and
the Cao Dai.^^
Senator Mike Mansfield described the scene in Vietnam
in 1954 as follows:
The political crisis in South Viet-Nam stems from the 
same causes that were evident at the time of my pre­
vious visit, except that these causes have now become 
more acute. There is still the same shortsighted 
struggle for immediate gain among factions. Each of 
these elements possesses some aspects of power in its 
organisation, armaments or heritage of authority.
None, however, is broadly based in the people. The 
urgent need to develop such a base through the forma­
tion of a national government by popular participa­
tion continues to be ignored. In their anxiety to 
preserve and enhance their individual positions the 
petty power groups in South Viet-Nam appear completely 
oblivious to the overhanging shadow of the Vietminh 
which before long may envelop them all unless they 
put aside their factionalism,
Saigon is the hub of the political crisis. Since 
the Geneva agreement that capital city has seethed 
with intrigue and counter-intrigue, with rumors and 
counter-rumors. The political plotting goes on in 
army circles, government circles, foreign circles, 
in party headquarters, in police headquarters, and 
even in the demimonde of ill-disguised gangsters, 
pirates, and extortionists.24
In spite of these conditions the leader of South Vietnam, Ngo 
Dinh Diem, managed to maintain a modicum of stability during 
his first three years in power.
However, events in China portended further instabi­
lity in Southeast Asia. The success of the Russian sputnik 
in 1957 motivated Mao Tse-Tung to observe that the "Eastwind
^^Hilsman, To Move A Nation. 416-17.
24Maxwell D, Taylor, Responsibility and Response (Nev; 
York: Harper & Row, 1967), 54.
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prevails over the Westwind” and therefore to initiate an aggres­
sive foreign policy. In response to this new development the 
United States felt constrained to reassure South Vietnam of
its backing; therefore in 1957, John Foster Dulles, with moral-
25istic overtones, reiterated the United States commitment.
This commitment was of a unilateral nature in order to avoid
identification v/ith European colonialism in Southeast Asia.
However the type of military training which the United States
employed was to become an increasing area of controversy, as 
27will be shown.
As the decade of the fifties closed the United States 
commitment to South Vietnam increased as President Diem 
steadily lost his grip on the situation. His resultant author­
itarian practices such as stopping village elections and prac­
ticing nepotism through progressively extending more power to 
his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, cost him more popular support. The 
situation almost came to a head when an elite parachutist sec­
tion, which constituted the core of South Vietnam's anti-
28guerrilla cadre, attempted a coup in November 1960.
In spite of these conditions the Chief of the American 
Military Mission could state before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in April 1959 that the guerrillas in South Vietnam
^^Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 285-89.
26Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 537.
Z^lbid.. 539.
28Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 418.
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had been "gradually nibbled away until they ceased to be a 
major menace to the government." But not all military per­
sonnel were so optimistic. General Edward Lansdale had been 
sent on a secret mission to Vietnam in liason with the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Although assigned under Eisenhower he 
did not present his report until February 1961 after Kennedy 
had entered office. The report shocked the president who 
was favorably impressed with Lansdale’s recommendation to con­
centrate on the strategy of military civic action in order to
29regain the support of the population.
Kennedy’s strategy during the pre-decisional sequence, 
then, was to honor Eisenhower's commitment in Vietnam through 
a policy of military civic action. Through this policy he 
attempted to avoid choices limited to escalation or retreat 
and to buy time for the attitude of the populace to turn in 
favor of Diem* A report to the president by Lyndon Johnson in 
in May 1961, reinforced Kennedy’s opinion that this v/as the 
correct policy to pursue. The vice-president had gone to South 
Vietnam at the request of the president to gain first-hand 
knowledge of the situation, and it was his opinion that a com­
mitment by the United States to military civic action in sup-
30port of Diem was definitely a necessity at that time.
Kennedy’s commitment to military civic action was fur­
ther clarified in his address to Congress on May 25, 1961 in
Z^lbid.. 418-19.
30Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 543.
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which he spelled out the specific amounts of material he wanted
31in order to implement his policy.
However, lacking a democratic tradition, subjected to 
continuous war for two generations, and steeped in the tactics 
of conventional war for at least six years under the guidance 
of the United States military advisors, it was to become in­
creasingly evident that the Vietnamese military was incapable 
in the short-run of building democracy through civic action.
The situation became progressively more tenuous in the face of 
steadily mounting pressure from communist guerrillas.
In order to understand the debates within the Kennedy 
administration over the proper strategy with which to counter 
these guerrillas, it is instructive to survey the precepts of 
the philosophy of guerrilla warfare through the writings of 
Mao Tse-Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap and "Che” Guevara. This is in 
line with Kennedy's directive to all the members of his decision, 
unit to study their writings.
These writers sought, through theory and practice, to 
prove that through guerrilla warfare the armies of technolog­
ically superior countries could be brought to defeat. This 
basic premise is made explicit in the following statements:
Mao in 1937 stated that the "guerrilla campaigns being waged 
in China today are a page in history that has no precedent.
Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her
31"Special Message to Congress," in American Foreign 
Policy: Current Documents, 1962.
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32present struggle against the Japanese, but will be world wide."
In November 1949 China's number two communist, Liu Shao-Chi,
prophesied that there would be other Asian revolutions that
would follow the Chinese pattern. Furthermore, in December
1960, delegates of eighty-one communist and worker's parties
resolved that the tempo of "wars of liberation" should be 
33stepped up.
Giap, in commenting upon the Vietminh war against the 
French stated that "frcxn the military point of view the v;ar 
proved that an inadequately equipped army, fighting for a just 
cause, can with appropriate strategy and tactics, conquer a 
modern army of aggressive imperialism."^* Guevara, in discus­
sing Latin America, stated: "given suitable operating terrain,
land hunger, . . .  a hard core of thirty to fifty men is, in
my opinion, enough to initiate armed revolution in any Latin
35American country." He added that:
a new world is dawning. The pillars of colonialism 
are crumbling in the face of national and popular 
struggles in Asia and Africa. The people are united, 
not by religion, race, custom, or hunger, but desire 
to improve their lot. Asia and Africa joined in 
Bandung. Now Cuba is uniting Asia and Africa with
32Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans., Samuel 
Griffith (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1961), 3.
33Liu Shoa-Chi, Inaugural Address to the Asian- 
Australian Trade Union Conference, Novenber16. 194^. 2.
^*Vo Nguyen Giap, "Inside the Vietminh," 147-77 in 
T. N. Greene, ed.. The Guerrilla And How To Fight Him (New York: 
Frederick Praeger, 1962).
35"Che" Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare. 67-68.
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colonial America.
Furthermore, he said that Cuba was the symbol of a new concept
of nationalism and that Fidel Castro v/as the symbol of libera-
. . 37tion.
The basis of the communist theory of guerrilla warfare
is oriented around Karl Von Clausewitz's thesis that v/ar is
38merely a continuation of political relations. Guerrilla war 
is kept limited by a political elite which provides its stra­
tegy and direction. Mao states that "there is no reason to 
consider guerrilla war separately from national policy." He
adds that the political goal of the leaders must coincide with
39the aspirations of the people. This need for a clear concep­
tion of political goals and a political organization to obtain 
them suggests rhe necessity to indoctrinate military officers 
so that they may inculcate political goals to the inhabitants 
of guerrilla z o ne s . Th o se  "simple minded militarists" who 
"are not interested in politics but only in the profession of 
arms" must be made to realize the relationship between politics 
and military affairs. Military action is a means to a political 
end. It is impossible to separate one from the other.
3Gibid.. 75.
3?lbid.. 74.
38John Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare. (Hew York; 
The Free Press, 1965), 25.




In relation to the politicization of the army there
are three political imperatives according to Mao: spiritual
unification of officers and men within the army, spiritual
unification of the army and people and destruction of the
42unity of the enemy. In order to carry out the first task 
it is necessary to base discipline on the individual con­
science. This is the primary characteristic of a democratic 
army.^^ External discipline leads to indifference between 
officers and men. It is a feudal concept which will destroy 
unity and fighting strength. Within the political army po­
litical liberty and propaganda must be tolerated and encour­
aged, and the officers should live under the same conditions 
as the men.*
Concerning the second political imperative, unity be­
tween army and populace, Mao describes "three rules and eight 
remarks." Under rules he indicates that all actions are sub­
ject to command, that stealing is forbidden and selfishness 
and unjustness are to be avoided. His eight remarks include 
the admonishment to replace the door of houses after the cus­
tomary summer practice of sleeping on them, to roll up bedding 
on which one has slept, to be courteous, be honest, return 
what one borrowed, replace what has been broken, not to bathe 





pockets of those arrested without their authority. At this
point he gets off the famous phrase that Kennedy liked to
quote: The people "may be likened to water and the [troop^
to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two
cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who
make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of
45its native element, cannot live."
Finally Mao's third political imperative exorts the 
troops to destroy the enemy. His emphasis on the primacy of 
the political is seen in his directive that the enemy is to 
be destroyed mainly through propagandizing his troops, treat­
ing captured soldiers with consideration and in caring for his
wounded. Mao adds that in failing this the solidarity of the
46enemy is increased.
The political nature of guerrilla war is also indicated 
by Giap who states that the revolution is to be controlled by 
the communist party acting through the National United Front. 
This combines all social classes and sets its major goal as 
keeping the revolutionary ardor of the people at optimum levels. 
Toward this end Giap's army, like that of Mao is a politically 
oriented force. From 35 per cent to 40 per cent of the enlisted 
men are party members while in the officer ranks the percentage 
reaches 90 per cenr.^^
^^Ibid., 93.
4Gibid., 93.
47Giap, "Inside the Vietminh."
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Alco similar to Mao is the fact that Giap’s army strives 
for equality between officers and enlisted men. "The officer 
likes his men. He must not only guide them in their work and 
studies, but must take an interest in their desires and initia­
tives." The soldier must respect his superiors and correctly 
fulfill all their orders. "The army practices a strict disci­
pline, allied to e wide internal democracy." This discipline 
though does not contravene internal democracy in the troops, 
for in cells, in executive meetings of the party at various 
levels and in plenary meetings of fighting units, the principle 
of democratic centralism is the rule. Giap believes that the 
more democracy is respected within the army the more unity is 
strengthened.
Giap states that during the resistance war democracy 
was exercised in three ways and brought about good results: 
the first way was through a grass-roots level democracy. Demo­
cratic congresses were held regularly so that men as well as 
officers had the opportunity to speak their views on fighting, 
work, study and living conditions. In the revolutionary army 
the men have the right to criticize the officers as well as 
vice-versa. The second way in which democracy was practiced 
was through meetings which occurred during the fighting when­
ever circumstances permitted. Finally economic democracy was 
exhibited. Officers and soldiers possessed the right to take 
part in the management and improvement of material life. In 
this manner the talent of the men was utilized in solvino the
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complex problems of fighting a difficult type of war and inter­
nal unity increased,
Giap followed the Mao doctrine of propagandizing the 
people in order to increase the unity between them and the army, 
lie euoted Mao's dictum that the people are to the army as water 
is to fish. He stated that the army always worked to educate 
the people and helped them to the best of its ability. The 
Vietnamese fighter always took care to observe Point 9 of his 
Oath of !'.onor: "In contacts with the people, to follow these
three recommendations: to respect the people; to help the neople;
to defend the people , , . in order to win their confidence
and affection and achieve a perfect understanding between the
48people and the army,"
The third important theorist and practitioner of guer­
rilla war, "Che" Guevara, also espoused the political leader­
ship of r: vanguard. He believed only one or two persons should 
be familiar with the plans of the revolution, especially in 
the beginning stages. This was to correct the deficiency
which most earjy aborted revolutionary attempts had exhibited:
49a lack of preparation. In further describing his elite con­
cept he noted the necessity for two well organized staffs, one 
for the nation as a whole and the other for local guerrilla 
areas. The purpose of these staffs was to ensure that the 
army and the people understood the political nature of the
^^Ibid,
49Guevar , Guerrilla Warfare. 66,
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struggle. Hence the staffs were organized to disseminate prop­
aganda, In relation to propaganda he exorted them to stick to 
the truth for "a small truth well-presented is far better than 
the most glittering lie."^^
Guevara elaborated on the potential of women as tools 
of propaganda. He indicated that in colonial areas they were 
especially discriminated against and underestimated. He dis­
agreed with those who contended that women increased oppor­
tunity for sexual conflict within guerrilla units. Instead 
he accentuated their positive contribution to the attainment 
of the revolutions' political goal. For example they were 
especially important in communication of messages and in ob­
taining enemy information. Besides if they were captured they 
would invariably be accorded better treatment than men. They 
could also be indispensible in indoctrinating the troops, 
population and children. Parenthetically, he added that many 
successful marriages were contracted within guerrilla camns.
Another innovation which Guevara made in relation to
propaganda lay in the role of the medical doctor. He could
contribute immeasurably to the on-going of the cause through
51giving moral as well as physical support to his patients.
Guevara followed the procedure of Giap and Kao in 
resoect to the method of obtaining unity within the troops.




had not stood the test of battle. He also sanctioned the de­
mocratic notion of discipline in stating that it must be
52based on reason and personal conviction.
The importance of reason and discipline are seen in 
the strategy with which the guerrillas are indoctrinated.
Mao's strategy is based on the philosophical concept of Yin 
Yang which is oriented around the concept of the unity of op­
posites. In isolation opposites possess weaknesses as well
as strengths which complement each other. "In strength there
53is weakness, in weakness strength." The influence of this 
philosophy may be observed in Mao's theory of the phases of 
guerrilla warfare. For example within the context of the 
first phase— strategic defense— he exorts his followers to 
continually instigate tactical offensive maneuvers which will 
lead to the second stage of stalemate. In this latter stage, 
while concentrating on deliberate protracted war, the guer­
rilla should initiate tactical forays with speed and quickness.
The unity of opposites is also seen in his dictum to 
exploit the weaknesses within the ostensibly stronger enemy. 
Although the enemy possesses greater technological power, and 
hence greater weapons, weaknesses are in evidence. Among them 
is usually insufficient manpower and barbarism. Against this 
Mao balances an abundant quantity of forces and a good rapport
54
S^ibid.. 63-64.
^^Pustay, Counterinsurqency Warfare. 30. 
54Mao, Guerrilla Warfare. 96,
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with the people. The impatience and underestimation of the 
ouerrilla which the enemy portrays is countered by Mao's axiom 
to trade sooce for time in order to alternately destroy the 
enemy's will and augment that of the guerrilla. The impatience 
of the enemy will lead him to strive quickly to occupy space. 
Since the guerrilla fights a protracted war characterized by 
speedy tactical retreats this loss of space does not hinder 
his effort. In fact it is an asset to the guerrilla, as the 
enemy's limited number of troops are tied dovm holding terri­
tory. Meanwhile as time elapses the enemy's impatient nature
meets frustration and his will power dwindles. Concomitantly
55the will power of the guerrilla is strengthened. In this 
manner the guerrilla "conserves strength and destroys the 
e n e m y . " T a x  Shan is a great mountain because it does not 
scorn the merest handful of dirt . . .  the rivers and seas
57are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams."
As originally implemented, the policy of military 
civic action resembled the strategy of Mao, Giap and Guevara 
in its attempt to synchronize military and political aspects 
of policy. However, as the decisional sequence unfolded, new 
factors in the situation became relevant to the members of 
the decision unit who consequently reformulated their goals
55E, L, Ketzenbach, "Time, Space, and Will: The Politico-
Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung," 11-21 in Greene, The Guerrilla 
and How to Fight Kim.
^^Mao, Guerrilla Warfare. 95.
S?lbid.. 76.
156
and means into new strategies of action. One of these factors 
concerned the Vienna Conference between Khrushchev and Kennedy 
and the resultant Berlin crisis.
On the eve of the Vienna meeting, Kennedy believed 
that Khrushchev was still the master in the Kremlin even though 
hard-line military advisors were crowding him. For this rea­
son the Russian leader's perception of the world political 
scene v/as important to the president. On an occasion v/hen re­
porters asked him to view the world from Khrushchev's eyes,
Kennedy responded that if he were Khrushchev he would see the 
West as divided on the one hand, with journalists and officials 
disagreeing with their leaders, and draw the conclusion that 
the tide of history was on the side of the Soviets.
On the other hand though, if Khrushchev had spent time 
in the west Kennedy believed that he would take a different 
view of the tide of history. He would then see where prophets 
of European collapse in 1947-48 were wrong. He would recog­
nize that dissent and controversy brings a kind of vitality 
that protects individual liberty. He would consider that per­
haps Russian society could be improved, and that the tide of 
history might not be running necessarily with the Russians.
;'e would see the impending conflict within the communist bloc 
also. In sh.ort, he would see that although the United States 
was divided on many issues it was still determined to fulfill 
its comnitmonLs and play the role in history which it had created.
5f:Kennedy and the Press. June 2, 1961, 85.
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In order to instill this perception of the West in
Khrushchev, Kennedy perceived several aspects of the domestic
setting for which he must compensate. One of these lay in the
difficulty which a free society experienced in competing with
the discipline of a communist state. Kennedy believed that
the total mobilisation of man and things for the service of
the state which the Soviets were able to accomplish constituted
a danger and a hazard to the West which would continue through
59the remainder of the century.
Kennedy believed that democracy was more durable in 
the long-run, though, for it best suited the qualities and as­
pirations of people who desire to be their own masters. Demo­
cracy's job then was to maintain its strength until its great 
qualities could be brought to bear more effectively. This 
would require a united and determined e f f o r t . T h e  neople 
must be asked to spend a good deal of money on mutual security 
and foreien assistance which v;as not a popular program but 
which was essential.
Kennedy, then, was very conscious of his role as mani­
pulator of public morale. This probably accounts for his ex­
treme sensitivity with regard to the content of newspapers, 
lie vfas known to spend a whole evening with a writer v;ho presented 
what he believed to be the wrong view or v/ho misrepresented
S^ibid.. May 5, 1961, 73. 
GOibid.. April 12, 1961, 61. 
^^Ibid.. May 5, 1961, 73,
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62the facts as he perceived them. This motivation to arouse 
the public may also be seen in his method and timing in imple­
menting the space program. On the eve of the meeting with 
Khrushchev in Vienna, he officially launched the United States 
into the space race on May 25, 1961, by declaring America's 
goal to put a man on the moon before the end of the decade.
The commitment to space then v/as probably as much for symbolic 
as for scientific purposes. Also at least partially within 
the realm of the symbolic, v/as his implementation of the Peace
Corps and food for peace program which helped build public
63morale through commitment to a great cause.
The initiation of these measures to arouse the Ameri­
can people before Vienna enhanced Kennedy's assurance on the 
eve of that conference that the world balance of power v/as not 
moving in favor of Khrushchev. But there was another aspect 
of the internal setting which bothered Kennedy at this time 
and which he would have to contend with before the end of the 
summer. This was the fact that he did not trust Congress in 
foreign affairs. He believed for example that Congress failed 
to look at the stage of development of a country before deter­
mining the type of foreign aid to distribute. He also believed 
that, as a group, it adhered to several myths such as: "the
existence of inherently good or bad nations . . .  our diplomatic 
recognition could impair another nations' military power . . .
62Sorenson, Kennedy. 311, 
G^lbid.. 531.
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the democratic way of life will inevitably be victorious in 
any struggle with an alien power .. . allies owe perpetual 
homage to the United States.
At Vienna Kennedy hoped to convince Khrushchev of the 
wisdom of reaching an agreement on the status quo,^^ He be­
lieved the necessary conditions for this move had existed 
since at least 1959. On a visit to the United States in that 
year Khrushchev made a speech to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee of which Kennedy was a member. From the speech 
Kennedy gleaned five elements the United States and the Soviet 
Union possessed in common which should augment their mutual 
guest for peaceful coexistence: both wanted freedom from the
arms race; neither wanted a nuclear war: neither wanted nu­
clear weapons to pass into the hands of other nations; neither 
wanted to pollute the air with nuclear tests and both wanted 
to expand their economies and scientific achievements.^^
Kennedy’s idea of defining the status quo consisted 
first of a delineation of those underdeveloped areas in which 
neither power held a paramount interest and which consequently 
constituted a political vacuum. He then proposed an agreement 
between the U.3.S.R, and the United States not to agitate these 
areas and make them a battleground for the cold war. TTnon
G^lbid.. 510.
AC'■'Hammond, The Cold War Years. 159,
^^Mevins, Strategy of Peace, 12,
6 7Hammond, The Cold War Years. 159,
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pcf- innLii:" bi-cnc proposals to Khrushchev, Kennedy reali- ed 
the breadth of tne existing communication can between the t'o 
no' vers. Kennedy stated that they gave different meanings to 
the same words such as war, peace, democracy and popular will.
" Je have wholly different views of right and vjrong, of what 
is an interna] affair and what is aggression," He added that 
above all they had a "different conception of where the world 
is and where it is g o i n g . A n o t h e r  example of the communica­
tion crisis concerned the fact that Khrushchev was expecting 
a showdown at the communist party congress in October in rela­
tion to the coexistence doctrine which he espoused. Since 
Russia held a superiority in conventional weapons and manpower 
and since it was competitive in nuclear power, Khrushchev ex­
pected Kennedy to exhibit the chess player's logic and realise 
that oastinance would cause everyone to suffer needlessly. 
Kennedy's refusal to recognize the obvious led Khrushchev to 
attenot to scare him into capitulation by ranting and ravine:. ' 
i.'hen he threatened to grab Berlin before December ended, Kenned>' 
retorted that "it will be a cold winter." Hypertension pro­
duced hypertension causing Kennedy to stir the emotions of his 
nation to fever-pitch during £i speech on July 25. On that date 
he announced the necessity to build bomb shelters in nrepara- 
tion for the impending debacle between the two super powers.
The hysteria which Kennedy's reaction induced seeped into Eurooe
^^Sorenson, Kennedy « 550.
69"^Fuller, Year of Crisis. 226-35.
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from where it further reinforced Kennedy's hard-line stance
70through the process of feedback. Particularly obstinant in
their hard-line stance were General de Gaulle and Konrad 
71Adenauer. In precipitating the Berlin crisis the communica­
tion gap exhibited at Vienna had an important bearing upon the 
eventual nature of the U.S. brand of counterinsurgency.
The Berlin crisis focused on the issue of whether the 
United States possessed the right to occupy Berlin. Kennedy 
expressed his opinion on this issue in a press conference on
June 28, in which he stated that the crisis was Soviet- 
72manufactured. That country had illegally blockaded the city 
from 1948 until the spring of 1949. From then until 1958 the 
situation was relatively peaceful with the people of West 
Berlin developing a healthy and thriving city. During this 
period, the United States carried out its responsibilities and 
exercised its rights of access to the city without serious in­
cident. In November 1958, however the Soviets began a new 
campaign to force the allied powers out of Berlin, a process 
which led up to the abortive summit conference in Paris in 
May, 1959.
Kennedy continued by pointing out that in 1961 the 
Soviets revived that drive by calling upon the United States 
to sign "what they call a peace treaty" with the regime that
^^Ibid.. 242.
'Ibid.. 245.




they created in East Germany. They further stated that if v;e 
refused this demand that they themselves would sign such a 
treaty. Kennedy believed that the obvious purpose here was 
not to have peace but to make permanent the partition of 
Germany. The Soviet's peace treaty would bring an end to al­
lied rights in West Berlin and to free access to that city.
At this point Kennedy interjected his opinion on the 
legality of the Soviet actions: "It is clear that such uni­
lateral action cannot effect these (allie*^ rights, which stem 
from the surrender of Nazi Germany." He believed that such 
action would mean a repudiation by the Soviets of multilateral 
commitments to which they solemnly subscribed and had repeated1'̂ 
reaffirmed.
It was Kennedy's opinion that if the Soviets withdrew 
from their obligations it was a matter for the other three al­
lies France, England and the United States to decide how the'' 
’ould exercise their rights and meet their responsibilities.
But the Soviets declared that if this happened the allies would 
be subject to the designs of the East Germans.
Therefore it v/as plain to the president that the kind 
of "Free City" which the Soviets had in mind was one in which 
the rights of the citizens of West Berlin were gradually but 
relentlessly extinguished. This did not connotate to Kennedy 
a Soviet Union that desired peaceful coexistence.
Kennedy then summed up his definition of the threat:
This is not a question of technical legal rights. It
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involves the peace and the security of the peoples 
of West r.erlin. It involves the direct responsibi­
lities and commitments of the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Prance. It involves the peace 
and security of the Western World.73
\t least one writer believes that Kennedy's actions in
inducing hypertension in the public due to the Berlin threat
v-cts actually an exercise in calculated caution: he sought to
stabilise the status nuo as he had defined it at Vienna.
Kennedy realised that the status nuo which he was describing
would be c’̂ er’-'helmingly in his favor. West Berlin and West
^ern^ny ./»/ outclassed the communist puppet regime of C^st
Germany uoth in political stability and in productivity.
Therefore he was asking Khrushchev to agree to a status quo in
which the premier would continue indefinitely to witness the
flight of thousands of refugees from East Germany to the brighter
future evident in the West. Only by convincing the public that
nuclear war was imminent could Kennedy legitimize allowing
Khrushchev to force the East Germans to remain behind the "iron
curtain." Therefore, when Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall,
Kennedy ostensibly v/as horrified and placed troops in position
on the west side; hov/ever he did not attempt to make Khrushchev
back down. In the process he received a modicum of agreement
on the maintenance of a status quo which both sides could ac- 
75cept. In August, the establishment of the Berlin Wall
^^Ibid.
^^Uammond, The Cold War Years. 160-64. 
75Ibid.
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ironically ensured the agreement on the status quo which 
Kennedy had asked for at Vienna. A further point which indi­
cates that Kennedy was more calculating than emotional is 
seen in his statement that "Khrushchev* s national inferiority 
complex makes him appear tough at times,
Besides convincing Khrushchev of the necessity to de­
lineate the status quo, Kennedy's emotional response to the 
Berlin ultimatum was also geared to impress the neutral nations. 
In order to maintain their confidence he had to prove at Berlin
that he was willing to go to the limit for the principle of
77self-determination.
In relation to his policy to uncommitted nations he 
also sought by his actions to influence Congress, As indicated 
earlier Congress had been slow to provide him the necessary 
funds to properly implement his policy of civic action; there­
fore, within the context of the Berlin situation he emphasized
the military imperatives inherent in his requests to Congress
78for foreign aid.
This emphasis on the purely military point of view in 
relation to appropriations differentiates the pre-decisional 
from the decisional sequence, A pattern emerges during the 
latter period which portrays the gradual submersion of the
76Sorenson, Kennedy. 555,
77"Address and Replies made by the Under Secretary of 
State at the National Press Club," August 15, 1961, 623-25 in 
American Foreign Policy; Current Documents. 1962,
^^Puller, Year of Crisis. 225,
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political or preventive aspect of military civic action in 
favor of the military aspect of counterinsurgency. This is 
due largely to the enhanced spheres of competence which 
Rostow, Taylor, and McNamara obtained during the Berlin cri­
sis. Particularly important was their role in reinforcing 
Kennedy's opinion that more ground troops were needed in or-
79der to successfully implement the policy of flexible response. 
Consequently, contrary to Khrushchev's expectations, the 
United States made a credible showing of military force. In 
spite of this strong showing, Kennedy received much criticism 
for allowing Khrushchev to retain the wall. This criticism, 
in turn, constituted still another factor driving Kennedy to
a harder line encompassing an emphasis on military over poli-
yotic 1 factors.' It is within this context that the strategic 
concent for counterinsurgency which was promulgated in Vietnam 
during the decisional sequence should be viewed.
79Sorenson, Kennedy. 590-91, 95.
60nchlesinger, A Thousand Days. 548,
CHAPTER VI
VIETNAM AND THE ASCENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
The debate over the proper strategy to invoke in re­
sponse to guerrilla war constituted the most divisive issue 
in the Kennedy administration and Vietnam comprised the pri- 
mary matrix within which it evolved. Accordingly this chap­
ter will focus upon the main ingredients of that strategy as 
derived during the decisional sequence. It will be shown 
how and why the trend toward a military dominant response, evi­
dent throughout this dissertation, received fruition in the 
jungles of Southest Asia.
During the height of the Berlin crisis Roger Hilsman, 
the head of the Intelligence Research Division of the State 
Department, presented the composite of his division's views 
on that strategy. In developing his argument he first presented 
the two most likely situations in which a guerrilla war might 
occur. One of these he compared to the situation in France 
during the World War II occupation by Germany. Before the 
Germans became distracted in repelling the allied invasion they 
were adept at breaking up any move by French guerrillas to 
weaken their position. However after the Normandy invasion 
the guerrillas became increasingly successful. In this
1Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 413.
166
167
example Hilsman pointed out that the whole populace arose in 
support of the guerrillas.
The vulnerable underdeveloped areas comprised the 
other situations likely to produce guerrilla war. Hilsman 
elaborated upon the multitude of political problems which the 
governments of these regions must encounter. For example there 
were externally induced problems such as antagonism between 
states in regard to territorial claims generated by the sudden 
political vacuum which the withdrawal of the colonial masters 
created. There were also indigenous causes of chaos. Region­
alism, tribalism and separatism were rife as was antagonism
2between social classes. Not only was inter-class rivalry 
evident but intra-class competition also occurred through the 
tendency of modernizing elites to attempt to garner for them-
3selves the benefits of the modernization process. Supple­
menting social class rivalries were those between different 
races or ethnic groups. Even the presence of bandit gangs 
constituted a common denominator of undeveloped areas. Finally, 
and probably most important, was the phenomena of ubiquitous 
constitutional crises as ostensibly representative governments 
inadvertantly violated the local norms of political legitimacy.
4These then were some of the problems of nation building.
To alleviate these conditions Hilsman announced that
2Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic,"
22-36 in Greene, ed., The Guerrilla.
3Pustay, Counterinsurqency Warfare. 18.
^Hilsman, "Internal War."
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the United States must become deeply involved in a systema­
tic way to modernize these countries. Included in his sug­
gestions toward this end were the following: encourage refor­
mers to organize mass parties; create citizens militias; in­
crease the capacity of friendly governments to augment social 
and political reforms as a basis for modernization; look for 
ways to ease the access of beleaguered states to outside as­
sistance. Hilsman believed that the addition of these modern­
ization measures would paradoxically induce more chaos in the 
short run due to the psychological effects of removing people 
from their traditional folk-ways. For example when modern­
ization began many rural dwellers would migrate to the big 
cities for the promised better life. However the city's 
capabilities for coping with large quantities of people was 
limited; hence many of these people joined the increasing 
numbers of discontented in the city slums. This connection 
between rural and urban discontent constituted fertile soil 
for guerrilla exploitation. In order to stabilize the modern­
ization process in the face of communist aggression Hilsman 
suggested training local police and military forces in the 
art of counter insurgency v/ar fare.
Before illustrating his operational concept Hilsman 
elaborated upon reasons why regular conventional forces were 
dysfunctional in guerrilla warfare. He stated that in field 
formation conventional forces with their heavy equipment 
tended to cluster together centralizing their power on terrain
169
that allows rapid movsnent. They rely on roads and consider 
such targets as cities to be vital. Concentration keeps units 
at unwieldy battalion strength with stress on holding land
5rather than destroying enemy forces.
Hilsman maintained that it was ironic for Americans 
to have to learn this lesson again in the twentieth century 
when they had taught the British regulars Indian fighting on 
several occassions. Also Americans had fought one of the 
most successful guerrilla campaigns in history in the Philip­
pines at the turn of the century. After Aguinaldo's army 
lost the conventional war it took to the hills where it joined 
forces with several bands of guerrillas who had sojourned 
there for three centuries while jabbing at the Spanish.
The regular army's attempts to fight these guerrillas 
led to frustration as the latter continually faded into the 
jungle. The regulars were too burdened with equipment to 
initiate rapid pursuit. Also impeding their progress was the 
necessity to maintain supply lines since they could not live 
off the country or function without ammunition trains or 
hospital corps. Augmenting these problems was their practice 
of establishing fixed bases which enabled the guerrillas to 
always know their location, including the details of the pro­
cedure of their guards. Thus the stage was set for the guer­
rillas to implement surprise attacks.
Through bitter trial and error the United States
^Ibid.
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arrived at the proper strategy to quell the guerrillas. This 
lay in the recruitment of native Filipinos who were wise to 
jungle ways. These were divided into small groups of ten, 
fifteen, twenty or fifty men with each placed under the com­
mand of an American officer. The resultant Philippine Consta­
bulary patrolled every trail until they extirpated the guer­
rillas.
To Hilsman the lesson of the Philippine experience 
v;as to addopt the tactics and weapons of the guerrilla in or­
der to defeat him. Reinforcement for this conclusion came 
from his ovm experience in Burma during World War II when he 
operated an OSS guerrilla battalion behind the Japanese lines.
The Japanese mistakenly operated in large unwieldy units which 
were easy to airibush, and their movements were simple to follow 
through the mountains and jungles. Hilsman related that at 
one stage his outfit, consisting of four Americans and about 
two hundred Burmese, kept a whole Japanese regiment of three 
thousand men marching and countermarching over the mountains 
and far away from the front lines. He added that his group 
held a greater fear of smaller patrols, especially cavalry, 
than of large masses of troops. The sweeps of the regular 
troops were cumbersome and also led to antagonism between them­
selves and the local population.
Drawing upon these and other experiences Hilsman for­
mulated his operational concept for counterinsurgency as follows: 
A guerrilla-infested part of the country is marked off and
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divided into sections. Each section is patrolled by small 
units v;ho are in contact with a central headquarters which, 
in turn, has a reserve force at its disposal. Upon contact­
ing guerrillas, a patrol alerts headquarters and adjacent 
patrols. As the latter converge, headquarters dispatches 
paratroops or helicopter transports behind the enemy who is 
surrounded and destroyed. Once an area is pacified the gov­
ernment consolidates its control and moves on to the next 
section of land to be cleared. The main ingredients then 
are constant patrols, good communication facilities, rapid
g *mobility and a capacity for rapid concentration.
This then v/as Hilsman’s contribution in August 1961 
to the emerging strategic concept of counterinsurgency. How­
ever he noted one basic flaw in his scheme: in fighting this
was of attrition in v/hich guerrillas would surely be killed 
or captured there was no guarantee that they would not just 
recruit more to take their place. Robert Thompson, a British 
advisor in Vietnam v/hom Hilsman met on a trip there in January,
71962, offered a suggestion to correct that flaw.
Thompson perceived that the Americans were prone to 
make the same mistakes in Vietnam as the British in Malaya 
and the French in Vietnam. In fighting primarily a conven­
tional war they had played into the hands of the guerrillas.
For example the French had formed what they called an "Iron
^Ibid.
7Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 429.
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Triangle” of forts along v;hich they defeated every conven­
tional assault by the Viet Minh, However within this tri­
angle the guerrillas were controlling the populace by what­
ever means were necessary, from kindness to assassination.
In short, the French controlled the open battlefield while 
the Vietminh controlled the people. Similarly the British 
in Malaya fought a conventional style of war the first 
two years of their decade-long encounter wL^h :cmmunist 
guerrillas. Finally, in contrast to the French, they learned 
their lesson and began to fight with the guerrilla's tactics. 
In addition they built progressively more garrisons to pro­
tect pockets of people from the guerrillas until slowly 
they brought a majority of the people under their authority 
and control. In the process the guerrillas lost their ma­
jor source of supply,®
This opinion on the location of the guerrilla's 
source of supply in Vietnam served to differentiate Thompson 
sharply from the point of view of the typical conventional 
military analyst. Whereas the latter believed that the main 
source lay in the trails leading into North Vietnam and Laos, 
Thompson thought it lay in the thousands of trails leading 
from the many hamlets in South Vietnam, To further differen­
tiate Thompson from the conventional military analyst the 
former believed that the main body of the enemy was not the
g
Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency;
The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York; Praeger, 1966), 
chapter 11, 121-4Ô,
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concentrated .oattalions of Viet Cong which the army periodi­
cally faced on the battlefield. Rather he believed that the 
main body of the enemy, at least potentially, was the people 
of South Vietnam; the guerrillas depended upon the people for 
their food and other necessities.
Following this line of thought Thompson’s goal con­
sisted of three parts: he would cut through these enemy
supply lines as he defined them; he would counter the poten­
tial strength to the guerrillas from the population by winning 
the allegiance of the latter; and he would cause the guerril­
las to fight on the government* s terms rather than on his
9
o\fjn terms.
His procedure for achieving these goals was to uti­
lize strategic hamlets. This was essentially the same proce­
dure indicated above which the British used in Malaya to im­
pede the rebels there. The strategic hamlet program involved 
two components, one military and the other political. The 
former task consisted of protection for the people. To this 
end the military was expected to perform five different but 
inter-related roles: the first v/as termed static defense and
consisted of guarding such sensitive installations as bridges, 
factories and hospitals. Second there was the "clear and 
hold" function of forming a protective ring around the vil­
lages while the political function occurred within. Thirdly, 
the military provided strategic reserves who could reinforce
gHilsman, To Move a Nation. 433-34.
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the civic action corps within the villages when necessary
and also set up ambushes of the guerrillas who ventured too
close. These three roles were to be primary in the early
stages of the program. As progress ensued the fourth and
fifth roles became more important. They were, respectively,
to keep the enemy off balance through search and destroy
operations and to seal off infiltration routes from the north
10by ambushing trails.
The general aim of the political component of the 
strategic action program was to gain the political allegiance 
of the population. The demands of the people were to be in­
jected upwards to the government while goods and services
flowed down. This, as Hilsman said, was a revolutionary
11concept to which the people would be very receptive. It 
included such services by the government as education, sani­
tation, and medical facilities as well as indoctrination in 
democracy aind instruction in self defense. Each village
was equipped with a radio with v;hich to alert the government
12when the hamlet needed reinforcements.
In combination the political and military components 
of the strategic hamlet program would instill the proper 
amount of civil, military, social and political measures to
l^Ibid.. 435-36.
11"Address by the Director of Intelligence and Research, 
Department of State, Chicago, September 18, 1962," 1109-1117 in American Foreign Policy; Current Documents. 1962,
^̂ ibid.
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allow the government to cut off the main source of supply
from the guerrillas. To this end the "ink blot" principle
was to be followed: beginning on the coast a few hamlets in
strategic locations were to be made safe. Then gradually
more were to be added until a hedgehog of villages covered
the majority of the country. Faced with this formidable sea
of allied and protected villages sweeping across the land
the guerrillas would be forced to starvation or obliteration
13if they remained in the area.
The Hi.l sman-Thompson plan was one alternative of the 
State Department which Kennedy considered in regard to for­
mulating a strategic concept for counterinsurgency. There 
was also another viev/point which a prominent member of that 
Department presented for his consideration. Under-Secretary 
of State Chester Bowles interjected the idea of enlarging 
the concept of a "neutral and independent Laos" to include 
Burma, Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaya. Bowles 
believed that such a neutral belt would eventually be guaran­
teed by the Soviet Union, China, India, Japan and the SEATO 
powers. In this manner international support to counter 
communist aggression would be more readily forth-coming, and 
the United States would not have to suffer the accusation of 
being imperialist. Although this was an imaginative proposal 
its opponents contended that it would be taken as a deliberate 
abandonment of regimes which depended on the United States
^^Ibid.
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in exchange for empty promises from China and Moscow. Other
critics maintained that it was fine but that it was either
14too early or too late.
Although reasons against the utilization of Bowles' 
idea appeared immediately and were readily apparent, the fate 
of the Hilsman-Thompson plan was more complex. It must be 
viewed within the framework of the other alternatives which 
Kennedy received during the decisional sequence.
In April, 1961, the results of two task forces on 
Vietnam reached the President. Since the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff composed one of these while the Central'Intelligence 
Agency heavily influenced the other, Kennedy was skeptical 
of their advice, especially when their solution to the Viet­
nam situation reeked of militarism. Kennedy was still under 
the influence of the Bay of Pigs disaster at that time; con­
sequently he was prone to distrust both the CIA and the JCS. 
Besides he believed that their alternative unrealistically 
depended too heavily on supplies from Laos and reforms by
Diem.̂ S
Although Kennedy was not completely satisfied with 
these reports he apparently followed some of their advice.
For example, on May 11th he approved deployment of four hun­
dred Special Forces troops along with programs for covert 
action in North Vietnam* Among these actions were: dispatch
14Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 545.
15Sorenson. Kennedy. 652-53,
177
of agents into North Vietnam; aerial resupply of agents in 
North Vietnam through the use of civilian mercenary air crews; 
infiltration of special South Vietnamese forces in Southeast 
Laos to locate and attack communist bases and lines of com­
munication; formulation of networks of resistance, covert 
bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment inside North
Vietnam and conduct of overflights of North Vietnam for the
1.6purpose of dropping leaflets.
As noted earlier in May 1961 Lyndon Johnson recommended 
an emphasis on the preventive aspect of military civic action 
rather than attempting a military defeat of the insurgents 
through a policy of counterinsurgency.
In July, Kennedy sent still another mission to Viet­
nam, this time under the leadership of Professor Eugene Staley 
of Stanford Research Institute. After a stay of six v;eeks in
Saigon, he and the Vietnamese economist. Vu Quoc Thuc, worked
17out a v/ar doctrine and an action plan. The Staley Plan 
contained a military and a social-economic aspect. The former 
placed emphasis on the village militias that would be supplied 
with modern weapons and on the National Guard. It also 
recommended that the 170,000 man regular army be trained in 
jungle fighting. Also, since the bad behavior of the soldiers
Pentagon Papers," New York Times, quoted in The 
Houston Chronicle. July 2, 1971.
17Jean Lacouture, Vietnam Between Two Truces, trans. 
Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael (New York: Random House,
1965), 64.
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had been one of the principle reasons for the villagers' 
grievances against the government, the Vietnamese soldiers 
were to receive training in psychological warfare.
On the social-economic plane the Staley Plan called 
for an "agro-city" experiment. There were to be twenty-six 
such cities in all originally with the number to reach one 
hundred in a year. It was around these agro-cities that stra­
tegic hamlets were to be set up. They were to have bamboo 
hedges surrounding them and to have guard towers providing 
protection. In this fashion the peasants could work during
the day in the agro-city and find protection in the strate-
“18gic hamlets at night.
There is an obvious similarity between Staley's agro­
city and Thompson's strategic hamlet. However the basic 
difference exemplifies the theme of this chapter; the trend 
toward a military dominant strategy. The Staley mission
did not give "much evidence of being alert to the realities
19of the South Vietnamese situation." In contrast to Thomp­
son's "ink blot" principle it was designed to "wipe out the
23Viet Cong in eighteen months," In addition the Staley mis­
sion, "though essentially of a civilian character, came forth 
with few recommendations that were not of a military nature."
^̂ Ibid.
4 g
Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Frederick
Praeger, 1967), 373.
20George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United 
States in Vietnam (New York: Dial Press, 1967), 2871
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21None involved the necessary political changes.
On September 18, 1961, the political aspect became 
further submerged as the need for military protection increased 
in South Vietnam. On that date the Viet Cong seized a Pro­
vince Chief within 55 miles of Saigon and decapitated him.
Adding to the September chaos was the occurrence of torren-
22tial floods which caused 500,000 South Vietnamese to go hungry. 
With the communists capitalizing upon the resulting frustra­
tion Kennedy clothed his remarks on the situation to the
United Nations on September 25 with such phrases as the "smol-
23dering coals of war.'*
A month later, on October 24, President Kennedy ap­
parently had become apprehensive about the Vietnamese situa­
tion as is indicated in his letter on that date to President 
Diem:
Mr. President . . .  We have seen and marked well the 
anguish— and glory— of a nation that refuses to sub­
mit to Communist terror. From the people that twice 
defeated the hordes of Kublai Khan, we could expect 
no less. . . .  America is well aware of the increased 
intensity which in recent months has marked the war 
against your people, and of the expanding scale and 
frequency of the Communist attacks. . . .  And I have 
taken note of the stream of threats and vituperation, 
directed at your government and mine, that flows day 
and night from Hanoi. Let me assure you again that 
the United States is determined to help Viet-Nam pre­
serve its independence, protect its people against 
Communist assassins, and build a better life through
^^Fall, Two Viet-Nams. 278.
22Cooper, The Lost Crusade. 178.
23"Department of State White Paper, 1961," 123-24 in 
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. 1965.
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24economic growth.
Kennedy added that he was "awaiting with great inter­
est the report of General Maxv/ell Taylor based on his recent 
talks and observations in viet-Nam, supplementing reports
25which I have received from our Embassy over many months."
Accompanying Taylor on that mission was W. W. Rostov;. Kennedy
had directed them to find out whether the United States was
better off at that time than the French had been in the early
fifties. Specifically he wanted to know if "Vietnamese na­
petionalism had turned against us."
The composition of the mission was significant. Headed
by a general and a White House aide v/ith no figure of compa­
rable rank from the State Department, it expressed a conscious 
decision by Rusk to turn the Vietnam problem over to the 
Secretary of Defense. Schlesinger believes that "Rusk doubt­
less decided to do this because the military aspects seemed 
to him the most urgent, and Kennedy doubtless acquiesced be­
cause he had more confidence in McNamara and Taylor than in 
27State."
The trouble as Taylor and Rostow defined it, was a
"Letter from the President of the United States to 
the President of Vietnam, October 24, 1961," 1049-50 in
Current Documents. 1962,
^̂ Ibid.
^^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 545.
^^Ibid.
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28"double crisis of confidence:" On the one hand doubt 
existed in Vietnam as to whether the United States was really 
determined to save Southeast Asia, while on the: other hand 
there was doubt that Diem's methods could really defeat the 
Viet Cong, To halt the decline Taylor and Rostow recommended 
increased American intervention to the point of a limited 
partnership.
In spelling out the means to accomplish their task
29"the report concentrated on military matters," Rostov*; be­
lieved that the essence of the problem lay in a crisis of 
the modernisation process, not unlike the Hilsman analysis. 
However he differed from Hilsman in the emphasis he placed 
on military security as the means to alleviate the chaos.
He described the communists as "the scavengers of the modern­
isation process" and felt that in order to overcome their 
debilitating effect elanents of reform "must be measured in 
terms of their contribution to physical s e c u r i t y , H e  
revealed further emphasis on a military solution when he 
stated the necessity to block off the infiltration routes 
in the north by which the Viet Cong received their supplies. 
On this point also his divergence from Hilsman and Thompson
^®Ibid,, 546,
^^Ibid,
30W, W, Rostov/, "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped 
Areas," 54-62 in Greene, ed., The Guerrilla,
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31is obvious. In fact, Rostow was so obstinate in his demand 
for an attack on the north that "Rostow Plan 6 became jocu­
larly established in the contingency planning somewhere after 
SEATO Plan 5."^^
Rostow's analysis not only conflicted with the Hilsman- 
Thompson perception of the situation but it also did not coin­
cide with the view of General Lansdale. Lansdale, who had 
been involved in Vietnam since the Eisenhov;er administration, 
was also a member of the Taylor-Rostow mission. "His exper­
ience with the political undercurrents in Vietnam was pro­
bably greater than any other American's, as were his sources 
of information. But much to his disgust, he was put to work 
estimating the costs and number of men required to "seal off" 
the 250 mile borders of jungle and mountains through which
the infiltrators came— a question that he thought itself re-
33vealed a misunderstanding of guerrilla warfare."
Lansdale's position reflected his association with 
Ramon Magsaysay's successful effort to quell the communist 
uprising in the Philippines— the Huk rebellion.In ap­
proaching that problem Magsaysay had decided that popular sup­
port for Philippine communism existed for the following reasons; 
the new Philippine government had drifted toward the traditional
31Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 422.
32Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 547.
33Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 421. 
^"^Ibid.. 417.
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Asian acceptance of inefficiency, graft and corruption as 
the prerogatives of those in power; the people had received 
abusive treatment from some of the mij.itary; a lack of na-
35tional socio-economic reforms compounded by universal poverty, 
Magsaysay's solution to the crisis lay in an emphasis on poli­
tical over military means. For example, on one occasion he 
stated that the Huks were "fighting the Government because
they want a house and land of their own . . .  all right, they
36can stop fighting, because I will give it to them." As a
37result the Huks began to come in, eventually by the hundreds.
In essence Lansdale's position coincided v;ith the
first two recommendations of the Taylor-Rostow report. The
first of these encompassed a series of demands for political,
governmental and administrative reforms by the Diem govern- 
38ment. ’ The second set of recommendations covered a list of 
items of technical aid which the United States should pro­
vide to Vietnam. Included were arms and equipment for self 
defense corps and specialized equipwnent such as helicopters 
to free the Vietnamese military fror static defense. Along 
with these items the United States would send highly trained
35Major Boyd Bashore, "Dual Strategy for Limited War," 
184-202 in F. M. Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New 
York; Free Press, 1962).
^^Major K. M. Hammer, "Huks in the Philippines,"
177-83 in Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare.
^ Îbid.
38Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 422.
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technicians who would operate the equipment while training
the Vietnamese to take over. In addition special air force
squadrons code named "Farmgate" and including slow-flying
propeller-driven B-26s and T-28s would be sent to aid in the
39counterinsurgency operations.
The first two recommendations of the Taylor-Rostow 
report, then, were basically in accordance with the views of 
Lansdale and Hilsman. The third recommendation, however, re­
flected a divergence from the precept of military civic ac­
tion of preventing insurgency toweird that of defeating the 
insurgents in a military sense. This is seen in its advoca­
tion to close infiltration routes from the north through the 
use of 10,000 regular American troops,Although Taylor 
stated that instead of being primarily combat troops they 
were to boost the morale of the South Vietnamese, he admitted 
the possibility of combat: "Hov/ever the United States troops
may be called upon to engage in combat to protect themselves,
4'!their working parties, and the area in which they live,"
Secretary of Defense McNamara's opinion of the Taylor 
report is seen in his statement to Kennedy in November in 
which he stated that it should be adopted with the "under­
standing that it will be followed up with more troops as needed
^^Ibid,, 422,
^^Ibid,. 422-23,
41"The Pentagon Papers," New York Times (New York: 
Bantam Books, Inc,, 1971), 142,
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42and with a willingness to attack Vietnam."
The President read the report with interest. He was 
impressed by its description of the situation as serious but 
not hopeless and attracted by the idea of stiffening the Diem 
regime through an infusion of American advisors. However he 
was not impressed with the recommendation of a direct Ameri­
can commitment:
They want a force of American troops . . .  they say 
it's necessary in order to restore confidence and 
maintain morale. But it will be just like Berlin.
The troops v/ill march in; the bands v;ill play; the 
crov/ds will cheer; and in four days everyone v;ill 
have forgotten. Then we will be told we have to 
send in mere troops. It's like taking a drink. The 
effect wears off, and you have to take another.
He added that the v/ar in Vietnam was the Vietnamese's war,
and that if it were converted into a white man's war, the United
44States would lose as the French had lost a decade earlier.
In addition to Hilsman, Thompson, Bowles and Lansdale, 
Kennely had other support for his view that the crisis was 
not primarily of a military nature. J. K. Galbraith and 
Averell Harriman were sure that the crisis of confidence v/as 
political in its origins and had resulted from Diem's repres­
sive and reactionary policies in the face of a communist- 
managed peasant insurrection.^^ Even more important from
^^Peter Arnet, Associated Press, quoted in the Sunday 
Oklahoman, July 4, 1971.




Kennedy's point cf view were the opinions in 1961 of Charles 
de Gualle and General Douglas MacArthur. Both these men 
warned him that the Asian mainland was no place to be fight­
ing a non-nuclear land war. They pointed out that there was 
no end to Asiatic manpower and that even if v/e poured a mil­
lion American infantry soldiers into that continent v/e v/ould 
still find ourselves outnumbered on every side. MacArthur 
added that the domino theory was ridiculous in the nuclear 
age, and he was critical of the military advice which the 
President had been receiving from the Pentagon. He indicated
that over the last ten years the military leaders had ad-
46vanced the v/rong young officers.
Kennedy seemingly reflected this advice in an address
at the University of Washington on November 16, 1961:
We posses weapons of tremendous power but they are 
least effective in combatting freedom's foes: sub­
version, infiltration, guerrilla warfare, and civil 
disorder. We send arms to other peoples . . .  just 
as v/e can send them the ideals of democracy in 
which we believe . . .  but we cannot send them the 
v/ill to use those arms or to abide by those ideal s. 4 7
During the same speech he also reflected frustration 
over the divergence in his sources of advice: "We must face
problems which do not lend themselves to easy or quick solu­
tions." He then implied that advocates of tv/o extreme views 
were pressing upon him and proceeded to define those views:
^^Kenneth O'Donnell, "LBJ and the Kennedys," 44-56 
in LIFE. August 7, 1970.
47"Address by the President at the University of Wash­
ington , Seattle, November 16, 1961," 53-56 in Current Docu­
ments . 1962.
137
"Each believes that we have only two choices: appeasement
or war, suicide or surrender, humiliation or holocaust, to 
be either red or dead. Each side sees only 'hard' and 
'soft' nations, hard and soft policies, hard and soft men,"
He summed up his views by stating that both professed to be 
the true realist of our time but that neither could be more 
unrealistic. Both failed to grasp the essential fact that 
diplomacy and defense were not substitutes for one another, 
"Either alone would fail,"^®
In this mood of frustration the President promulgated 
the so-called "Thanksgiving Day Massacre" in which he placed 
into key positions in the State Department personnel whom he 
understood and in whom he had confidence. He told Hilsman 
that he was moving toward a more direct and personal super­
vision of foreign affairs. It is significant at this point 
to recall Dean Rusk's definition of his role as that of judge 
rather than of initiating and defending positions, for Kennedy 
apparently sought security from his frustration in placing 
men in key positions whose views he knew and understood. It 
is also significant to recall that the key positions, espe­
cially after the Bay of Pigs invasion, were to be at the level
49of assistant secretary,
48Ibid, It should be noted that he apparently referred 
here to advice from outside his decision unit*, as its members 
did not proffer such extreme views,
49Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 53,
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Into perhaps the most influential assistant secretary 
position he placed Rostow. This was the position of Assis­
tant Secretary of State for Policy Planning or the Chairman­
ship of the Policy Planning Council.Established in 1947, 
it v;as important for several reasons. One was its location 
within the Office of the Secretary of State. Another lay in 
its si%e, comprising only approximately twelve persons allowed 
an intimacy for rapport and frank discussion. Still another 
reason for its importance was its official functions: it
was to advise the Secretary of State and to engage in long-
range consideration and analysis of policy problems, thus
51giving continuity to policy.
In order to carry out these functions the Policy Plan­
ning Council had to be informed of and coordinate its direc­
tives with, other divisions of the Department. One of the 
most sensitive end important of these divisions was created 
in May 1961. This v/as the Politico-Military Affairs Staff 
headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico- 
Military Affairs(3/PM). Both the PPC and the Politico-Military 
Affairs Staff fell under the supervision of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
Rusk characterized the function of the Political
50'ibid.. 50.
51Burton Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign 
Policy (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966), 112-li.
^^Ibid.. 393.
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Military Affairs Staff in August 1961:
(it is toj assist the supervisory level of the 
State Department in the management and conduct of 
all the Department's relations with the Depart­
ment of Defense, including the Military Establish­
ment. It is intended to provide leadership on 
such matters within the State Department, and 
thereby enable it to fulfill more effectively its 
role of providing timely political guidance to 
other governmental agencies on politico-military matters,53
"The Planning Council continues to be actively engaged in 
politico-military problems as an aspect of its long-term 
planning in the foreign policy field, and its members v/ork 
with G/PM political military officers on the politico- 
military facets of their planning t a s k s T h i s  quote from 
Burton Sapin indicates the influence which the Planning Coun­
cil had in coordinating political policy with military policy. 
Further specification of the influence which Rostow probably 
wielded comes from Sapin's statement that the interdepartmental
group that drafted the United States policy doctrine of coun-
55terinsurgency was chaired by a political-military officer.
As Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning Rostov; 
apparently constituted the connecting link between this group 
and the President,
In assessing the importance of Rostov/'s new position 





precedents and his strong personality to become the primary 
spokesman for the Department of Defense and that Kennedy rec­
ognized the situation as such. Also germane is the fact that 
Kennedy recognized Taylor as his primary expositor for coun­
terinsurgency doctrine. Thus paramount spheres of competence 
in his decision unit for military strategic policy as of Novem­
ber, 1961, were occupied by Rostov;, McNamara and Taylor.
Since these individuals v/ere apparently prepared to accept 
the consequences of an increase in counterin surg ency opera­
tions, the reasons for the movement in that direction become 
obvious.*
Further reduction of Kennedy’s available alternatives 
vis à vis counterinsurgency doctrine on the eve of 1962 is 
evident in the circumstances surrounding his appointment of 
a new commander in Vietnam. Kennedy had the choice of appoint­
ing a younger officer who appreciated the interrelationship 
between the political, social and economic as well as the mili­
tary factors involved there or of choosing one of the older 
officers more steeped in conventional warfare tactics as prac­
ticed in Korea. In appointing General Harkins he chose the 
latter.Still further reduction of Kennedy’s alternatives 
appear in a revelation by General Lannitzer. As Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff he expressed the general consensus
Hilsman, To Move a Nation. 427.
•See "Pentagon Papers," New York Times, particularIv 
Chapter 3. -------------
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of that group's views in April, 1961, that the problem in 
Vietnam was definitely military instead of political. Fur­
thermore he expressed his opinion that even an emphasis on
military counterinsurgency was out of order; he would opt
57for the purely conventional solution.
Besides being surrounded by military oriented per­
sonnel who advocated military solutions, Kennedy occupied 
the untenable position of having civilian personnel in high 
spheres of competence who believed in the importance of the 
political but who failed to push for their alternative. The 
reticence of Rusk has already been discussed. In addition 
McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, never became a serious factor in the delib­
erations over Vietnam during 1961. Also pertinent is the 
fact that Kennedy removed Bowles, the advocate of neutralism,
from his position as Under Secretary of State during the
58Thanksgiving Day Massacre. Within this context Kennedy 
made a major commitment to Vietnam in December which marked 
the final breax between a policy emphasizing military civic 
action to one of counterinsurcency.^^
The next month saw the influence of the military 
axis become even more entrenched. In January of 1962 the
^^Ibid.. 416.
^^Ibid.. 50.
59"Message from the President of the United States to 
the President of Vietnam," December 14, 1961, 1056-57 in Cur­
rent Documents, 1962.
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Special Group Counterinsurgency came into existence. Its 
duties consisted of coordinating all aspects of counterin­
surgency policy including contingency plans of various coun­
tries so that they coincided with the objectives of the 
United States, It also had the responsibility of conducting 
research into plausible doctrines of counterinsurgency. The 
significance of this group in relation to the theme of this 
chapter lies in its composition, especially in its chairman, 
Maxwell T a y l o r , F r o m  this position he could ensure the im­
plementation of his views. Another important member v/as the 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U, Alexis 
Johnson, v/ho in October had proposed to Kennedy that "our
real and ultimate objective in Vietnam should be the defeat
6*1of the Viet Cong," Still another important member v/as
General Lemnitzer, whose views have been mentioned. Also
present on the SGC was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell
Gilpatrick, v/ho on April 27 had recommended "the dropping of
earlier conditions that Diem undertake political and social
62reforms in return" for American military assistance.
Another member was CIA director, John McCone, also a hard­
liner, Besides these hard-line advocates there was one mem­
ber who presumably possessed little influence in counterinsurgency
^^Barber and Ronning, Internal Security. 97,
"Pentagon Papers," New York Times, quoted in The 
Houston Chronicle, July 2, 1971,
G^ibid.
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63policy at that time; as mentioned earlier, McGeorge Bundy.
The final member, Robert Kennedy, merits special 
mention, "His distinctive contribution v/as to fight unremit­
tingly for his brother’s understanding that foreign policy 
v/as not a technical exercise off in a vacuum but the expres­
sion of a nation’s internal policy and purpose."^** Various 
quotes establish him as an advocate of the primacy of the 
political over the military. He stated that he v/as impressed 
by the fact that America could make contact v/ith the youth 
and intellectuals in Asia only as a progressive country:
"I kept asking myself what a conservative could possibly 
say to these people. I can talk all the time about social 
welfare and trade unions and reform; but v/hat could some say 
v/ho didn’t believe in these things?”^^
Although the Kennedy brothers both advocated the 
primacy of the political, apparently the situation within 
which the strategic concept for counterinsurgency emerged 
engulfed them.
63Barber and Ronning, Internal Security. 97, 




This chapter v/ill redefine the problem, restate the 
method utilized to solve it, and present the primary conclu­
sions of the study. Then it v/ill indicate the importance of 
these conclusions to the discipline of International Relationr 
This dissertation has sought to determine why John P. 
Kennedy decided to implement the policy of military civic 
action as a means of preventing insurgency in the underdevel­
oped areas, particularly in Latin America and Southeast Asia. 
It has also sought to determine why in Vietnam the nature of 
that policy chanced to a primary emphasis on the defeat of 
insurgents through counterinsurgency.
To answer these questions the study has utilised the 
methodology formulated by Richard Snyder, H. W. Druck and 
Burton Sapin in an attempt to perceive the then contemporary 
setting from the point of view of the decision unit most 
immediately involved in the decision. Accordingly those fac­
tors v/hich appeared to hold relevance to the members of that 
decision unit have been isolated. In this manner it has 
been shov/n that the frame of reference within v/hich those 
individuals occupying the highest spheres of competence have 
considered these factors has constituted the paramount
194
195
influence on the decision under analysis.
In the external setting the members of the decision 
unit perceived the most relevant factor as a more or less 
monolithic world communist movement menacing the free world. 
Anchored in Moscow this threat extended from Southeast Asia 
through Africa and right into the United States' backyard in 
Latin America.
As Kennedy occupied the presidency, internal factors 
limited his alternatives of response to this external threat. 
Primary among these factors was the beaucratic inertia which 
precedents of more than a decade of utilising variations of 
the containment policy had ordained. Shortly after World 
War II America's leaders had drawn an imaginary line around 
the iron curtain and dared the communists to cross it, and 
the norms of international relations had become accustomed 
to this policy. Continuing this hard-line approach was the 
Eisenhower policy of massive retaliation, which not only al­
lowed the United States to "blast the villain that opposed 
it" but enabled it to do so with a balanced budget.
Therefore as Kennedy entered office economics and 
strategic concept were tv/o internal factors occupying the 
same side of the coin. They, in turn, v/ere connected to a 
third factor. Congress. In order to obtain financial back­
ing for a strategic concept of flexible response v/ith which 
to replace massive retaliation Kennedy needed the support 
of what he termed "that more conservative body." To be able
196
to influence Congress though, the president would have to 
first influence the electorate. But Kennedy’s options vis 
à vis the public were limited by the closeness of his elec­
tion.
To receive the desired support within this internal 
setting, as he perceived it, Kennedy had to govern his actions 
according to its norms of legitimacy. Hence he appealed to 
America's values by building a "reputation for action," He 
would present a picture of perpetual motion toward great 
under-takings in order to mold public support. Some of the 
results of these actions were the Alliance for Progress, the 
Peace Corps and the food for peace program.
Setbacks at the Bay of Pigs, Laos and Vienna caused 
the president to strengthen these efforts toward public 
arousement, as exemplified in the commitment to space and 
the admonition to build bomb shelters. In the process he 
over-played his hand and paradoxically augmented the very 
trends which he condemned: a reactionary public and Congress,
and a belligérant communist bloc.
Within this emotion-charged setting the influence of 
Kennedy's decision unit upon his military policy in the un­
derdeveloped areas becomes important. Although he repeatedly 
stated his affinity for the political aims of military civic 
action, he sought the counsel of advisors who advocated the 
primacy of military means embodied in the policy of counter­
insurgency.
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Although utilization of the Snyder method has led to 
conclusions concerning why the decisions under analysis were 
made, the primary question involved in the test of behavioral 
political theory remains: On the basis of the conclusions
what predictions are in order? In other words what contribu­
tion does the study make to the discipline of international 
relations?
The answer must be sought within the present struc­
ture of international relations. Thu most significant char­
acteristic of that structure is the balance of power between 
the United Stares and the U.S.S.R. in regard to nuclear capa­
bility. Neither nation has sufficient power to prevent its 
adversary from retaliating from a first strike with sufficient 
force to inflict serious damage. This situation has led to 
an emphasis upon conventional limited war as a more sane al­
ternative. However there is still the ever-present .danger 
that this type of war will escalate into a nuclear holocaust. 
Besides, as with nuclear parity, both countries also possess 
a near equal capability to fight this type of war. The re­
sultant nuclear and conventional stand-off has set the stage 
for the proliferation of "wars of liberation." As Kennedy 
noted, these wars do not transpire across national boundaries. 
Rather subversion of the legal government occurs from within. 
This technique has enabled the enemies of the West to out- 
maneuver it. Not only are the West's nuclear and conventional 
weapons unable to cope with "wars of liberation," but
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cnti-communist alliances are incapable of containing an enemy 
that operates from within a nation.
The setting which will face the members of the United 
States decision unit on military policy for the indefinite 
future then is characterized by the primacy of the threat of 
guerrilla war. Consequently the major contribution of this 
study to the discipline of international relations is to pre­
sent some guidelines on hovi to meet that threat.
A review of the data leads to the conclusion that 
the decision unit must above all recognize the political na­
ture of the threat. Within this context it should examine 
three factors in its domestic setting which have caused the 
United States to underestimate this aspect of the problem 
in order to project the proper goals and means to cope with 
it. The examination would show that geopolitics has been 
instrumental in determining the characteristics of the United 
States foreign policy. A position between two oceans far 
away from potential aggressors has enabled the United States 
to become the dominant power in its neighborhood. The de­
cision unit would also find the time period in which it be­
came an important nation to be relevant. The nineteenth cen­
tury which witnessed the rise to maturity of the United States 
also witnessed the dominance of Europe first by England and 
then by Germany. Under the hegemony of these nations Europe 
remained locked in a balance of power from which it could 
not extricate itself without major conflict. Hence America
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remained isolated and secure. The third factor that the de­
cision unit should consider is the method by which the United 
States developed its political traits. Claiming to speak for 
a world of which it comprised a "melting pot" the United 
States came to believe its policies reflected the composite 
good of that world.
The examination of these three facets of the past sug­
gests several conclusions in relation to today's situation.
One is the reason for the United States culture trait of com­
plete separation between the military euad politics. Tradi­
tionally the United States has felt little need to maintain 
a large standing army, and has tended to view with disdain 
those European nations that do. On the other hand proximity 
between European nations has necessitated large armies in 
constant readiness to defend or expand their country's fron­
tiers. This has caused them to synchronize political and 
military goals. The decision unit should recognize that tech­
nology has now created a similar proximity between the United 
States and its enemies and initiate steps toward diminishing 
the dichotomy between military and political goals end means. 
This is especially imperative in view of the ubiquitousness 
of military personnel occupying high spheres of competence 
in political decision units.
Another conclusion which may be reached from the sur­
vey of America's past is the basis for the "football stadium 
psychology" which Kennedy perceived as prevalent in American
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diplomacy. Maxwell Taylor commented on the same phenomenon 
when he blamed the adherents of massive retaliation for ex­
hibiting the "frontier mentality." The reason behind this 
trait is that Americans were able to journey uninhibited 
across a vast continent. Since, in their opinion, they rep­
resented the best traits of all the world they could with im­
punity strike dovm any villain who dared oppose them and 
then move on to the next one. As each obstacle appeared the 
main thing was to overcome it immediately and with a ven­
geance. This suggests the reasons for the American penchant 
for "holy wars" and for the impatience with which they view 
conflict of any sort. From football games to war the same 
principle applies, fight to win without regard to political 
consequences, then immediately disengage. In relation to 
meeting the threat of wars of liberation this presents the 
need to inculcate patience, not only in the military but in 
society as well. The alternative is to play into the hands 
1 the advocates of Mao's principle to trade space for time 
in order to destroy will power.
Another conclusion which the examination of the do­
mestic setting indicates concerns the issue of the public's 
right to know versus secrecy in government. Having pragma­
tically formed a government which they felt reflected the 
world culture, ,Americans fell heir to the prevailing trends 
of that culture, "estern norms were progressively favoring 
the dissemination of political rights and hence information
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to more people. Concurrent to these trends was the paradoxi­
cal situation which existed at the source of that culture in 
Europe: the Europeans proximity to their neighbors necessi­
tated closer political and military coordination and, concomi­
tantly engendered the necessity for governmental secrecy. If 
these facts are correlated with the tactic of the political 
vanguard of communist guerrillas to engineer the political- 
military situation in such a manner as to keep the enemy off 
balance, the conclusion arises that in order for the United 
states government to counter this tactic it must maintain a 
balance between governmental secrecy and the peoples right to 
know. The important consideration is to educate the people 
to the necessity for a certain amount of secrecy.
Connected to the historical necessity to adher to the 
demands of the people is another lesson concerning the threat 
of wars of liberation. The communists claim to occupy the 
forefront of the developing world norm of equality as shovm 
by their emphasis on individual military discipline. There­
fore the procedure with which the United States soldier is 
indoctrinated as to political goals must be geared to recog­
nize his worth as a person, emphasizing his right to assimi­
late political views according to his own conscience. Mao 
warned that an army based on negative discipline from above 
is feudalistic and he believes that he has the time, patience 
and manpower to prove it.
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